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CITIZENSHIP, DIVERSITY AND EDUCATION: 
An egalitarian pluralist approach 
Mitja Sardoj 
ABSTRACT 
The terms of debate over the civic purposes of public education in a plurally diverse polity have 
been centred on the educational significance of engagement with forms of diversity that are 
both plural and heterogeneous. Central to these discussions have been various challenges, 
problems and difficulties related to the status, scope and justification of a citizenship education 
that would educate students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity that is plural in its cultures, values and traditions. Yet, existing conceptions 
of citizenship education, I argue, both misrepresent our commitment to civic equality and also 
fail to treat with equal civic respect the normative significance of individuals' diverse 
commitments and allegiances. 
This thesis explores how and why a defensible conception of the civic purposes of public 
education is to be squared with the fair terms of engagement with diversity and how an 
alternative way of articulating the civic priorities and the individual interests in educating 
citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity is to be justified. I maintain that the 
challenges, problems and difficulties linked to the education of citizens so as to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity depend in large part on how we 
define and connect the two principled commitments associated with the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship. 
In this thesis I outline and defend an egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education that 
offers a distinctive response to the theoretical problems and practical difficulties in educating 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. I 
articulate a conception of the fair terms of engagement with diversity that would be of the 
greatest benefit to those students that are the least advantaged. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CITIZENSHIP, DIVERSITY AND EDUCATION: 
REFRAMING THE DEBATE 
I. 	 The nature of the problem 
For over two decades now, the terms of debate over the civic purposes of public education in a 
plurally diverse polity have been centred around the justification of the civic priorities and the 
individual interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity that is 
marked by a range of separate challenges including 'democratic deficit', the 'fact of pluralism' 
and the 'circumstances of multiculturalism'. As Amy Gutmann rightly emphasizes, many 
contemporary discussions about public schooling, 'turn on the clash of two apparently 
competing educational aims: securing civic values and respecting cultural differences' 
(Gutmann, 1996: 156). In particular, discussions over the status, scope and justification of 
citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity have been largely confined around the 
questions over the educational significance of engagement with forms of diversity that are 
plural and heterogeneous. In fact, diversity, writes Stephen Macedo, is the 'original problem of 
modern politics' (Macedo, 2000: 28). 
Engagement with diversity has become the centrepiece of any educational agenda of 
citizenship in a polity that is plural in its cultures, values and traditions. As Eamonn Callan 
eloquently emphasizes, central to the discussions over the civic purposes of public education in 
a plurally diverse polity have been various challenges, problems and difficulties of conceiving 
`the ends and means of civic education in a way that does not wrongly impair diversity' (Callan, 
1997: 12). The landmark US Supreme Court cases of Wisconsin v. Yoder case and Mozert v. 
Hawkins (Burn, 1994; Stolzenberg; 1993; Galston, 1995, 2002a; Gutmann, 1995; Macedo, 
1995b, 2000; Reich, 2002), the case of the Islamic veil [L ' ff aire du foulard] (e.g. Laborde, 
2008; Galeotti, 2002 [ch. 4]; McKinnon, 2006 [ch. 7]) together with other controversies have 
long divided scholars and policy makers engaged in normative discussions over the status, 
scope and justification of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. At the 
same time, the publication of the Ajegbo Report (DfES, 2007) together with various other 
activities and initiatives introduced the discussion over engagement with diversity as an 
integral part of the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. 
The debates over the status, scope and justification of educating citizens as fully 
cooperating members of a polity and over the educational significance of engagement with 
diversity have taken place across a range of academic disciplines including political philosophy 
(Ben-Porath, 2006; Galston, 1995, 2002a; Gutmann, 1995, 1999; Kymlicka, 1999; 2000; M. 
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Levinson, 1999b; MacMullen, 2007; Macedo, 2000; Reich, 2002; Rawls, 1993; Rosenblum, 
2000; Tamir, 1993; Tomasi, 2001), political theory (Crick, 2000; Miller, 2000; Spinner-Haley, 
1994), philosophy of education (Archard, 1999; 2003; Brighouse, 2000; Callan, 1997; Clayton, 
2006; Costa, 2011; Enslin & White, 2002; Feinberg, 1998; Hand & Pearce, 2009; Haydon, 
2003; 2006a; McLaughlin, 1992; 1995; 2000; 2003; Tooley, 2000), education policy and 
curriculum studies (Lockyer, Crick and Annette, 2003), sociology of education (Arnot & 
Dillabough, 2000; Beck, 1998; Hahn, 1998; Ichilov, 1998; Parker, 2003) and other disciplines 
within the broader field of the social sciences and education (Banks, 2004; Cogan & Derricot, 
1998; Kiwan, 2007; Starkey & Osler, 2005; etc.). 
An interesting trend is observable in these discussions. On the one hand, there has been 
little disagreement over the centrality of citizenship as 'a political conception of the person' 
(Rawls, 1993: Lecture I [§ 5]) and the role of public education in the project of educating citizens 
as fully cooperating members of a polity. In fact, 'the nature of citizenship and the education 
suited to its realization', writes Eamonn Callan, 'have traditionally figured among the basic 
questions of normative political theory' (Callan, 2004: 71). As Meira Levinson points out, 
[c]ivic education is crucial in a liberal state, I suggest, because no matter what institutions and 
freedoms are built into the basic structure and constitution of the state, their realization will always 
depend on the character and commitments of its citizens [...]. (M. Levinson, 1999b: 101-102) 
As has been rightly emphasised by scholars as diverse as those who identify themselves as 
liberals, civic republicans, social conservatives and multiculturalists, the stability and the civic 
unity of a plurally diverse polity does not depend exclusively on the justice of its basic 
institutional framework and the fair distribution of entitlements associated with free and equal 
membership in a polity but also on the virtues, dispositions and active engagement of its 
citizens in the shared public space and in the associative network of civil society (Berkowitz, 
1999; Dagger, 1997; Galston, 1991; Macedo, 1990; White, 1996). Creating virtuous citizens, 
Callan points out, 'is as necessary an undertaking in a liberal democracy as it is under any other 
constitution' (Callan, 1997: 3). In fact, without citizens who are equipped with civic virtues 
and other dispositions, writes William A. Galston, 'the ability of liberal societies to function 
successfully progressively diminishes' (Galston, 1991: 220). At the same time, discussions 
over engagement with diversity and its centrality in the project of educating citizens as fully 
cooperating members of a polity goes basically undisputed. 
On the other hand, despite the convergence of opinion on the integrative function of 
citizenship as a political conception of the person and the centrality of public education in 
educating students as fully cooperating members of a polity, citizenship education remains a 
strategic battleground between advocates of divergent traditions of political thought as well as 
between scholars sharing the same normative outlook. For example, as John Tomasi, emphasizes, 
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[...] civic education has proven one of the most hotly contested terrains on which proponents of 
political liberalism have sought to differentiate their view from the various forms of ethical or 
comprehensive liberalism they seek to displace. (Tomasi, 2002: 196) 
In particular, a number of divergent objections against various elements associated with the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its educational agenda of 
citizenship arise. First, social conservative and civic republican critics of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship argue that its principled commitment to equal civic respect for 
diversity fails to consider the importance of civic unity and the various obligations associated 
with membership in a political community [the cultural fragmentation objection]. They 
furthermore maintain, that the toleration-based approach to diversity fails to generate the 
convergence with common principles and shared public values necessary for the stability of a 
plurally diverse polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework [the civic 
erosion objection]. In contrast, the multiculturalist critique of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality critically argues that the 'uniform treatment 
approach' (Song, 2007) associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship fails to acknowledge the asymmetry between different groups and communities in a 
plurally diverse polity [the disproportionate disadvantage objection] and the lack of 
coextensiveness between inclusion and justice [the justice-based objection]. Critics of the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship identified above criticise its two 
principled commitments as either too permissive and inefficient on the one hand or too 
divisive, unfairly discriminatory and oppressive on the other. 
While each of these criticisms and the associated objections against the integrative 
character of our commitment to civic equality and equal civic respect for diversity rightly 
diagnose the foundational challenges and difficulties any educational agenda of citizenship in a 
plurally diverse polity is faced with, the different theoretical positions explicated above fail to 
grasp the complexity of the problem at hand. The relationship between the two commitments 
that define the very essence of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
raises a number of theoretical questions over the status, scope and justification of educating 
citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. Likewise, discussions over the status, scope 
and justification of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity remain divided over our 
commitment to civic equality and over the educational significance of engagement with forms 
of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous. Four separate questions need to be distinguished 
here, i.e.: [I] What are the principled bases of any educational agenda of citizenship in 
educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity? [2] What aims, means and 
expected outcomes of citizenship education arise out of our two principled commitments to 
civic equality and equal civic respect for diversity? [3] How are different interpretations of the 
educational significance of engagement with diversity included into a conception of citizenship 
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education that aims to educate students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and 
equal member of a polity? [4] How should various issues associated with fairness be part of a 
conception of engagement with diversity that aims to be of the greatest benefit to those 
students that are the least advantaged? 
The research questions posed above indicate that existing conceptions of citizenship 
education fail to consider a number of separate theoretical problems associated with the 
justification of the centrality of educating students so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity in the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity. At the same time, existing accounts of citizenship education leave largely 
unspecified various theoretical problems and contextual issues associated with the distributive-
specification and the agent-relative specification of engagement with diversity. In fact, as 
Penny Enslin emphasises correctly, 'a long-standing criticism of liberal political theory and its 
attendant conception of education is that they have tended to underestimate the significance 
and worth of diversity' (Enslin, 2003a: 73). This is a significant omission, given the fact that 
engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous is among the crucial 
aims of any educational agenda of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity. In particular, I 
maintain, existing conceptions of citizenship education are based on implausible assumptions 
about the normative significance of individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances, 
incorporate a reductionist understanding of the educational significance of engagement with 
diversity, and ignore a range of separate considerations about the justification of civic priorities 
and individual interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. Existing 
conceptions of citizenship education therefore fail to grasp the complexity of the project of 
educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a 
polity. In particular, they offer only inconclusive arguments for three foundational questions 
linked to engagement with diversity as part of the project of educating citizens as fully 
cooperating members of a polity, i.e. [i] why is engagement with diversity an indispensable part 
of any educational agenda of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity; [ii] what justification is 
offered for inclusion of and engagement with diversity in the institutional arrangement and 
curriculum design of public education; and [iii] how should engagement with forms of 
diversity that are plural and heterogeneous be carried out in a non-ideal educational 
environment characterized by differing degrees of richness, evenness and distance [using these 
terms in a sense that will be explained later]? 
It is this manyfold failure of existing conceptions of citizenship education that 
introduces the need for an alternative educational agenda of citizenship. In particular, the 
limited success of existing conceptions of citizenship education in adequately addressing the 
theoretical problems and practical difficulties that arise out of the engagement with diversity in 
the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity, I maintain, calls for 
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an educational agenda of citizenship that is sensitive primarily to the fair terms of engagement 
with diversity. 
To summarise: this thesis explores how and why a defensible conception of the civic 
purposes of public education is to be squared with the fair terms of engagement with diversity 
and how an alternative way of articulating the civic priorities and the individual interests in 
educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity is to be justified. I maintain that the 
challenges, problems and difficulties linked to engagement with diversity and its educational 
significance depend in large part on how we define and connect the two principled 
commitments associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. 
In this thesis I outline and defend an alternative educational agenda of citizenship that offers a 
distinctive response to the theoretical problems and practical difficulties that arise out of the 
project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect each other as free and equal 
members of a polity. I articulate an account of citizenship education that advances a conception 
of the fair terms of engagement with diversity that would be of the greatest benefit to those 
students that are the least advantaged. 
13 
II. 	 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis consists of three parts, each engaging from a particular perspective with the problems, 
challenges and difficulties associated with the justification of the centrality of educating 
students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity in the 
project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. The first part of the 
thesis [including Chapter 1 and Chapter 2] aims to provide both a clarification and a defence of 
the foundations, nature and the value of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its twofold principled commitment to civic equality and equal civic respect for 
diversity. The second part of the thesis [including Chapter 3 and Chapter 4] elaborates in detail 
the status, scope and justification of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity as well as 
the various controversies over the educational significance of engagement with forms of 
diversity that are plural and heterogeneous. In part III of the thesis [including Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6], I outline and defend the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education as 
well as applying this alternative educational agenda of citizenship to the non-ideal 
circumstances of everyday pedagogical practice. In particular, I delineate the institutional and 
the individual dimension of the fair terms of engagement with diversity that characterise the 
alternative account of citizenship education as well as advance a distinctive set of capacities we 
should cultivate in students in order to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity. 
I start in Chapter 1 with the examination of foundational dimensions of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship as a shared political status associated with free and equal membership 
in a polity. I first identify the basic elements of the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship. I take as the starting point the classical liberal conception of 
citizenship as advanced by T.H. Marshall in his essay Citizenship and Social Class (Marshall, 
1992 [1950]). I proceed then with the critical examination of the traditional and the modern 
critique of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and the elucidation 
of their objections directed against the various elements of this conception of citizenship and its 
commitment to civic equality. In particular, I elaborate in detail the multiculturalist objections 
against civic equality and the 'uniform treatment approach' that is part of the liberal version of 
the rights-based conception of citizenship. I examine the two multicultural models of citizenship 
as advanced by Will Kymlicka and Iris Marion Young. At the same time, I examine the 
feminist and the liberal egalitarian objections against the different elements of the multicultural 
critique of the rights-based conception of citizenship raised by Susan Moller Okin (1999), 
Brian Barry (2001) etc. I conclude Chapter 1 with a delineation of the requirement of 
difference-sensitivity that is consistent with the liberal version of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship and its principled commitment to civic equality. 
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Chapter 2 examines in detail the toleration-based approach to diversity as both 
historically and conceptually, toleration is one of the foundational characteristics that defines 
the very essence of a plurally diverse polity and the basic virtue associated with a liberal 
conception of citizenship. I identify the conditions and the circumstances of the toleration-
based approach to diversity and also critically evaluate the principal arguments associated with 
the justification of toleration in a plurally diverse polity. I then present the moral and the 
conceptual objections against the toleration-based approach to diversity advanced by civic 
republican, social conservative and the multiculturalist critiques. While both civic republicans 
and social conservatives advance the criticism that toleration of diversity fails to develop in 
students the basic civic virtues and public responsibility to maintain the basic institutional 
framework and the shared public values that provide us with the 'conditions of liberty', 
multicultural scholars maintain that a toleration-based approach to diversity is insufficiently 
inclusive in its recognition and accommodation of diversity. On this interpretation, a toleration-
based approach to diversity does not give equal weight to the different values, beliefs and 
conceptions of the good present in a plurally diverse polity. I present the competing notions of 
mutual respect and recognition advanced by Amy Gutmann (1995) and Charles Taylor (1997) 
as more appropriate models of engagement with diversity and proceed then with a critical 
examination of the tensions between toleration, mutual respect and recognition and the limits 
each of the three models of engagement with diversity is faced with. 
Part II of the thesis starts with Chapter 3. Building on the theoretical examination of the 
foundations, nature and requirements of the rights-based conception of citizenship together 
with the status, the justification and the value of the toleration-based approach to diversity, 
Chapter 3 critically engages with the various problems and challenges associated with the 
status, scope and justification of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity. I take up the 
central contrasts dividing two distinct conceptions of citizenship education, that of autonomy-
based citizenship education as advocated by Eamonn Callan (1997), Amy Gutmann (1995, 
1996, 1999), Meira Levinson (1999b), Stephen Macedo (1995a, 1995b, 2000), Rob Reich 
(2002), John Tomasi (2001) and that of toleration-based citizenship education advanced by 
William Galston (1991, 1995, 2002a; 2006), Francis Schrag (1998), Nancy Rosenblum (1998, 
2000) and Chandran Kukathas (2003). I critically evaluate the internal coherence of their basic 
civic aims and their consistency with the two principled commitments associated with the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. Crucially, however, both accounts 
of citizenship education fail to a large extent to grasp the moral significance of individuals' 
diverse commitments and allegiances and therefore to address adequately those commitments 
and allegiances in the institutional arrangement and curriculum design of public education. In 
particular, the competing normative justifications of the civic priorities and the individual 
interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity advocated by these two 
accounts of citizenship education have given an inadequate level of attention to both the 
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distributive and the agent-relative specification of engagement with diversity. On the one hand, 
I maintain, the autonomy-based account of citizenship education leaves us without a legitimate 
justification for the development and cultivation of a set of basic civic virtues and shared 
public values that is consistent with the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. On the other hand, I argue, the 
toleration-based account of citizenship education fails to build a set of shared principles about 
how we are supposed to ensure that the institutional arrangement of public education and its 
curriculum design will accommodate diversity into the plurally diverse polity. This lack of 
consideration over the restrictions the basic institutional framework employs in the justification 
of the civic priorities and the individual interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity, I argue, is inconsistent with the project of educating citizens so as to 
recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
Chapter 4 takes up the issue of engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and 
heterogeneous and the various educational problems we are likely to encounter while including 
diversity in classrooms and other educational settings. I provide a tentative answer to the three 
foundational questions linked to engagement with diversity in the project of educating citizens 
as fully cooperating members of a polity: [i] what are the basic dimensions of diversity; [ii] 
what is the educational significance of engagement with diversity and what are the different 
functions of including diversity in the non-ideal cirumstances of any educational environment; 
and [iii] what are the capacities for engagement with diversity that need to be developed in 
students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. I 
maintain that the educational significance of engagement with forms of diversity that are plural 
and heterogeneous is much more complex than existing conceptions of citizenship education 
have been able to recognise. I then differentiate between two levels of exposure to diversity in 
the educational environment of public education, i.e. the institutional level [inclusion of 
diversity] and the individual level [engagement with diversity]. Based on the explication of the 
different dimensions and levels of encountering diversity in the non-ideal cirumstances of any 
educational environment I proceed with an examination of the basic functions inclusion of and 
engagement with diversity in education perform. I maintain that existing accounts of 
citizenship education are insensitive to the pluralism of diversity I identify at the outset of this 
chapter as well as failing to take into account the different functions inclusion of and 
engagement with diversity perform in non-ideal cirumstances of any educational environment. 
I first identify the basic functions of engagement with diversity and then continue with a critical 
examination of the capacities for engagement with diversity advocated by contemporary 
accounts of citizenship education examined earlier in Chapter 3, i.e. [i] critical engagement; [ii] 
reflective detachment; and [iii] imaginative engagement. In the concluding section of this 
chapter I identify three possible shortcomings existing accounts of citizenship education and 
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their conceptions of engagement with diversity are faced with, i.e. [i] the civic shortcomings; 
[ii] the moral shortcomings; and [iii] the epistemic shortcomings. 
Part III of the thesis outlines and defends an egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship 
education that offers a distinctive response to the theoretical problems and practical difficulties 
that arise out of the engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous in 
the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. An account of 
citizenship education that claims to be both egalitarian and pluralist at the same time is faced 
with two distinct difficulties. At the theoretical level, the project of educating citizens as fully 
cooperating members of a polity depends in large part on how we define and connect the two 
principled commitments associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship. At the practical level, any educational agenda of citizenship that aims to educate 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity needs 
to specify the fair terms of engagement with diversity in the non-ideal circumstances of 
everyday pedagogical practice. I first explain how and why to advance a position that would be 
both egalitarian and pluralist at the same time: how a conception of citizenship education that 
claims to educate students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity could square its egalitarian commitment to civic equality with its pluralist 
commitment to equal civic respect for diversity. I elaborate in the next section some of the 
principal background conditions that an egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education 
must satisfy in order to be consistent with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and then identify the basic principles of this alternative conception of citizenship 
education. I then delineate two distinctive elements of the egalitarian pluralist account of 
citizenship education, i.e. [i] the distributive specification of engagement with diversity; and 
[ii] the agent-relative specification of engagement with diversity. Furthermore, I specify how 
we are to understand the basic idea of the fair treatment of engagement with diversity that is 
associated with the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I defend in this thesis. In the 
final section of this chapter I advance a modified version of the educational ideal of openness 
to diversity and its strategy of optimisation. 
Chapter 6 applies the normative framework of the egalitarian pluralist account of 
citizenship education and its conception of the fair terms of engagement with diversity to the 
non-ideal circumstances of everyday pedagogical practice. Building on the basic features of the 
alternative account of citizenship education outlined in the previous chapter of the thesis, I 
advance a conception of civic integrity that is consistent with the pluralist understanding of the 
educational ideal of openness to diversity. I then examine the key features of civic integrity as 
well as the conditions for the exercise of an integrity-respecting conception of toleration in a 
non-ideal educational environment. I maintain that the development of an integrity-respecting 
conception of toleration gives citizens with diverse and heterogeneous conceptions of the good 
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an equal protection of their basic interest in being recognised and respected as free and equal 
members of a polity. 
The conclusion summarises the main features associated with the alternative educational 
agenda of citizenship I advance in this thesis. This account of citizenship education, I argue, 
should enable the provision of an educational environment that educates citizens so as to 
recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. In particular, the 
strength and plausibility of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education stem from 
its articulation of the fair terms of engagement with diversity in a way as to be of the greatest 
benefit to those students that are the least advantaged. I defend the view that this alternative 
conception of citizenship education takes the engagement with forms of diversity that are 
plural and heterogeneous beyond the instrumental characterisation of engagement with diversity 
that characterizes existing accounts of citizenship education. Furthermore, I present a threefold 
justification [theoretical, policy and practical] of the central place engagement with diversity 
should play in any educational agenda of citizenship that claims to educate students so as to 
recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. Moreover, I anticipate 
some of the possible objections to the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education and 
the difficulties it is likely to encounter in the non-ideal circumstances of everyday pedagogical 
practice. In the concluding section of the thesis, I outline the different possibilities this 
alternative account of citizenship education presents for the education of citizens as fully 
cooperating members of a polity. 
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PART I 
CIVIC EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY 
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CHAPTER 1 
CITIZENSHIP IN A PLURALLY DIVERSE POLITY: 
TENSIONS, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 
The difficulty in conceptualizing citizenship as a political conception of the person originates 
from its complexity as any of its existing conceptions entail several distinct and interrelated 
meanings. Either as a shared status of membership in a political community, a political identity 
or a normative ideal of a 'good' citizen as a fully cooperating member of a polity', citizenship 
as free and equal membership in a polity is associated with a number of tensions, problems and 
challenges that are both complex and controversial. As the existing literature examining the 
foundations, nature and value of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity amply demonstrates 
(Beiner, 1995; Bellamy, 2008; Callan, 1997; Kymlicka & Norman, 1995; Macedo, 2000; 
Miller, 2000; Rosenblum, 2000; Shklar, 1989; Spinner-Haley, 1994; Tamir, 1995; Tomasi, 
2001; Young, 1990), some of the most important issues associated with a rights-based 
conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality remain contested thus making 
any conception of citizenship open to different interpretations. To illustrate: while equal basic 
rights define the very essence of any modern conception of citizenship, the traditional and the 
contemporary criticism of the rights-based conception of citizenship question both the justice 
and the overall effectiveness of equal basic liberties as the foundation of civic equality. A 
number of objections have been articulated, each claiming that this conception of citizenship is 
either too permissive and inefficient on the one hand or too divisive, unfairly discriminatory 
and oppressive on the other. Furthermore, a set of theoretical objections, political conflicts and 
practical controversies that arise out of the tension between the two principled commitments 
associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship challenge both 
the integrative and the redistributive function of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity. 
In order to tackle both the complexity and the controversiality of citizenship as a 
political conception of the person as well as the tensions, problems and challenges associated 
with the basic normative commitment to civic equality, this introductory chapter of the thesis 
has a twofold aim. First, it aims to examine the foundations, nature and value of the rights-
based conception of citizenship and to clarify the various tensions, problems and challenges 
this conception of citizenship is faced with. Drawing on the extensive literature from a range of 
academic disciplines, it aims in particular at the critical evaluation of various discussions 
relating to citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity, as the culturally diverse 
character of contemporary pluralist societies challenges our commitment to civic equality. 
Second, it aims to examine the most important criticisms against the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality arising from the recent discussions on the 
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inadequacy of the theory, policy and practice of citizenship as a political conception of the 
person. 
This chapter of the thesis consists of five sections. I start in Section I with a number of 
preliminary considerations associated with citizenship in a plurally diverse polity and proceed 
then in Section II with the explication of the rights-based conception of citizenship as a shared 
political status associated with free and equal membership in a political community. I identify 
here the foundational dimensions of citizenship and examine in detail the basic elements of a 
rights-based conception of citizenship. I then focus in Section III, on a number of objections to 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. I proceed with the presentation 
of the traditional and the contemporary criticism of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
as each of the two critiques focus on different aspects of the foundational features of 
citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity. In particular, I critically evaluate the two 
models of multicultural citizenship that have been advanced as a critique of the liberal version 
of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality. Next, I 
examine in Section IV a number of different criticisms of multiculturalism and its models of 
differentiated citizenship. I identify here a number of paradoxical issues raised by a multicultural 
conception of citizenship and its alternative understanding of civic equality including the 
paradox of multicultural vulnerability and the paradox of multicultural diversity that point 
towards the largely unexamined effects of the politics of multiculturalism on both cultural 
diversity and civic equality. In the concluding section of this chapter I delineate the requirement 
of difference-sensitivity that is consistent with the liberal version of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality. 
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I. 	 Citizenship and civic equality: an outline 
`There is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, and none more variable in history 
or contested in theory.' (Shklar, 1989: 1) This opening sentence of Judith Shklar's Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values entitled American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion encapsulates 
best in all its breadth and detail the variegated philosophical, conceptual and political issues 
that characterise contemporary discussions on citizenship and citizenship education in terms of 
theory, research, policy and practice. Discussions over the foundations, nature and value of 
citizenship as a political conception of the person, the principled commitments of a rights-
based conception of citizenship together with the discussions over the civic purposes of public 
education and the controversies over the status, scope and justification of citizenship education 
in a plurally diverse polity persist as one of the most complex and controversial philosophical, 
political and educational challenges. As T.H. McLaughlin aptly observes: 
1i1t is the absence of agreement about these 'public virtues' and the common good, which gives 
rise to the various disputes about 'citizenship' and 'education for citizenship' which have been 
alluded to. (McLaughlin, 1992: 47) 
A further crucial aspect associated with our commitment to civic equality and equal civic 
respect for diversity concerns the permissible means available to public education in the 
promotion of common principles and shared public values and the reproduction of our common 
institutions, given the diverse and competing commitments and loyalties of its citizens. This 
tension between the obligations of citizenship and the claims for toleration, respect and 
recognition of diversity raises a number of theoretical questions over the justification of public 
education in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity and over the 
legitimacy of cultivating shared public values, dispositions, capacities and basic civic virtues in 
public schools and other public institutions. Not surprisingly, as Stephen Macedo notes, 
[p]ublic schooling has been and remains a source of some of the deepest moral conflicts that 
our polity has witnessed' (Macedo, 2000: 229). At the heart of these theoretical, political and 
practical disputes lie a number of conflicts and divergent tensions determining citizenship as 
free and equal membership in a polity, as a shared civic identity and as a normative ideal of a 
fully cooperating member of a polity. 
At the empirical level, a number of social and political changes have occurred during 
the last two decades that influenced the development of discussions over the foundations, nature 
and value of citizenship as well as discussions on the status, scope and justification of 
citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity. On the one hand, the collapse of communism 
and socialism and other undemocratic forms of government around the globe together with the 
end of Apartheid in South Africa have had an inspiring influence on the positive overall impact 
of democratization and the spread of the culture of human rights in formerly oppressive and 
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undemocratic regimes (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2002). On the other hand, the rise of religious 
fundamentalism and xenophobic nationalism in different regions of the world (e.g. the conflict 
in the former Yugoslavia and in parts of the former Soviet Union) together with a decline in 
social, civic and associational life in well-established liberal and democratic states (Macedo, 
2005; Putnam, 2000) have had a negative effect on the stability of our plurally diverse societies 
(Levy, 2000). As Anthony Giddens observes, 
Democracy is spreading around the world [...] yet in the mature democracies, which the rest of 
the world is supposed to be copying, there is widespread disillusionment with democratic 
processes. In most Western countries, levels of trust in politicians have dropped over the past 
years. Fewer people turn out to vote than used to, particularly in the U.S. More and more people 
say that they are uninterested in parliamentary politics, especially among the younger generation. 
Why are citizens in democratic countries apparently becoming disillusioned with democratic 
government, at the same time as it is spreading round the rest of the world? (Giddens, 2000: 90) 
Furthermore, there has been serious concern among politicians and policy makers over the 
overall distrust among citizens in the institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity, the 
increasing 'democratic deficit' of liberal and democratic societies and the resulting criticism 
that the rights-based conception of citizenship may lack the resources with which to respond 
adequately to the challenges of pluralism and diversity. Claims of ethnocultural minorities, 
religious groups and other social groups over the accommodation of their claims for the 
preservation of their cultures, values or practices pointed out that a plurally diverse polity and 
its basic institutional framework might be at best prejudiced against their traditional way of life 
or oppressive and discriminatory towards their ethical environment (Kymlicka, 1995; Spinner-
Haley, 2000, Swaine, 2006). In particular, the persistence of conflicts between nation-states 
nationalism and minority nationalism in several Western democracies (e.g. Basques and 
Catalans in Spain, Quebecois in Canada, the Flemish community in Belgium, etc.) clearly 
exemplifies that the very character of a plurally diverse polity is far from settled and that the 
challenges our societies face are much more complex and controversial than we take as granted 
(Kymlicka and Straehle, 1999). Moreover, tensions in several countries between different 
groups divided by race, ethnicity or religion clearly exemplify that the persisting conflicts both 
between as well as within these groups are generating problems in so called 'divided societies', 
such as Northern Ireland, Croatia, Israel, South Africa and Korea which have difficulties in 
creating as well as maintaining civic unity and social cohesion (Enslin, 2003b).3 These social 
and political changes have raised both policy controversies as well as practical problems and 
challenges to the liberal ideal of citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity upon 
which the rights-based conception of citizenship is based. From the practical side, then, we 
have to confront a number of distinct challenges including the 'paradox of democracy' 
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(Giddens, 2000; Mouffe, 2000; Talisse, 2005), the 'fact of pluralism' (Rawls, 1993) and the 
`fact of multiculturalism' (Archard, 2003). 
At the theoretical level, various issues stemming from the obligations of citizenship and 
its twofold normative commitment to civic equality and equal civic respect of diversity arose 
out of the discussions over the justice of a liberal society (Rawls, 1971) and over the 
maintenance of its basic institutional framework in a plurally diverse polity on the one hand 
and out of the discussion over the status of the self (Sandel, 1982) and the community 
(Maclntyre, 1981; Taylor, 1989; Walzer, 1983) on the other. Citizenship, writes Will 
Kymlicka, 'is intimately linked to liberal ideas of individual rights and entitlements on the one 
hand, and to communitarian ideas of membership in and attachment to a particular community 
on the other' (Kymlicka, 2002: 284). While the communitarian critique of liberalism 
contributed significantly to the recasting of the basic position of modern liberalism itself 
(Rawls, 1993), it was the next stage of the criticism evolving from the communitarian critique, 
involving the multiculturalist critique of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality that put questions over citizenship as free and 
equal membership in a polity at the centre stage of contemporary theoretical discussions.4 
This was stimulated by a number of controversies over the nature of citizenship as a 
political conception of the person and the alleged failure of equal basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms to treat all members of a political community irrespective of any differentiating 
characteristic with equal civic respect. For example, freedom of expression and respect for 
diversity have raised a divergent set of challenges at the theoretical, policy and political level, 
such as the Satanic Verses controversy, controversies over the wearing of the hijab5 in schools 
or the recent 'cartoon controversy', i.e. the publication of drawings of the Prophet Mohammad 
in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.6 At the same time, freedom of association and 
freedom of expression have also been criticised as insufficiently inclusive for treating minority 
groups with equal respect (Kymlicka, 1995; Kukathas, 2003). 
The problems and challenges identified above exemplify clearly that the common 
principles and shared public values of a plurally diverse polity are far from uncontroversial or 
far from being settled at either the empirical or the theoretical level. In order to articulate an 
alternative version of the civic purposes of public education that would be consistent with the 
two principled commitments associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship we have first to identify the foundational elements of a rights-based conception 
of citizenship. This is the task of the next section of this chapter. 
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IL 	 Foundations of a rights-based conception of citizenship 
Citizenship as a political conception of the person is both complex and controversial as holding 
the status of citizenship includes a number of distinct and interrelated meanings, i.e. sharing a 
common status defined by civic equality, enjoying a specified set of basic rights and 
fundamental liberties.' In this sense, citizenship consists of two foundational dimensions, i.e. [i] 
the vertical dimension; and [ii] the horizontal dimension. The first dimension refers to 
citizenship as a status that determines the political relationship between a member of a polity 
and the political community. Citizenship, Kymlicka emphasises, 'refers to membership in a 
political community, and hence designates a relationship between the individual and the state' 
(Kymlicka, 2003a: 147). On this understanding, writes Rawls, the role of the citizen is 
`specified by its political institutions' (Rawls, 1999: 460). The second dimension of citizenship 
as a political conception of the person is primarily horizontal and expresses the social, cultural 
and psychological relations between a political community and its members8 as well as the 
relationship between members of a polity themselves and their relationship towards members 
of other political communities and those who live in the same society but are not members of 
their political community, such as those who do not hold the status of citizenship [immigrants, 
guest workers, asylum seekers etc.]. Here, citizenship as shared membership of a polity serves as 
a unifying element as it provides a source of civic unity and social cohesion among members of 
a political community and provides them also with a shared civic identity.9 
The two dimensions of citizenship as a political conception of the person refer to three 
basic elements any conception of citizenship is bound to entail.1° Firstly, there is the status-
based element that raises the question of membership; secondly, the rights-based element that 
raises the question of basic entitlements associated with membership in a polity;11 and thirdly, 
the virtue-based element that raises the question of the obligations that the status of citizenship 
as a political conception of the person imposes on members of a political community. Let me 
expand on each of the three elements associated with the two dimensions of the liberal version 
of the rights-based conception of citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity. 
III The status-based element of citizenship 
The status-based element of citizenship raises the question of membership, i.e. who is a citizen 
of a polity and what are the qualifications for full membership in a particular political 
community. As a status, citizenship is conferred to individuals via a threefold mechanism. The 
first is by aggregation, i.e. by being born on the territory of a state [jus so/i], the second by 
birth, i.e. obtaining the status of citizenship by descent or parentage [jus sanguinis]. These two 
mechanisms show that the acquisition of citizenship as membership in a political community is 
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first and foremost out of the volitional power of the individual. In this sense, Amy Gutmann 
emphasises, citizenship is 'largely not a voluntary phenomenon' (Gutmann, 2009: 411). As 
Rawls also rightly emphasises, we do not join society 'voluntarily but are born into it' (Rawls, 
1999: 397). As citizens, he argues, 'we find ourselves in a particular political society at a 
certain moment of historical time' (Rawls, 2001: 4). In this respect, the status of citizenship is 
primarily an involuntary personal characteristic.' 2 
The acquisition of citizenship via this twofold mechanism needs to be contrasted with a 
volitional mechanism available to those who want to acquire the status of citizenship of a 
particular political community. Normally, the process of naturalisation involves a range of 
different requirements that are associated with the acquisition of the status of citizenship of a 
particular state, e.g. language proficiency, civic tests, legal residence for a certain period of 
time etc. Here, the conferring of citizenship to an individual without historical or cultural 
connections to a particular political community takes place via an act of conscience-based 
volition [volitional allegiance] and the related process of naturalisation. In fact, Samuel 
Scheffler explains, 'actual liberal societies attach far more weight to birth than to choice in 
assigning citizenship and its associated privileges and obligations' (Scheffler, 2002: 70; 
Shachar, 2009). 
Throughout history the question of membership has been associated with the status-
based element of citizenship, of who is a member of a polity and what the qualifications are for 
holding the status of citizenship, such as sex, race, propriety ethnicity, religion, military service. 
In fact, what the bases are for granting individuals the status of citizenship remains a crucial 
aspect that defines the nature of citizenship as membership in a polity as well as the very 
character of a political community. As J.G.A Pocock points out in his seminal article 'The Ideal 
of Citizenship Since Classical Times', ' [fl or Aristotle [...] the citizen must be a male of known 
genealogy, a patriarch, a warrior, and the master of the labor of others (normally slaves) [...]' 
(Pocock, 1995: 31). In other words, the status of citizenship in ancient Athens was defined by a 
number of qualifications that any contemporary conception of citizenship would find either 
exclusive, discriminatory and oppressive. In fact, as John Tomasi emphasises, `[t]his classical 
understanding of citizenship, however qualified, is famously exclusive and exploitative. It might 
well be argued that — in its Aristotelian formulation at least — this conception of citizenship 
depended even as a concept on its exclusiveness' (Tomasi, 2002: 63). 
In contrast, in contemporary liberal and democratic societies, the status-based element 
of citizenship encapsulates two defining features, i.e. [i] the identity-related feature ; and [ii] 
the civic-related feature. In the first case, ethnicity or nationality has been a defining 
prerequisite for acquiring the status of citizenship as was the case until very recently — most 
explicitly — in Germany [the ethnic basis of citizenship]. In the latter case, citizenship can be 
obtained via the process of integration as — for example — in the case of France. 
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11.2 	 The rights-based element of citizenship 
The question of basic rights and fundamental freedoms that is associated with the rights-based 
element of citizenship identified above needs to be divided further into two distinct questions, 
i.e. [a] why members of a polity have rights;13 and [b] what rights are to be associated with the 
status of citizenship, e.g. civil, political, social, cultural rights. On a liberal interpretation of the 
first question, two basic functions associated with the question of why members of a political 
community have rights arise, i.e. (a) the traditional aspect; and (b) the modern aspect.14 
The first question refers to the basic interests rights as entitlements granted to members 
of a political community perform. The traditional aspect of rights is associated with the 
protective function they primarily perform. On this view, basic rights and fundamental freedoms 
protect individuals against the risk of the `tyrrany of the majority' (Mill, 1989). In other words, 
as some scholars have argued, these are entitlements that citizens as free and equal members of 
a polity are entitled to in virtue of their membership in a political community to limit the power 
of the state and its basic institutional framework. In this sense, the heart of liberal democracy, 
writes Nancy Rosenblum, 'has been to guard against the tutelary or manipulative intent of 
authorities, particularly political authorities, who want to mould minds, call up moral 
sentiments, or exact displays of virtue and enthusiasm' (Rosenblum, 1998: 14). 
In fact, liberalism as a political doctrine has been — first and foremost — characterized 
by the protection of basic civil and political rights, including 'the right of freedom of religion, 
expression, thought, association, the right of political participation, and the right of due legal 
process' (Buchanan, 1989: 854). This characterisation of the relationship between the 
individual and the political community upon which the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship is articulated assumes that the basic function of rights and the basic 
institutional framework of a polity is to protect the individual liberties of its members.15 
Liberalism, writes Russell Hardin, 'is about arranging institutions to allow all of us to prosper 
in our own individual ways' (Hardin, 2003: 1) and, as Judith Shklar emphasises, 'has only one 
overriding aim: to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal 
freedom' (Shklar, 1989: 3). 
On the other hand, the modern aspect of the question why members of a polity have 
rights is based on the integrative function of rights, which are to produce a sense of civic unity 
and social cohesion among members of a political community. As T.H. Marshall firmly points 
out, equal rights of citizenship would generate a 'direct sense of community membership based 
on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession' (Marshall, 1992 [1950]: 40). In this 
respect, the integrative function that rights perform is primarily aimed at the development of a 
sense of mutual connectedness and unity among members of a political community that can 
differ among themselves in terms of sex, race, ethnicity, religion etc. However, we need to 
contrast the two questions here. On the one hand, the first question of the rights-based element 
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of citizenship identifies the different functions that rights perform for those who hold the status 
of membership in a polity, such as the protective function and the integrative function. On the 
other hand, the second question of what rights define the status of citizenship raises a different 
set of challenges as each of the major theoretical positions outline a different set of entitlements 
members of a polity should be granted. In this respect, conceptions of citizenship differ among 
themselves in three separate respects, i.e. [i] what rights should members of a polity have; [ii] 
what are the priorities between the rights granted to members of a polity; and [iii] what interests 
should basic rights and fundamental freedoms protect? This leads to a number of different 
understandings of the nature of citizenship as a political conception of the person and the 
nature of political community itself. For example, the liberal and a multiculturalist conception 
of citizenship are primarily divided over the issue whether cultural rights should be granted to 
members of ethnocultural minorities or other non-dominant minority groups. 
11.3 	 The virtue-based element of citizenship 
The virtue-based element of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
opens the question of the obligations the status of citizenship poses on those holding this status 
as the ideal of civic equality, as some scholars have argued, also make demands on how citizens 
act within the associative network of civil society (Galston, 1991; Gutmann, 1998; Macedo, 
1990).16 Among the most widely acclaimed achievements bearing this mark is the expansion of 
nondiscrimination from the public sphere into the sphere of civil society. The demands of 
civility and non-discrimination in the sphere of civil society has been one of the effects of the 
public sphere and its basic institutional framework, for example the desegregation of US 
society in the 1960s and 70s (Kymlicka, 2003b). 
This extension of common principles and shared public values into the sphere of civil 
society, as some scholars have argued, has both positive and negative effects (Rosenblum, 
2000). On the positive side, the extension of the public principle of nondiscrimination and 
civility into other social spheres, e.g. education or employment does primarily perform a 
positive function. On the negative side, the extension of shared public values and the 
congruence of values between the two spheres might involve an [unjust] imposition of civic 
obligations and responsibilities of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship upon the `associational networks of civil society' (Walzer, 1995 [1992]: 164) as the 
ethical environment or the very structure of an association might be incompatible or in tension 
with society's broader social arrangements, e.g. illiberal, undemocratic or both.17 On this 
interpretation, the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its 
commitment to civic equality makes demands also on how citizens act in the associative 
network of civil society. As Will Kymlicka emphasises, the extension of the public principle of 
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non-discrimination 'from government to civil society is not just a shift in the scale of liberal 
norms, it also involves a radical extension in the obligations of liberal citizenship' (Kymlicka, 
2003b: 50). In fact, as Jeff Spinner-Haley rightly observes, 
[t]he universal nature of citizenship may triumph over, or at least transform, private identities. 
Liberalism makes far-reaching demands on how ordinary citizens act toward each other in 
many different settings. (Spinner-Haley, 1994: 37-38) 
This transformative effect arising out of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality can have a twofold effect, i.e. [i] a gravitational 
pull towards the mainstream with the melting away of the distinctive features of a cultural 
group [the liberal expectancy effect]; and [ii] the possible creation of conflicting diversity and 
subsequent distance of the marginalised social group from the mainstream [the conflicting 
diversity effect]. This characterisation of the possible outcomes associated with the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality 
delineates to a large extent also the status and the function of the associative network of civil 
society in a plurally diverse polity. As some scholars have argued, there are two prevailing but 
somehow distinct understandings of the relationship between a polity and the associative 
network of civil society (Rosenblum, 1998; Fullinwider, 1992; Walzer 1992). The first sees 
civil society 'as a source of legitimacy and stability for government' (Post and Rosenblum, 
2002: 1). On this interpretation, the relationship between a polity and its basic institutional 
framework and the associative network of civil society can be mutually supportive as well as 
reciprocally compensatory. In this respect, the associative networks of civil society 
complements citizenship as free and equal membership in a plurally diverse polity. The 
associative network of civil society, writes Galston, 
can express liberty as well as personal or social identity; provide arenas for the accommodation 
of deep differences; temper individual self-interest; help integrate otherwise disconnected 
individuals and social groups into society; nurture trust; serve as seedbeds of citizenship; and 
resist the totalizing tendencies of both closed communities and governmental state power. 
(Galston, 2002a: 16) 
On the second interpretation, as various scholars have emphasised, the associative networks of 
civil society compensates for the various shortcomings and difficulties the basic institutional 
framework of liberal and democratic government is faced with. On this conception, the 
associative networks of civil society have been depicted as the 'seedbeds of civic virtue' 
(Glendon, 1993: 109), namely associations that inculcate civic virtues and other dispositions of 
citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity (Post and Rosenblum, 2002: 18). The 
associative network of civil society is therefore basically seen as an idealized version of 
uncoerced membership and a likely corrective to the obligations of citizenship and the burdens 
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imposed on our relationship with the state and its institutional framework. However, I 
maintain, not all associational networks are equally important for the well-being of a plurally 
diverse polity and not all associations display characteristics that are coextensive with common 
principles and shared public values of a plurally diverse polity. One possible solution on how 
to make this relationship between the two spheres more compatible and our diverse pluralist 
societies more stable and cohesive is to rely on the 'logic of congruence' as outlined by Nancy 
Rosenblum in her book Membership & Morals (1998). This 'logic' relies on the assertion that 
the stability of a plurally diverse polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional 
framework imply that the associational networks of civil society should be structured in 
accordance with common principles and shared public values of a polity. Despite a 
straightforward answer that this particular element might be a crucial issue related to the 
stability of a political community and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework, two 
divergent aspects need to be identified here. First, what civic virtues and other dispositions that 
support the common good are needed in a plurally diverse polity? Second, whose role is it to 
inculcate these virtues and dispositions? Is it the state and its basic institutional framework, the 
associative network of civil society, the market or the family? 
The three elements of the two dimensions of citizenship as a political conception of the 
person identified above, i.e. [i] the status-based element; [ii] the rights-based element; and [iii] 
the virtue-based element can function as a litmus test for determining the basic orientation of a 
particular theoretical or political perspective. For example, a civic republican understanding of 
citizenship would give priority to the third element [virtues] compared to the second element 
[rights] whereas a liberal conception of citizenship gives priority to the second compared to the 
third. Moreover, a civic republican and a liberal understanding of citizenship would also differ 
over the very nature of some basic rights, e.g. whether political rights are intrinsically or 
merely instrumentally valuable. At the same time, a libertarian, a liberal egalitarian and a 
multiculturalist understanding of citizenship differ over the question of why members of a 
polity have rights as well as over the range of entitlements members of a polity have. To 
clarify: a libertarian conception of citizenship states that civil and political rights are a 
sufficient prerequisite for citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity. It consists in 
the assertion that the expansion of entitlements includes two potential dangers. First, the 
positive entitlements associated with membership in a polity, including welfare rights such as 
health care, education and social security allegedly undermine individual responsibility and 
other virtues of its citizens. Second, the expansion of entitlements to members of a polity also 
expands the power of the state and therefore reduces the overall freedom of its citizens. On the 
other hand, a liberal egalitarian understanding of citizenship would claim that these two groups 
of rights are necessary but not sufficient and so some welfare rights are also a necessary 
element of citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity. A multiculturalist conception 
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of citizenship, in contrast, would advance claims for group-differentiated cultural rights as 
providing the 'context of choice' necessary for members of those groups who are not part of the 
mainstream society and who belong to a marginalized or disadvantaged ethnocultural group. 
To summarise: the evolution of the ideal of civic equality that defines the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship is defined by two characteristic features. 
Historically, the first characteristic feature consisted in the inclusion of those individuals that 
figure as equal members of a polity and has gradually resulted in the inclusion of those 
individuals and social groups who were previously excluded from the status of citizenship 
including women, workers, racial and ethnic minorities and several other individuals or non-
dominant groups of a political community. Compared to Ancient Athens or the Medieval city 
states, contemporary liberal and democratic societies are much more open and inclusive. As 
Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha Nussbaum have emphasised in their introduction 
to the book Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women (1999), over the last two decades 
social and political hierarchies [...] have meet with repeated challenge from movements 
inspired by ideas of human equality. Abolitionists insisted that slaves are human beings, not to 
be held as property. Working-class movements of the 1920s and 1930s argued that a decent life 
for human beings should not depend on market success. The civil rights struggle of the 1960s 
said that skin color must be irrelevant to human fate, and condemned the practice of racial 
apartheid. More recently, movements for gay and lesbian rights have rejected the idea that 
people should be subjected to public humiliation for their choice of sexual partner. (Cohen, 
Matthew and Nussbaum, 1999: 3) 
The second characteristic feature of the ideal of civic equality associated with the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship, refers to the extension of rights that 
anyone holding the status of citizenship is entitled to. Equal liberties, as Rawls emphasises, 
`define the common status of citizenship' (Rawls, 1999: 194). At the same time, as Jurgen 
Habermas emphasises eloquently, la]n equal distribution of rights results only if those who 
enjoy rights recognize one another as free and equal' (Habermas, 1995: 114). According to the 
historical interpretation of the rights-based conception of citizenship examined in T.H. 
Marshall's essay Citizenship and Social Class (1990 [1956]), the basic rights and liberties 
granted to members of a polity were gradually expanded to incorporate three separate groups of 
rights that have been traditionally associated with the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality, i.e. civil rights18 [in the 18th 
century]; political rights19 [in the 19th century]; and social rights20 [in the 20th century] 
(Marshall, 1992 [1950]). On this interpretation, over the last three centuries, the evolution of 
citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity has witnessed a twofold expansion. The 
first consisted in the expansion of those that figure as civic equals in a particular political 
community [expansion of membership] whereas the second expansion consisted in the 
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expansion of different groups of rights members of a polity are entitled to [expansion of 
entitlement]. This twofold expansion associated with citizenship as a political conception of the 
person includes an equal distribution of political power as well as the protection from the abuse 
of this power granted by 'a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties' (Rawls, 2001: 42). 
Yet, the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its principled 
commitment to civic equality could not sidestep altogether some of the challenges associated 
with citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity. In fact, both the expansion of 
membership and the expansion of entitlement that characterise the development of the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality raise 
a number of separate objections that are advanced by both the traditional and the contemporary 
criticism of the rights-based conception of citizenship. I examine them in a more detailed 
manner in the next section of this chapter. 
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III. 	 Critique of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
The liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its principled commitment 
to civic equality examined in the preceding section of this chapter has been criticized from two 
distinct and opposing directions, i.e. [i] the traditional criticism; and [ii] the contemporary 
criticism. Both critics forcefully argue that this conception of citizenship and its principled 
normative commitment fo civic equality is either too permissive and inefficient or too divisive, 
unfairly discriminatory or even oppressive. The traditional criticism incorporates four divergent 
critiques each targeting a particular element associated with this conception of citizenship: [i] 
the civic republican critique (e.g. Beiner, 2003; Miller, 2000); [ii] the communitarian critique 
(e.g. Sandel, 1982; Maclntyre, 1981; Taylor, 1989; Walzer, 1983); [iii] the libertarian critique 
(e.g. Nozick, 1974); and [iv] the social conservative critique (e.g. Scruton, 2002). The 
contemporary criticism incorporates three distinct critiques: [i] the deliberative democratic 
critique (e.g. Brettschneider, 2006; Deveaux, 2009; Talisse, 2005); [ii] the feminist critique 
(e.g. Okin, 1989; Nussbaum, 1999; Shachar, 2001; Song, 2007); and [iii] the multiculturalist 
critique (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995; Modood; 2007; Parekh, 2000; Raz, 1994; Young, 1990). I 
examine below the main objections advanced by the traditional criticism of the liberal version 
of the rights-based conception of citizenship and then proceed in a more detailed manner with 
the exposition of the two versions of the multiculturalist critique and its twofold objection to the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its principled commitment to 
civic equality. 
111.1 The traditional criticism of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
The traditional criticism identified above is composed of three separate objections each 
targeting a particular element of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship identified in Section II of this chapter as well as the two characteristic features of 
the principled commitment to civic equality in general, i.e. [i] the identity-related objection 
[associated with the expansion of membership]; [ii] the virtue-related objection; and [iii] the 
effectiveness-related objection [both associated with the expansion of entitlement]. 
The first objection [the identity-related objection] has posed two different challenges to 
the promotion of citizenship as a shared civic identity. On the one hand, the expansion of the 
number of those granted the status of citizenship resulted in the decreasing of civic unity and 
social cohesion as by creating a more inclusive community where membership in a polity is not 
predisposed or limited by a range of factors including race, religion, ethnicity or cultural 
membership, the sense of civic unity and social cohesion among members can be diluted. On 
the other hand, if more and more individuals are granted full political membership in a polity, 
those that remain excluded are likely to become much more radically marginalised. An 
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inclusive polity can therefore be more polarised and composed disproportionately of a large 
inclusive majority that might have difficulties in coping with the diversity and the consequent 
lack of civic unity and social cohesion as well as a small part of those who are much more 
radically marginalized from society's broader social arrangements and its basic institutional 
framework. On this interpretation, the bonds of citizenship as free and equal membership in a 
polity are jeopardized due to an increasing diversity that makes it difficult for members of a 
polity to identify with one another. In this sense, civic unity, social cohesion and solidarity 
among members of a polity are threatened thus making the stability of a polity and the 
maintenance of its basic institutional framework difficult to achieve. 
The second objection advanced by the traditional criticism is largely formulated against 
the consequences of the rights-based conception of citizenship, i.e. the individuals' basic rights 
and fundamental freedoms [the virtue-based objection]. According to this criticism, the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship pays little or no attention at all to the 
importance of community and shared membership in a polity. One of the most persistent 
criticisms of liberalism and its conception of citizenship, writes Samuel Scheffler, 'is that the 
priority it assigns to freedom and individual rights is not simply disruptive of conventional 
social norms but also undermines the value of community' (Scheffler, 2002: 18). On this 
interpretation, recognition and accommodation of diversity fail to develop among members of 
a polity the basic civic virtues as a set of capacities and dispositions that support the common 
good necessary to maintain the common principles and shared public values that provide us with 
the 'conditions of liberty'. In particular, the civic-republican and the communitarian critique 
blame the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship for all major problems 
contemporary plurally diverse societies are faced with, such as the low turn-out at local, 
regional or national elections; the disengagement of individuals from the associative network 
of civil society; the decrease in social capital expressed through low trust in the basic 
institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity, and the overall disengagement of citizens 
from active participation in shared public life. On the social conservative and the civic 
republican interpretation of the civic and political rights granted to members of a polity, both 
freedom of expression and freedom of association should be limited when we can expect that 
their exercise will jeopardise the common civic interest in the stability of a plurally diverse 
polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework . According to these criticisms, 
as Samuel Scheffler points out, the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
bears the responsibility for 
a host of social problems, whose source, according to many critics, lies ultimately in a culture 
of individualism and a breakdown of communal values for which liberal thought itself is 
responsible. (Scheffler, 1994: 5) 
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In this sense, the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship has been 
criticised as being too disruptive as well as for not demanding enough because it lacks the 
necessary means to support the sense of civic unity among members of a political community. 
It argues that the presence of different and competing values, beliefs and practices fails to take 
into account the convergence required to sustain a plurally diverse polity and its basic 
institutional framework and therefore contributes decisively to the falling off of unity among 
members of a political community. The liberal formula, as these critics argue, is therefore 
incapable of sustaining the civic and moral conditions that cultivate membership in a plurally 
diverse polity. In this sense, social conservatives and civic republicans21 advance a criticism, 
that the liberal institutional framework is basically ineffective, because instead of 'creating' 
individuals equipped with the virtues, capacities and dispositions associated with citizenship as 
free and equal membership in a polity, it 'produces' citizens with a looser sense of 
responsibility and without a sense of solidarity and citizens who are not eager to take up a cause 
and participate in the public sphere [the moral collapse criticism]. In particular, civic 
republicans criticise primarily civil rights including freedom of expression and freedom of 
association as they allegedly undermine the primacy of political rights, such as political 
participation and community involvement. 
The third objection against the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship [the effectiveness-related objection] advanced primarily by social conservatives 
(Scruton, 2002) and libertarians (Friedman, 2002; Nozick, 1974) targets welfare elements of 
the rights-based element of citizenship like social rights. Two different criticisms need to be 
distinguished here, i.e. [i] the efficiency-related criticism; and [ii] the oppression-related 
criticism. On the one hand, according to the efficiency-related criticism, the positive 
entitlements guaranteed by the state and its basic institutional framework, such as rights to 
public education, health care and support in the case of unemployment undermine individual 
responsibility for the choices individuals are to make. As Samuel Scheffler points out, [o]ne of 
the most familiar conservative criticisms of the welfare state is that its policies rely on and 
enforce a diminished conception of individual responsibility and choice' (Scheffler, 2005: 5). 
On this interpretation, the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship is 
incapable of cultivating the basic civic virtues among members of a polity as its inability to 
inculcate individual responsibility weakens civic unity, threatens social cohesion and 
undermines solidarity among members of a political community. On the other hand, according 
to the oppression-related criticism, social rights seriously undermine other fundamental rights 
of other members of a political community, for example property rights. In this sense, 
redistribution as the foundational basis of social rights is largely seen as jeopardizing 
individual liberty. 
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What these objections against the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality share in common is the assertion that the 
rights-based element of citizenship undermines both the civic unity and social cohesion of a 
political community as well as individual responsibility and civic virtues of its members. Each 
of these objections maintains that citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity should 
primarily be compensatory in nature. In other words, it should find solutions to the challenges 
of 'democratic deficit', the 'fact of pluralism' and the 'circumstances of multiculturalism' 
identified earlier. These problems and the associated challenges raised by the liberal version of 
the rights-based conception of citizenship are usually addressed by the attempts of two diverse 
solutions. Firstly, more democracy through devices like referenda, and secondly, through 
reducing individual liberties by, for example, restricting what might become a threat to the 
stability of a political community and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework.22 
This can lead to circumstances where advocates of the traditional criticism of the liberal 
version of the related rights-based conception of citizenship, e.g. civic republicans and social 
conservatives argue that those groups and individuals whose conceptions of the good or 
practices might be incompatible or in tension with society's broader social arrangements 
represent a threat to the civic unity and social stability of a political community and the 
maintenance of its basic institutional framework. A civic republican understanding of 
citizenship as a political conception of the person expects its citizens to give priority to public 
concerns and to subordinate their self-interest to the common good (Miller, 2000). On this 
interpretation, I maintain, the civic republican model of citizenship denies the moral equality of 
its citizens since it prioritises the public sphere over their citizens' private' commitments. On 
the other hand, a social conservative understanding of citizenship would object primarily to the 
responsibility element, which includes the virtues associated with the requirements of the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship, i.e. public reasonableness and 
civility as well as the 'traditional' forms of family life and shared public values, etc. 
I turn now to the presentation of the contemporary criticism of the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality whose various 
critiques and objections challenge the consistency of this conception of citizenship with its 
basic foundations and the core normative principles associated with citizenship as free and 
equal membership in a polity. 
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111.2 The contemporary criticism of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
Contrary to the objections raised by the traditional criticism of the liberal version of the rights-
based conception of citizenship, the objections advanced by the modern criticism, question its 
consistency with the conception of citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity.23 As 
has been emphasised at the outset of section III of this chapter, the contemporary criticism of 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its principled commitment 
to civic equality consists of three distinct critiques including [i] the deliberative democratic 
critique; [ii] the feminist critique; and [iii] the multiculturalist critique. 
The deliberative democratic critique of the limitations and shortcomings of resolving 
conflicts using the liberal formula (e.g. Brettschneider, 2006; Deveaux, 2009; Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996; Talisse, 2005), weighs different claims in terms of competing rights. In this 
respect, the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship fails to adequately 
address the conflicts between claims that might be of equal value, e.g. gender equality and 
cultural coherence. As Monique Deveaux emphasises, 'liberal principles set limits to both the 
form and possible outcomes to such deliberations' (Deveaux, 2009: 24). 
In contrast, the feminist critique of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship has criticized liberalism's alleged indifference to various forms of injustice in the 
private sphere and the reproduction of inequality between the sexes in the public sphere and its 
basic institutional framework (Enslin, 2003a; Okin, 1989, 1994). On this interpretation, the very 
ideal of citizenship as free and equal membership in a political community is incompatible 
with the principle of non-discrimination and its commitment to gender equality. 
On the other hand, the multiculturalist critique claims that the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship is insensitive to different claims for the accommodation 
of diversity in the institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity and has not redeemed its 
principled commitment to both civic equality and equal civic respect for diversity. Despite the 
fact of being granted the status of citizenship, inclusive of equality of status and equal civil, 
political and social rights, various groups and individuals remain largely excluded, 
marginalised and discriminated. On this interpretation, the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship remains contested since its twofold expansion of membership and the 
expansion of entitlement (as articulated in Section II of this chapter) have not resulted in an 
equally accommodating polity. Members of non-dominant minority cultures, so the criticism 
goes, continue to face unfair disadvantages compared to those members of a polity that are part 
of the mainstream since they do not enjoy the same background conditions as do members of 
the mainstream despite the equal basic rights granted to all members of a polity. What is 
therefore needed, both advocates of liberal multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 1995; Raz, 1994) and 
advocates of multiculturalism in general argue (Modood, 2007; Parekh; 2000; Taylor, 1997) is 
not just protection of individuals' basic rights, e.g. freedom of association [associative liberty], 
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freedom of expression [expressive liberty] and toleration of diversity, but the set-up of 
multicultural policies aiming at the protection, promotion and respect of cultural diversity and 
the introduction of group-specific rights that would compensate and reduce any unfair 
asymmetry between the majority and non-dominant minority groups. 
The multiculturalist critique of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality is both complex and manifold at the same 
time. We can distinguish between two different views associated with the multiculturalist 
critique, i.e. [i] the moderate multiculturalist view (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995; Raz, 1994); and [ii] 
the critical multiculturalist view (Modood, 2007; Parekh, 2000, 2008; Young, 1990 etc.). I 
examine below some aspects of both views identified here together with the two models of 
citizenship advanced by the multiculturalist critique, i.e. [i] the multicultural citizenship model; 
and [ii] the differentiated citizenship model. 
111.2.1 The moderate multiculturalist view 
The moderate multiculturalist view primarily claims that basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including the rights to freedom of religion, conscience and belief, expression, 
association and political participation, are a necessary but not a sufficient mechanism to match 
with the obligations of civic equality for all citizens in the design of the institutional framework 
of a plurally diverse polity, including public education. This critique of the liberal version of 
the rights-based conception of citizenship is best exemplified by two competing claims that 
characterise its advocates, i.e. [i] the requirement of equal choice; and [ii] the requirement of 
equal freedom [equal protection of cultural membership]. 
The first claim advanced by the moderate multiculturalist view, i.e. the requirement of 
equal choice maintains that individuals should have access to cultures they are traditionally 
connected to (Kymlicka, 1995; 2001). Those groups that are traditionally not part of the 
ethnocultural mainstream, should be given additional rights in order for their members to have 
the same choice-enabling conditions as do individual members of the majority population. In 
this sense, the aim of minority rights is to ensure that each member of a polity has equal access 
to a secure cultural context. Contrary to the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship that distributes an equal set of rights to all members of a political community, the 
model of multicultural citizenship associated with the moderate multiculturalist view distributes 
an additional set of rights on the basis of membership in groups that meet the criteria for 
accommodation. Kymlicka and Norman (1995: 304-306) distinguish three different ways of 
differentiated treatment of ethnocultural minorities via the model of minority rights, i.e. [i] 
special representation rights; [ii] self-government rights; and [iii] multicultural rights.24 Special 
representation rights [usually] perform a temporary measure to reduce or delete altogether the 
difference between various social groups or minorities. Self-government rights, on the other 
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hand, consist in claims for 'the right to govern themselves in certain key matters, in order to 
ensure the full and free development of their culture and the best interests of their people' 
(ibid.: 305). Unlike self-government rights, multicultural rights such as bilingual educational 
programs, multicultural schools and a curriculum that includes different cultures and traditions 
are intended to support the integration of disadvantaged or under-represented groups into the 
mainstream. Furthermore, some differentiated rights are intended as temporary in nature, such 
as affirmative action policies, whereas some are perceived as permanent mechanisms for the 
accommodation and recognition of diversity, such as self-government rights for constitutionally 
recognised minorities. In this sense, minority rights and the model of multicultural citizenship 
advanced by the moderate multiculturalist view aim to equalise the choice-enabling conditions 
between the majority and the minority as a precondition for exercising basic rights and 
fundamental freedoms. On this interpretation, cultural rights given to minority cultural groups 
are consistent with the basic principles of the liberal conception of citizenship as free and equal 
membership in a polity (Kymlicka, 1995 [ch. 2]). 
The second claim advanced by the moderate multiculturalist view is that the requirement 
of equal freedom limits the effect of the first requirement on individual members of these 
minority groups. In this sense, the additional rights given to minority cultures should not 
override the civil and political rights of its members. As Kymlicka emphasises, 'a liberal view 
requires freedom within the minority group, and equality between the minority and majority 
groups' (Kymlicka, 1995: 152). This second requirement basically refuses to allow basic rights 
and fundamental freedoms of individual members of ethnocultural minorities to be overriden 
by interests of subgroups in the maintenance of membership in their groups and the distinctive 
ethical environment of these groups. Advocates of the moderate multiculturalist view argue 
that internal restrictions over group members are inconsistent with liberalism's basic premise 
of free and equal citizenship since they are likely to override individual rights and freedoms 
and may create the 'reverse spillover' of these values into the public sphere. While generally 
sceptical of internal restrictions as a way to protect the culture of a particular community 
[community integrity] (first, if it cannot have enough adherents without coercion it is 
inefficient; second, internal restrictions are inconsistent with the basic principles of liberalism), 
they argue that external protections as a way of protection of a particular group against outside 
interference are basically consistent with the basic principles of citizenship as free and equal 
membership in a polity and should therefore be promoted since this basically guarantees the 
maintenance of cultural coherence within a particular societal culture and protects the ability of 
members of these communities to exercise their basic rights and fundamental liberties within 
their societal culture. 
In this sense, cultural rights perform a twofold function. First, they are designed to 
ensure the protection of non-dominant minority groups from the pressures and influences of the 
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dominant society and from outside interference in general [the protection of cultural coherence]. 
Accommodation and recognition of diversity and granting of group-specific rights or policies 
aiming at the protection, promotion and respect of cultural diversity that rely on external 
protection of a particular minority group does not override the individuals' civil and political 
rights and is therefore consistent with the basic principles of free and equal citizenship. 
Second, part of the demand for a supplementary set of minority group rights has been argued 
under the self-respect argument. Self-respect, writes Rawls in A Theory of Justice, 'includes a 
person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan 
of life, is worth carrying out' (Rawls, 1999 [1971]: 386). As Jeff Spinner-Haley points out: 
The political basis for self-respect is located in public institutions and those institutions that 
serve the public. [...] These institutions should not wrongly discriminate against citizens. (By 
wrongful discrimination, I mean discrimination based on ascriptive characteristics. 
Discrimination based on merit is surely acceptable.) Self-respect should have little to do with 
respecting the ends people choose; it should have much to do with respecting the ability of 
people to achieve these ends. (2000: 174) 
However, two challenges related to this model of multicultural citizenship arise here. First, 
external protections fail to comply with the principled commitment of civic equality in two 
important respects. On the one hand, they fail to meet the test of internal fairness within 
groups. On the other hand, they also fail to meet the test of pluralism. While group-specific 
rights assure the diversity between groups within a particular society, they potentially 
undermine the pluralism within groups and therefore undermine the diversity within a society 
as well as within cultural groups. The moderate multiculturalist view therefore unfairly 
disadvantages members of a particular minority group that — in one respect or another — do not 
identify fully with a particular element or marker of group identity, like language, religion or 
political affiliation. Despite its promotion of between-group diversity within a polity, the model 
of multicultural citizenship advanced by the moderate multiculturalist view puts at risk the 
internal pluralism within groups. Second, the most troubling premise of the moderate 
multiculturalist view and the model of multicultural citizenship demand to treat individuals as 
means to the well-being of a group or community, which is contrary to the basic principled 
commitment of civic equality associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship. 
111.2.2 The critical multiculturalist view 
The critical multiculturalist view (Modood, 2007; Parekh, 2000; Young, 1990) is much more 
radical in its critique of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and the 
overall effects of the liberal institutional framework. It forcefully argues that this conception of 
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citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity and its commitment to civic equality is 
inegalitarian as well as oppressive and unfairly discriminatory. Two criticisms advanced by the 
advocates of the critical multiculturalist view need to be distinguished here. 
The first criticism advances the claim that public institutions [including public 
schooling] are far from neutral either in intent or in effect, since they impose disparate burdens 
on members of disadvantaged social groups and upon adherents of different religious and moral 
views. They argue instead that a plurally diverse polity and its basic institutional framework are 
biased against social, cultural and religious minorities and are therefore inherently unjust, 
discriminatory and oppressive. As Iris Young emphasises, 'rights and rules that are universally 
formulated and thus blind to differences of race, culture, gender, age, or disability, perpetuate 
rather than undermine oppression' (Young, 1995 [1989]: 267). In her critique of the liberal-
egalitarian and the civic republican conception of citizenship and civic equality, she observes 
that both conceptions of citizenship do not pay adequate attention to the interests of those 
groups and communities identified as oppressed, disadvantaged or marginalised. She argues 
that these two conceptions of citizenship and civic equality 
excludes women and other groups defined as different, because its rational and universal status 
derives only from its opposition to affectivity, particularity and the body. Republican theorists 
insisted on the unity of the civic public: insofar as he is a citizen every man leaves behind his 
particularity and difference, to adopt a universal standpoint identical for all citizens, the 
standpoint of the common good or general will. In practice republican politicians enforced 
homogeneity by excluding from citizenship all those defined as different and associated with 
the body, desire or need influences that might veer citizenship away from the standpoint of pure 
reason. (Young, 1990: 117) 
The second, and related criticism claims that even with the winning of the status of citizenship, 
those groups that are not part of society's broader social arrangements remain oppressed, 
marginalised and excluded, therefore, reduced to second-class citizenship and denied full social 
justice. As Yael Tamir emphasises, 
[m]embers of disempowered minorities soon discovered that being granted a set of formal civic 
rights was insufficient to ensure equal status, and realised that they had to decide which was the 
lesser of two evils: remaining estranged and marginalised, or integrating at the price of self-
effacement. Members of such minorities thus became increasingly aware that the ideal of a 
culturally neutral public sphere embodies a dangerous and oppressive illusion. (Tamir, 1995: 164) 
According to this critique, both the liberal and the civic republican versions of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship offer an inadequate response to the problems of contemporary 
`circumstances of multiculturalism' since they are insufficiently inclusive or even 
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discriminatory. In particular, they do not give equal weight to different values, beliefs and 
conceptions of the good that are present in a plurally diverse polity. 
In contrast, a politics of difference as advanced by Iris Marion Young (1990) requires 
the cultivation of a shared public space where the basic institutional framework of a polity is 
sensitive to individual and group differences. In contrast to the liberal version of the rights-
based conception of citizenship and its basic commitment to civic equality, as Avigail 
Eisenberg emphasises, a politics of difference 'recognises that social structures and institutions 
can only address oppression and domination by making space for difference and by not 
reducing difference to some impartial, neutral or universal perspective' (Eisenberg, 2006: 15). 
However, I maintain, a more inclusive conception of citizenship that recognises the claims of 
pluralism and diversity faces a twofold challenge. First, accommodating group diversity might 
create or increase intra-group inequality within different communities. Second, it might also 
create the risk of social fragmentation between various groups and individuals and therefore 
undermine both solidarity and social cohesion of the polity itself. The model of differentiated 
citizenship as elaborated by the critical multiculturalist view therefore brings problems and 
challenges of its own. 
As we have seen in section 111.2.1 and 111.2.2 of this chapter, the moderate 
multiculturalist view and the critical multiculturalist view have advanced a twofold objection 
to the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic 
equality. On a moderate view, the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
is incompatible with some forms of identity and personal values and does not pay equal respect 
to the members of different ethnocultural minorities and their culture [equal civic respect 
objection]. It advances the claim that the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality basically reduces individuals' ethnocultural 
membership to individual preferences and private choices. The moderate multiculturalist view 
acknowledges the priority granted to individual rights but it points out that this model of 
protection of individuals' interests is basically insufficient. On this interpretation, the 'uniform 
treatment approach' associated with an equal distribution of individual rights is insufficient for 
the preservation of a particular cultural environment as a context of choice for individuals that 
belong to a particular non-dominant minority group. The critical multicultural view, in contrast, 
rejects outright the liberal conception of civic equality as inegalitarian in principle and both 
discriminatory and oppressive in effect. It maintains that the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship reflects the values, norms and practices of the majority and is 
subsequently prejudiced against those groups and individuals that are not part of society's 
broader social arrangements [cultural subordination objection]. In particular, the critical 
multicultural view argues that the basic institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity is 
unable to develop a coherent response to cultural and value diversity. In this sense, the liberal 
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version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality 
offers an inadequate response to the problems of contemporary 'circumstances of 
multiculturalism' since it does not give equal weigh to the different conceptions of the good 
present in a plurally diverse polity. In fact, as Sune Laegaard points out, 'liberalism is 
incomplete at best, or in itself unjust, at worst' (Laegaard, 2005: 326). 
However, the basic question both versions of multicultural citizenship have to answer is 
whether their group-differentiated model of citizenship, which includes the multicultural 
citizenship model advanced by Will Kymlicka and the differentiated citizenship model advanced 
by Iris Young, is consistent with the basic principled commitment to civic equality. I examine 
this challenge and the associated problems in the next section of this chapter. While both models 
of multicultural citizenship aim to provide a justice-based account of a group-specific model of 
cultural rights, as various critics argue, they both fail to capture the pluralism of diversity itself 
In this respect, I maintain, multiculturalism has itself become another part of the problem. 
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IV. 
	 The limits of the multiculturalist critique 
Multiculturalism has been rejected by different scholars as being an unsustainable policy of 
accommodating diversity, some of whom have been sympathetic and others critical of the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship that has been the motivational 
foundation for the development of the group-differentiated models of citizenship advanced by 
the two views of multiculturalism presented in the previous section of this chapter. Two groups 
of critics in particular need to be distinguished here, i.e. [i] the liberal egalitarian critique; and 
[ii] the feminist critique. Let me expand on both critiques and the main objections they raise 
against the limits of the multicultural citizenship model and the model of differentiated 
citizenship. This is necessary as the multiculturalist redefinition of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship and its principled commitment to civic equality has proven to be controversial 
both in intent and in effect. 
IV.I 	 The liberal egalitarian critique25 
In general, the liberal egalitarian critique exemplified most clearly by Brian Barry in Culture 
and Equality (2001) advances a range of different objections against multiculturalism and its 
group-differentiated models of citizenship. Its primary target was to challenge the 
emancipatory project of multiculturalism as incoherent at best or discriminatory and oppressive 
at worst. The justification for its wholesale rejection has been largely based on the inconsistency 
of cultural rights with the principled commitment to civic equality. Two objections need to be 
distinguished here. The first is the justice-based objection, which argues that a differentiated 
distribution of entitlements as in the case of ethnocultural rights is inconsistent with the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality. On 
this interpretation, ethnocultural rights impose a discriminatory understanding of the rights-
based element of citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity. The second is the equal 
respect objection, which argues that multicultural policies and the differentiated treatment of 
non-dominant minority groups fail to meet the requirement of equal respect and concern 
between citizens of a plurally diverse polity. Barry's contentious objection is even more radical 
as he advances the assertion that the claims advanced by advocates of multiculturalism cannot 
be defended by advancing justice-based arguments. As he poignantly emphasises, 
`administered in doses of any strength you like, multiculturalism poses as many problems as it 
solves ... [and] it cannot in the nature of the case address the huge inequalities in opportunities 
and resources that disfigure — and increasingly dominate — societies such as those of Britain and 
the United States' (Barry, 2001: 328). 
On this interpretation, the moderate multiculturalist view and the critical multiculturalist 
view raise two problems that might undermine the viability and sustainability of a polity and 
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risk violating the rights of some of its citizens despite their intended positive integrative 
function. First, conferring minority rights to ethnocultural groups may put at risk some 
members of these groups vis-à-vis their own group and the broader society by making it 
considerably more difficult for them to enjoy their individual civil and political rights. 
Contrary to the assumption shared by the moderate multiculturalist view and different sub-
variants of liberalism, such as those holding an autonomy-liberalism position, societal cultures 
are not internally homogeneous as they can be internally divided across different lines 
(religious, political, socio-economic etc.). External protections against the influence of majority 
culture may have the effect of coercively diminishing or reducing the options available within 
a particular minority group therefore restricting its members to the options available as well as 
reducing the overall diversity within a society. The liberal egalitarian critique argues that the 
introduction of minority rights might leave members of these cultural groups uneducated or 
otherwise disadvantaged and with fewer opportunities to compete with other members of a 
polity in the wider society. Second, whereas civil and political rights are status-based, with 
those holding the status of citizenship being entitled to them, cultural rights granted to some 
non-dominant minority groups fail to comply with the commitment of civic equality and the 
principle of nondiscrimination since only those cultural groups who are internally liberal and 
democratic would be granted cultural rights. While this certainly avoids the problem of 
possible in-group discrimination and oppression of at-risk members of these communities, the 
selective nature of cultural rights can be interpreted as both inegalitarian and discriminatory 
and therefore inconsistent with the principled commitment to civic equality. 
The other source of dispute between the liberal egalitarian and the multiculturalist 
scholars revolves around the nature of cultural membership and of culture itself (Song, 2007 
[ch. 2]). Two distinct and divergent objections can be identified here. On the one hand, liberal 
egalitarian scholars advocate the 'uniform treatment approach' (Barry, 2001) towards cultural 
diversity. Its main contention is that — from a liberal egalitarian perspective — minority rights 
and the associated model of multicultural or differentiated citizenship are not based on justice. 
On the other hand, advocates of either the moderate multiculturalist view or the critical 
multiculturalist view argue succinctly that ethnocultural membership and minority status is part 
of one's circumstance and is therefore entitled to justice-based entitlements, such as minority 
rights or exemptions from laws and other public norms. At the same time, claims by 
immigrants and guest workers are usually rejected as — on some interpretations — they have 
freely chosen either to move to another country or to work in a country other than their place of 
origin. It is precisely for this purpose that some versions of multiculturalism and its policies do 
not grant them any set of special entitlements. 
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IV.2 The feminist critique 
The feminist critique of both multiculturalism and multicultural policies (e.g. Enslin, 2003a; 
Okin, 1998; Nussbaum, 1999; Shachar, 2001; Song, 2007) is directed against the two views of 
the multicultural critique of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship.26 
According to this critique, minority rights discriminate against the least well-off members of 
those minority groups who are the beneficiaries of a differentiated allocation of rights. 
Minority rights risk creating in-group discrimination while aiming to reduce between-group 
discrimination or inequality. On this interpretation, the feminist critique of multiculturalism 
advances the objection that group-rights will create the 'paradox of multicultural vulnerability' 
(Shachar, 2001), i.e. the creation of within-group inequalities as an effect of group-
differentiated rights that aim to reduce or eliminate between-group inequality. It points to the 
unequal distribution of the benefits of minority rights within a particular community as well as 
the discrimination against members of a particular disadvantaged or marginalized community 
who are most at risk (usually women and children). This assertion implies that multicultural 
policies have a twofold effect, i.e. the direct effect and the indirect effect. The direct effect of a 
group-differentiated policy or remedy aims to reduce the inequality between groups and 
contribute to a more egalitarian and stable society. On the other hand, the indirect effect of a 
group-differentiated policy consists in the assertion that this policy would contribute to more 
inegalitarian relationships within the beneficiary community and that most at-risk members of 
these groups will be considerably worse-off. As Chandran Kukathas rightly emphasizes, 'No 
recognize groups is often to reify or entrench formations that might otherwise be temporary, 
and also to empower those who have authority to speak for the group' (Kukathas, 2004: 253). 
While multicultural claims were advanced under a broadly liberal claim for increasing 
self-respect of minority ethnocultural groups and other non-dominant social groups, the 
feminist objections against multiculturalism rest on the assertion that multicultural policies are 
likely to create more harm than good, i.e. that its effects [either intended or unintended] will 
outweigh the intended positive effects multiculturalism is likely to expect. On this 
interpretation, the feminist criticism of multiculturalism argues that gender equality is an 
important limit on cultural accommodation that challenges both the justice-based claims of 
minority groups as well as the integrative function of the claims for accommodation. 
Both the liberal egalitarian critique of the multiculturalist redefinition of the rights-
based conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality and the feminist critique 
of the paradox of multicultural vulnerability, raise a number of important issues. On this first 
interpretation, a differentiated allocation of rights associated with a multicultural or a 
differentiated conception of citizenship is inconsistent with the principled commitment to civic 
equality. On the second interpretation advanced by the feminist critique, a differentiated 
allocation of entitlements creates a paradoxical situation where the least well-off members of a 
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non-dominant minority group are both marginalized and oppressed within their minority 
groups as a consequence of the accommodation of group-based diversity and the differentiated 
allocation of entitlements to non-dominant minority groups. In this sense, while multiculturalist 
policies aim to reduce the asymmetry between non-dominant minorities and the majority, the 
other effect associated with them creates another asymmetry within minority groups themselves. 
/V.3 The paradox of multicultural diversity 
I want to join the critics of multicultural [group-differentiated] policies and the two models of 
group-differentiated citizenship for a different but related set of arguments. What I find 
objectionable in the multicultural project in general is the negative side effect of an intended 
positive policy, which is the recognition and accommodation of diversity in the basic 
institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity.27 I argue that the multiculturalist objection 
against the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its commitment to 
civic equality creates two important problems. The first problem refers to the possible violation 
of individual rights of women and other at-risk members of those non-dominant minority groups 
who can claim vulnerability via the system of differentiated citizenship and has been identified 
as 'the paradox of multicultural vulnerability'. This problem is related to the tension between 
common principles and shared public values of a particular political community and those 
values that constitute the ethical environment of a particular cultural group (Haydon, 2006a). 
In contrast, the second problem, I maintain, can potentially reduce the overall diversity 
within a political community as well as jeopardise the individual freedom of some of the 
individuals who are members of minority groups. Like languages, cultures and practices are 
diverse, heterogeneous and plural in nature as well. By publicly recognising and accommodating 
a particular minority culture or some of its aspects we risk failing to acknowledge the internal 
diversity, pluralism and heterogeneity of a particular minority culture and its ethical 
environment. As Jeff Spinner-Haley emphasises, Ji]nclusiveness does not reinforce 
distinctiveness, as some multiculturalists seem to think; inclusiveness wears away differences' 
(Spinner-Haley, 1994: 180). Moreover, a particular multicultural policy could essentialise a 
particular form of cultural diversity it aims to protect or accommodate. This creates the 
paradox of multicultural diversity.28 As Anne Phillips rightly emphasises, 
[m]ulticulturalism then appears not as a cultural liberator but as a cultural straitjacket, forcing 
those described as members of a minority cultural group into a regime of authenticity, denying 
them the chance to cross cultural borders, borrow cultural influences, define and redefine 
themselves. (Phillips, 2007: 14) 
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At the same time, in particular cases group-differentiated rights might violate the basic civil 
and political rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of a minority group [the 
reverse spillover effect]. This criticism is premised on the assumption that the basic problem of 
group-differentiated rights is that members of a particular group do not share equally a 
particular disadvantage. We can therefore conclude that group-differentiated rights as a 
compensatory and integrative strategy or policy to reduce the inequalities and disadvantages 
between different groups or between a non-dominant minority group and the majority, cannot 
function as an equalisandum within a disadvantaged community as its members do not share 
equally a particular disadvantage. The basic problem of any claim for group-specific 
accommodation of diversity, I maintain, rests on the assumption that members of a particular 
group bear an equal share of a particular disadvantage. I call this the fallacy of equal 
disadvantage.29 This paradox together with the paradox of multicultural vulnerability explicated 
above points to a number of potential perverse side effects of both the theory and the policy of 
multiculturalism and its inconsistency with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality. 
48 
V. 	 Conclusion 
As it turns out, the crucial distinction between the two versions of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship examined in this chapter of the thesis lies in the understanding of civic equality 
and the nature of diversity itself. In this respect, the basic question associated with the 
articulation of the status-based conception of civic equality that would be coextensive with 
citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity revolves around the foundational distinction 
between two normative sources of diversity, i.e. [i] ascriptive diversity, and [ii] conscience-
based diversity. The former form of diversity is a matter of chance or circumstance, i.e. the 
unchosen natural and social conditions associated with one's identity. The latter form of 
diversity, on the other hand, is a matter of individual choice. As Will Kymlicka firmly points 
out, `[t]he distinction between choices and circumstances is in fact absolutely central to the 
liberal project' (Kymlicka 1989: 186). 
Two distinct and divergent arguments can be identified here. On the one hand, liberal 
egalitarian scholars advocate the 'uniform treatment approach' (Barry, 2001) towards cultural 
diversity. Its main contention is that — from a liberal egalitarian perspective — special/minority 
rights and the associated model of multicultural or differentiated citizenship are not and cannot 
function as a requirement of justice. On the other hand, advocates of either the moderate 
multiculturalist view (e.g. Kymlicka, 1989, 1995) or the critical multiculturalist view (e.g. 
Parekh, 2000) identified in section 111.2.1 and 111.2.2 of this chapter argue that ethnocultural 
membership and minority status is part of one's circumstance and is therefore entitled to justice-
based entitlements, e.g. minority rights or exemptions from otherwise binding norms, 
obligations and laws. 
Any educational agenda of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity that claims to be 
consistent with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its 
commitment to civic equality, then, needs to address two separate issues. At one level, it needs 
to identify the civic priorities and the individual interests in educating citizens as fully 
cooperating members of a polity. At the other level, it needs to articulate the principled bases 
of the institutional arrangement and curriculum design of public education that would be 
sensitive to the various challenges the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity is faced with. A defensible conception 
of the civic purposes of public education in a plurally diverse polity, then, needs to specify 
both the educational significance of individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances as well 
as the distributive conditions of the fair terms of engagement with diversity. In this sense, an 
educational agenda of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and 
equal members of a polity must be seen not as an issue concerning the relative efficiency of 
different accounts of engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous but 
rather as an issue of how an alternative way of articulating the civic priorities and the individual 
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interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity is to be justified. 
These challenges associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality require an articulation of a justice-based 
conception of difference-sensitivity that would enable the basic institutional framework of a 
plurally diverse polity to adequately address the educational significance of engagement with 
forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous. Moreover, the problems of public education 
in educating students as fully cooperating members of a polity open up a number of questions 
over the foundations, nature and value of the toleration-based approach to diversity as both 
historically and conceptually, toleration is one of the foundational characteristics and among the 
most important attributes of any conception that claims to be consistent with a broadly liberal 
outlook and the basic virtue associated with a liberal conception of citizenship. I examine these 
controversies and the related problems at length in the next chapter of the thesis. 
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Notes 
The conception of a citizen as a fully cooperating member of a polity I use throughout the thesis is 
based on Rawls's articulation of the idea of citizens 'regarded as free and equal, and as fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life, from one generation to the next' (Rawls, 
1993). 
For a historical and conceptual overview of the idea of citizenship, see Beiner (1995); Heater 
(1999, 2004a, 2004b), Faulks (2000), Kymlicka and Norman (1995), Kymlicka and Norman 
(2000) and Kymlicka (2002). 
3 	 For a discussion of citizenship education in 'divided societies', see the contributions in a special 
issue of the Cambridge Journal of Education, vol. 33, issue 1, March 2003. 
4 	 Liberals have defended themselves against these critical objections by using different strategies 
either to [i] modify the theory in the part that should make it more internally consistent with its 
basic normative commitments (e.g. Rawls in Political Liberalism (1993)); [ii] incorporate part of 
the criticism by modifying or extending some aspects of the foundational elements of one's theory 
or its basic principles (e.g. Kymlicka in Multicultural Citizenship (1995)); [iii] respond and clarify 
one's position, reject the criticism as inconsistent with the basic principles of liberal political theory 
(e.g. Barry in Culture and Equality (2001)). 
5 	 For an examination of the hijab controversy in France in all its details, see, Laborde, 2008. 
6 	 For a discussion of the various problems associated with the publication of the cartoons of the 
prophet Muhammad, see, Laegaard, 2007a and 2007b. 
7 	 In her Tanner Lectures on Human Values entitled American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion 
Judith Shklar identified four distinct though related meanings of citizenship, 'citizenship as 
nationality, as active participation or 'good' citizenship, and finally, ideal republican citizenship' 
(Shklar, 1989: 3). 
8 	 In Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness, 
Joseph H. Carens advances a criticism that the unitary model of citizenship fails to take into 
account the legal, psychological and political dimension of citizenship (2000 [ch. 7]). 
For a discussion of the limits of patriotism, see the Nussbaum's essay 'Patriotism and 
Cosmopolitanism' (1996) and the accompanying essays in Cohen and Nussbaum (eds.) (1996). 
10 	 In discussing the liberal theory of citizenship, Alan Patten distinguishes between three distinct 
questions any theory of citizenship needs to answer, i.e. [i] the membership question; [ii] the 
entitlement question; and [iii] the responsibility question (Patten, 2000). 
11 	 For a classical expositions of the difference between the liberties of the ancients and the liberties of 
the moderns, see Benjamin Constant's essay 'The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of 
the Moderns' in his Political Writings (1988). 
12 	 For further reflections on birthright citizenship and the involuntary character of the status of 
citizenship as a political conception of the person, see Shachar (2009). 
13 The question of why members of a polity have rights is one of the basic disagreements among 
liberals and gives rise, as Daniel Weinstock emphasises, 'to disputes concerning their content' 
(Weinstock, 2009: 126). As an example of this dispute, he compares the disagreements between 
autonomy-based liberalism and toleration-based liberalism. 
14 For a somehow different characterisation of the functions rights perform, see the distinction 
between the 'historical' and the 'analytical' approach Rawls outlines in Justice as Fairness. 
Contrary to the historical approach, writes Rawls, the analytical approach 'considers the political 
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and social conditions essential for the adequate development and full exercise of the two moral 
powers of free and equal persons' (Rawls, 2001: 45). 
15 A conception of the good, writes Rawls, 'normally consists of a more or less determinate scheme 
of final ends, that is, ends we want to realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other 
persons and loyalties to various groups and associations' (Rawls, 1993: 19). 
16 Compared with the status of citizenship, membership in the associational networks of civil society 
is based on the assumption of voluntary participation and free choice both to enter and to exit a 
particular organisation or community. This assumption of voluntarism in the associational network 
of civil society makes membership a matter of individual choice that is founded on the right to 
associate. 
17 For a discussion over freedom of association in a plurally diverse polity, see Gutmann (1998); 
Kukathas (2003); Spinner-Haley (2000); Rosenblum, (1998); Galston (2002a; 2005a). 
18 Civil rights include a set of basic rights that protect individuals from outside interference and 
include — inter alia — freedom of expression, freedom of association etc. 
19 Political rights include the right to vote and to hold public office. 
20 Social rights include the right to unemployment support, public education, social security,  etc. 
Compared to civil and political rights, their purpose is primarily redistributive and integrative 
rather than protective. 
21 For an examination of the republican critique of liberalism's alleged inattention to active 
citizenship and civic virtue, see Patten (1996). 
22 For arguments defending this approach, see Dahl (1989). For an objection against this approach, 
see Galston (2009: 104). 
23 Part of the multicultural critique is reflected from the communitarian critique of the liberal version 
of the rights-based conception of citizenship as Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer have been 
labelled communitarian critics of liberalism as well as have contributed to the multicultural 
critique of liberalism (Taylor, 1997; Walzer, 2003). 
24 For a comprehensive overview of the diversity of cultural/minority rights and the different models 
to accommodate cultural pluralism (e.g. religious exemptions, affirmative action etc), see Levy, 
2000 (chapter 5). 
25 For a liberal egalitarian criticism of multiculturalism and the associated model of multicultural 
citizenship, see Barry (2001). A rejoinder to Barry's critique of multiculturalism has been collected 
in an edited collection by Paul Kelly (2002). 
26 On the discussion over 'the value of gender equality as an important limit on cultural 
accommodation', see Song, 2007. Amy Gutmann advances the claim that the right of individuals to 
exit the group does not suffice to ensure democratic justice (Gutmann, 2003: chapter 1 [pp. 38-85]). 
27 The doctrine of double effect has been used in just-war theory (Walzer, 1977). Other prominent 
political philosophers including Michael Sandel (2005) and Thomas Scanlon (2008) have also 
discussed various ethical issues, e.g. abortion, by applying the doctrine of double effect. For a 
comprehensive introduction to the various controversies over the doctrine of double effect 
including the basic texts by the most prominent contemporary moral and political philosophers, see 
Woodward (2001). 
28 For a critique of a reified and essenialist understanding of culture, see Phillips (2007). 
29 It was Douglas Rae who first emphasised that members of groups who are — in one way or another 
— disadvantaged do not equally share the same disadvantage(s) (1981). 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE BASIS OF THE TOLERATION-BASED 
APPROACH TO DIVERSITY 
As has been emphasised in the previous chapter of the thesis, contemporary accounts of 
citizenship remain divided over a number of tensions, problems and challenges that stem from 
our commitment to civic equality. Both traditional and contemporary critics of the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship forcefully argue that its principled 
commitment to civic equality is either too permissive and inefficient or too divisive, unfairly 
discriminatory and oppressive. It is the task of this chapter to articulate the foundations of the 
second principled commitment associated with the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship, i.e. the equal civic respect for diversity and its conception of the 
toleration-based approach to diversity. The basic aim of this chapter is to provide both a 
clarification and a defence of a toleration-based approach to diversity since toleration, as William 
A. Galston emphasises, is a 'core attribute of liberal pluralist citizenship' (Galston, 2009: 98). 
On the one hand, toleration needs to be clarified, because the complexity of the foundations, 
nature and the value of toleration as a political concept and the controversiality of the status, 
the justification and the limits of toleration in a plurally diverse polity, raise a set of challenges 
related to equal civic respect for diversity in the institutional arrangement and curriculum 
design of public education. On the other hand, toleration is to be defended because a toleration-
based approach to diversity — despite the various criticisms it received both from outside and 
from within the liberal tradition, I maintain — is the most consistent approach connected with the 
basic civic aim of public education, i.e. that of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect 
one another as free and equal members of a polity. Toleration, writes Meira Levinson, 'is one 
of the hallmarks of both a liberal state and the liberal citizen' (M. Levinson, 1999b: 103). 
The persistence of the moral and conceptual objections to the toleration-based approach 
to diversity confirms that toleration remains a contested concept, an ambiguous principle and 
an elusive virtue. In fact, there is hardly any concept in contemporary political thought that is 
more complex and controversial than that of toleration. Ultimately, several issues associated 
with the toleration-based approach to diversity remain disputed thus making any conception of 
toleration open to different interpretations since both friends and opponents of the toleration-
based approach to diversity have criticized liberalism's commitment to toleration as an 
insufficiently difference-sensitive mechanism for equal civic respect for diversity. I maintain 
that neither the traditional nor the contemporary critics of the toleration-based approach to 
diversity have paid sufficient attention to the clarification of the possibility conditions and 
justification of toleration as a political concept and the complexity of the circumstances of 
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toleration in a plurally diverse polity. While the first group of critics advance the objection that 
toleration of diversity fails to develop in students the basic civic virtues and public responsibility 
to maintain the basic institutional framework and the shared public values that provide us with 
the 'conditions of liberty', the second group of scholars maintain that the toleration-based 
approach to diversity is insufficiently inclusive in confronting claims associated with equal 
civic respect for diversity. They argue that it does not treat with equal civic respect individuals' 
diverse commitments and allegiances and the different conceptions of the good present in a 
plurally diverse polity. 
This chapter of the thesis consists of six sections. I present in Section I the main 
philosophical and conceptual issues related to the toleration-based approach to diversity in 
liberal political theory since our intuitive notion of toleration consists of a variety of conflicting 
meanings and interpretations. I first elaborate the different questions associated with a liberal 
conception of toleration and then outline the foundations of a toleration-based approach to 
diversity. I identify in section II the conditions and circumstances of a toleration-based 
approach to diversity as well as critically evaluate the principal arguments associated with the 
justification of toleration as a political concept. It is in this section that the complexity of the 
toleration-based approach to diversity comes to the forefront. In particular, I aim to clarify the 
principal background conditions a particular act must be consistent with in order to qualify as 
an act of toleration. In Section III of this chapter, I articulate the most pressing moral and 
conceptual objections against the toleration-based approach to diversity advanced by its many 
critics. Each of the moral and conceptual objections presented in this section criticises a 
particular element of the background conditions of toleration identified in section II of this 
chapter. Section IV addresses the two separate dimensions of the limits of toleration as a 
political concept. I then present in section V two of the competing approaches to the 
accommodation of diversity that the toleration-based approach to diversity is faced with: that 
of mutual respect and that of recognition. Advocates of these two approaches use some of the 
moral and conceptual objections identified earlier in Section III of this chapter to argue that a 
toleration-based approach to diversity is insufficiently inclusive in confronting claims associated 
with equal civic respect for diversity and that both mutual respect and recognition are more 
consistent with this commitment associated with the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship. I then proceed with a critical examination of the tensions between 
toleration, mutual respect and recognition and the limits each of the three models of 
engagement with diversity is faced with. In the concluding section of this chapter, I outline the 
conditions for a modified conception of the toleration-based approach to diversity that mediates 
between different requirements associated with the two principled commitments of the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. 
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1. 	 Foundations of the toleration-based approach to diversity 
The understanding of the basis of a liberal conception of toleration, writes Samuel Scheffler, 
`has taken on a renewed urgency at this historical moment' (Scheffler, 1994: 5) since 
liberalism's commitment to tolerating forms of diversity that are both plural and heterogeneous 
is also responsible for much of what is problematic and burdensome about classical as well as 
contemporary liberalism. The complexity of the foundations, nature and value of toleration and 
the controversiality of the status, the justification and the limits of what is to be tolerated, raise 
a number of questions over the basis of toleration in a plurally diverse polity. As the existing 
literature on this topic exemplifies clearly (e.g. Castiglione and McKinnon, 2003; Dees, 2004; 
Deveaux, 2000; Galeotti, 2002; Heyd, 1996; Kukathas, 2003; McKinnon, 2006; Mendus, 1989; 
Newey, 1999; Parekh, 2000; Rawls, 1993; Sarda, 2010; Scanlon, 2003; Taylor, 1997; Walzer, 
1997; Williams and Waldron, 2008), the persistence of the moral and conceptual objections 
against toleration confirm that a number of issues associated with the toleration-based approach 
to diversity and the possibility conditions of toleration remain contested. Nevertheless, despite 
the traditional and the modern criticisms of toleration, the advocacy of toleration as the basic 
virtue associated with a liberal conception of citizenship that defines the very essence of a 
plurally diverse polity, remains strongly associated with all major proponents of the classical 
liberal political theory including John Locke (1983), Immanuel Kant (1991), John Stuart Mill 
(1989), Ronald Dworkin (2000), John Rawls (1993), Judith Shklar (1989) as well as those 
modern scholars identifying with liberal pluralism (e.g. Galston, 2002a, 2005a; Kukathas, 
2003) and liberal culturalism (e.g. Kymlicka, 1989, 1995; Raz, 1994). 'A liberal polity', writes 
Chandran Kukathas, 'is a political society that accommodates a wide variety of ways of life 
without attempting to bring about any deep social and political unity' (Kukathas, 1998: 696). 
While both classical and contemporary proponents of toleration argued succinctly for 
its necessity for the maintenance of a stable and peaceful political community, its status, its 
justification and the limits of what is to be tolerated have met with a number of objections and 
criticisms throughout its historical development. These three foundational questions associated 
with a toleration-based approach to diversity, i.e. [i] why toleration; [ii] toleration of what 
[what is a legitimate object of toleration]; and [iii] how to tolerate; contributed in large part to 
the ambiguity surrounding the theory and the practice of toleration. At the heart of these 
controversies over the foundations, nature and value of toleration in a plurally diverse polity, lie 
a number of conceptual, normative and educational problems stemming from the requirements 
of equal civic respect for diversity in a polity that is plural in its cultures, values and traditions. 
A number of questions arise out of these manifold and complex demands for toleration, respect 
and recognition of diversity in the public institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity: 
What are the conditions of a toleration-based approach to diversity? Is this model of 
accommodating diversity sufficiently inclusive? Does a toleration-based approach to diversity 
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present a sufficiently elaborated model of accommodation of diversity to adequately address 
cultural and value pluralism? What are the limits of a toleration-based approach to diversity? 
In order to elaborate a political conception of toleration that is to be consistent with the 
second principled commitment associated with the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship [the equal civic respect for diversity] there are three separate tasks to 
be completed. First, it is necessary to articulate the conditions and the circumstances of 
toleration and to determine — amongst other things — what a relevant object of toleration is and 
what its justifications are. Next, there needs to be an analysis of the most pressing objections 
against the toleration-based approach to diversity. In the end, toleration as a political concept 
needs to be evaluated alongside other models of accommodating diversity, including mutual 
respect and recognition in order to clarify its advantages and shorthcomings as well as the 
various tensions, problems and challenges that are associated with a toleration-based approach 
to diversity. 
I. I 	 The puzzle of toleration 
The history and the development of toleration within the liberal tradition revolves around three 
basic questions identified by Susan Mendus in her Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism: [i] 
What is toleration? [ii] What is its justification? and [iii] What are the limits of toleration? 
(Mendus, 1989). Throughout the history of liberal political theory, a number of different and 
sometimes divergent arguments have been articulated to support toleration as a mechanism to 
grapple with the various forms of diversity that were sources of conflict. Liberalism, as Susan 
Mendus persuasively argues, 'begins from a premise of individual diversity' (ibid.: 56). Ever 
since the aftermath of the Medieval wars of religion where liberalism was born, modern 
societies have grappled with religious, social and ethnocultural diversity as potential sources of 
possible division and conflict. However, originally toleration was not a mechanism for the 
accommodation of diversity. As Michael Walzer rightly emphasises, the form of toleration that 
emerged out of the wars of religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 'is simply a 
resigned acceptance of difference for the sake of peace' (Walzer, 1997: 10). Historically, 
toleration arose out of doctrinal strife within the Catholic Church during the 16th and the 17th 
Century in Europe that challenged and ultimately radically transformed the prevailing forms of 
religious orthodoxy (e.g. Dees, 2004; Kaplan, 2010; Mendus, 1989; Williams & Waldron, 2008). 
The transformation of toleration from a pragmatic and prudential mechanism necessary for the 
security of peace and stability of an absolutist monarchy (e.g. in Medieval Europe) or empire 
(the Ottoman Empire)1 into to a 'universally' acceptable principle to accommodate diversity 
needs further clarification. As William Galston emphasises: 
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Religious toleration may well have begun as a modus vivendi directed toward the abatement of 
pious cruelty, but it developed into a doctrine of principled limits to state power. (Galston, 
2002b: 116) 
In other words, liberalism as a political theory about the limits of state power has universalised 
the toleration-based approach to diversity as a major mechanism of stability and peaceful 
coexistence between conflicting conceptions of the good within a plurally diverse polity by 
placing restrictions 'on the rationale that can be employed to justify state policy and on the 
means available to the state in pursuit of its aims' (Macleod, 1997: 542). The liberal 
foreground, writes Stephen Macedo, 'is composed of what might be thought of as negative 
constitutionalism: a sphere of individual inviolability [...] and the familiar constitutional 
mechanisms designed to ward off incursions on that sphere' (Macedo, 2000: 9). Liberalism, as 
Stephen Macedo argues, 
is grounded in a shared commitment to a range of political values and practices: to tolerance and 
mutual respect for fellow citizens, [...], but also to a range of distinctively liberal virtues that 
include respect for the rule of law and the democratic process, a willingness to think critically 
about public affairs, and a willingness to affirm the supreme political authority of principles that 
we can justify in public from a point of view that we can share with reasonable fellow citizens 
of other religious faiths. (Macedo, 1995a: 225) 
The liberal formula that has developed out of the liberal model of toleration was based on two 
interrelated strategies that are closely associated with the toleration-based approach to diversity. 
The first of these was the 'strategy of privatisation' that delimited the impact of a conflict and 
the second the strategy of non-interference. Both strategies associated with the toleration-based 
approach to diversity have had a crucial impact on the success of accommodating diversity in a 
plurally diverse polity as well as on the criticism against the liberal formula of resolving 
doctrinal conflicts that can be labelled as the puzzle of toleration. Two distinct problems related 
to the liberal doctrine of toleration can be identified here. The first concerns the strategy of 
privatisation associated with toleration. The other — and perhaps more problematic — is the 
universalisation of the toleration-based approach to diversity, as some scholars have argued, to 
the area of ethical choice in general. On this interpretation, the liberal formula is based on the 
assumption of 'liberal expectancy' (Rosenblum, 1998: 53-57), which is the expectation that 
the two strategies associated with the toleration-based approach to diversity will gradually 
exert a kind of gravitational pull on the associative networks of civil society. As Sanford 
Levinson empasized, toleration of diversity includes the expectancy that 'exposure to diverse 
beliefs and ways of life over time will shift the tolerated's view towards those of the tolerator' 
(S. Levinson, 2003: 91-92). Liberals hope and expect, writes Will Kymlicka, 'that ethnic, 
religious, and cultural associations will, over time, voluntarily adjust their practices and beliefs 
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to bring them more in line with the public principles of liberalism, which will reduce the 
`incongruence' between associational norms and liberal principles' (Kymlicka, 2002: 103). 
Similarly, as Jurgen Habermas emphasises eloquently, 
[t]he liberal state expects that the religious consciousness of the faithful will become modernized 
by way of a cognitive adaptation to the individualistic and egalitarian nature of the laws of the 
secular community. (Habermas, 2003: 6) 
However, the two strategies identified above have contributed to a number of challenges that 
are associated with the failure of the toleration-based approach to diversity — on some 
interpretations — to pay equal civic respect to all members of a plurally diverse polity. Three 
potential 'perverse' side effects associated with the puzzle of toleration can be identified here, 
i.e. [i] the overall reduction of diversity; [ii] the transformative effect on citizens' character; 
and [iii] the creation of conflicting diversity. The first challenge consists in the reduction of 
social, cultural and religious diversity due to the spillover of a liberal political culture and its 
two principled commitments into other areas of social life, e.g. the associative networks of civil 
society.2 As John Gray points out, 'liberal societies tend to drive out non-liberal forms of life, 
to ghettoize or marginalize them, or to trivialize them' (Gray, 1996: 154). 
Secondly, the transformative effect of the toleration-based approach to diversity does 
have a spillover effect on citizens' overall behaviour in other social spheres as well. As Jeff 
Spinner-Haley rightly emphasises, 'toleration is not only about establishing a private sphere; it 
also makes demands on how citizens act in public' (Spinner-Haley, 1994: 38). In this sense, the 
toleration-based approach would be inconsistent with the 'liberal promise', for example with 
the prudential commitment 'not to impose on some the values of others' (Sandel, 2005: 109). 
Thirdly, the toleration of diversity creates the risk of marginalising those forms of diversity that 
are inconsistent with the toleration-based approach to diversity or otherwise incompatible with 
the fair terms of cooperation in a plurally diverse polity. On this interpretation, we end up with 
a less heterogeneous society but — at the same time — there is greater risk of both alienation of 
these groups from the basic institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity and the creation 
of conflicting diversity that creates greater distance between members of the mainstream and 
those members of a polity whose values, beliefs or conceptions of the good might be 
incompatible or in tension with society's broader social arrangements. 
In order to examine in detail the various objections to the toleration-based approach to 
diversity that are to be addressed in Section III of this chapter, I examine below the conditions 
and the circumstances of toleration as a political concept, i.e. the general structure of the act of 
toleration that define the internal dynamics of any act that claims to be an act of toleration and 
the background conditions with which a particular act needs to be consistent with in order to 
qualify as an act of toleration. 
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II. 	 Conditions and circumstances of toleration3 
In order to examine in detail the moral and the conceptual objections against the liberal 
conception of toleration [Section III] and to evaluate the toleration-based approach to diversity 
against the related advancement of mutual respect and recognition as more appropriate 
mechanisms for the accommodation of diversity in a plurally diverse polity [Section V] there is 
a twofold task to be undertaken at this stage. First, we have to identify the foundational 
elements of a toleration-based approach to diversity, such as the elements that constitute the 
basis of any conception of toleration that is consistent with the liberal version of the rights-
based conception of citizenship. Second, and relatedly, we have to identify the principal 
background conditions of a toleration-based approach to diversity. This must include the 
circumstances a particular act needs to be consistent with in order to qualify as an act of 
toleration.4 The general structure of a toleration-based approach to diversity can be formulated 
by the following formulas: 
A tolerates B despite/because of the fact that B believing or doing p A finds 
false and/or morally objectionable. 6 
There are four basic elements in the formulation of the structure of toleration explicated above, 
i.e. [i] the tolerating agent [agent A], that exercises the capacity for toleration; [ii] the tolerated 
agent [agent B], that is being tolerated by the tolerating agent [agent A]; [iii] the object of 
toleration7 [action or belief p] — the source of disagreement between the two agents [A and B]; 
and [iv] the justifying ground for toleration, i.e. the rationale, why the action or belief p is 
being tolerated. The basic elements that constitute the general structure of toleration define the 
internal dynamics of any act that claims to be an act of toleration. However, there exist a 
number of different interpretations of the basic elements that constitute the structure of 
toleration identified above. We can identify three principal controversies associated with the 
foundations, nature and the value of toleration that need further clarification. 
First, who can qualify as an agent of toleration, e.g. is this an individual, a group, a 
political community? Next, what is the nature of the object of toleration? What do we actually 
tolerate? A doctrinal belief [religious belief], a value or a particular practice? What form of 
diversity can count as a legitimate object of toleration? Finally, how do we actually tolerate? 
Do we merely allow the object of toleration to exist, we do not persecute the tolerated agent or 
does the tolerating agent need to extend some positive protection to the tolerated agent, e.g. the 
facilitation or active support of its ethical environment? 
The background conditions of toleration set the terms which a given act has to meet if it 
is to qualify as an act of toleration. The circumstances of the toleration-based approach to 
diversity refer to those elements of shared public life which give rise to the conditions of 
toleration. In fact, a number of background conditions must first be fulfilled in order for a 
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particular attitude to qualify as an act of toleration. The conditions of a liberal conception of 
toleration can be formulated by the following characteristics: 
(i) recognition of the disagreement over a particular belief, practice or value both the 
tolerating and the tolerated agent find important [the importance condition]; 
(ii) rejection of the belief, practice or value of the tolerated agent and its moral 
disapproval, i.e. the existence of a doctrinal conflict between beliefs and attitudes 
among the two agents that persist for good reasons [the disapproval condition]; 
(iii) possibility of the malleability of the object of toleration, e.g. a doctrinal [religious or 
ethical] belief, a value or a particular practice carried out by the tolerated agent [the 
malleability condition]; 
(iv) conditional acceptance of the source of disagreement between the two agents as a 
legitimate source of conflict [the reasonableness condition].8 
Each of the background conditions identified above is a necessary element of any act that 
claims to be an act of toleration. In this sense, the importance condition basically refers to the 
moral cost the act of toleration has for the tolerating agent. If, suppose, the tolerated agent 
[agent B] holds a belief that Earth is triangular, the tolerating agent [agent A] might find this 
belief either irrelevant or unimportant and therefore neither necessary nor required to be 
tolerated. The importance condition requires that believing or doing p must be of crucial 
importance for both the tolerating agent [agent A] as well as for the tolerated agent [agent B]. 
Next, the disapproval condition depends on the evaluative judgement of the object of 
toleration by the tolerating agent that results in the disapproval requiring that the tolerating 
agent rejects the truth or rightness of the conflict. In other words, toleration refers to a distinctive 
disposition of the tolerating agent to weigh adequately a particular element of the object of 
toleration that the tolerated agent holds. As Graham Haydon emphasises, Ji]f we do not in 
some way dislike or disapprove of something, the question of tolerance towards it does not 
arise' (Haydon, 2006b: 460). However, it is necessary not to confuse toleration with civility and 
indifference (Walzer, 1997) or resignation (Galeotti, 2002) as the circumstances of toleration, 
writes Glen Newey, 'arise out of conflicting beliefs about value' (Newey, 1999: 158). 
Furthermore, the malleability condition primarily refers to the very character of the 
object of toleration. Two contrasting interpretations of this background condition of toleration 
can be identified here, i.e. 'old' and 'new' toleration (Jones, 2006). On the one hand, 'old' 
toleration is basically concerned with religious and moral disagreement. The beneficiaries of 
toleration were individuals and 'what was tolerated — their beliefs and values — were self-
chosen rather than ascriptive features of those individuals' (ibid.: 125). On this interpretation, 
the object of toleration that is the source of conflict or disagreement between the two agents is 
basically temporary in nature. More precisely, the paradoxical nature of toleration refers to its 
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temporary status. On the other hand, 'new' toleration, as Peter Jones emphasises, is to be 
directed at group identities rather than conscience-based commitments of individuals. The 
features that require toleration are basically ascriptive: these identities, unlike conscience-based 
commitments of individuals, are normally fixed elements of one's identity. 
Finally, the reasonableness condition of disapproval between the two agents of 
toleration is primarily concerned with the justification of toleration which presents itself as the 
motivational foundation of an act of toleration. Both early and modern advocates of toleration 
have offered a number of different accounts of the justification of why and how a particular 
form of diversity should be tolerated, e.g. religious, prudential, sceptical, epistemic, political, 
justice-based and pluralist. For example, the early liberal account of toleration exemplified by 
John Locke in his Letter Concerning Toleration (Locke, 2010) is characterized by two 
prevailing justifications for toleration, i.e. [i] the prudential argument; and [ii] the sceptical 
argument. In the first justification for toleration, he argued that using force is not the right way 
of resolving a conscience-based dispute since by forcing someone to change his religious 
belief we do not get the conversion for the right purpose and therefore cannot qualify as a 
sincere belief. As Stephen Macedo eloquently emphasises, for Locke 'persecution is irrational 
because faith depends on inward assent and cannot be coerced' (Macedo, 2007: 814). Second, 
he argued that belief can be fallible. Since we do not know what the right way to salvation is, 
we have to tolerate a variety of religious paths. 
The conditions and the circumstances of toleration identified above set limits to what 
qualifies as a relevant act of toleration in politically relevant contexts. In this respect, toleration 
is to be clearly delimited from attitudes that might have similar practical effects but are not 
equivalent with it at the moral level, e.g. indifference, compromise or resignation. In this 
respect, I agree with David Heyd's narrowing down of the concept of toleration: 
Wile concept of toleration must be narrowed down in its philosophical use so as to refer strictly 
to cases in which restraint in the response to another's belief or action is based on some 
specifically moral grounds (thus excluding both compromise and indifference). (Heyd, 1996: 4) 
Understood in this way, toleration therefore does not arise in cases where a conflict — however 
important — is limited to pragmatic considerations only but to those forms of diversity that are 
primarily publicly relevant. 
Yet, despite its centrality in the history of liberal political thought, a number of 
objections against the foundations, nature and the value of toleration have been advanced by a 
vast range of critics. In the next section of this chapter I examine the most pressing objections 
raised against the inadequacy and the limits of toleration. 
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III. 	 Moral and conceptual objections to toleration 
The inadequacy of the toleration-based approach to diversity has been advanced on a number of 
grounds. Two prevailing sets of objections can be associated with these criticisms, i.e. [i] the 
moral objections to toleration; and [ii] the conceptual objections against toleration. Central to 
the moral objections against toleration have been three interrelated objections that point to the 
morally troubling character of the toleration-based approach to diversity, i.e. [i] the social 
fragmentation objection; [ii] the virtue-based objection; and [iii] the justice-based objection. 
The conceptual objections to toleration consist of four differing objections that question the 
consistency of the toleration-based approach to diversity with the second principled 
commitment associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship, 
i.e. [i] the strategy of privatisation objection; [ii] the redundancy objection; [iii] the inegalitarian 
objection; and [iv] the paradoxical objection. 
Each of the objections that constitute the two sets of objections identified at the outset 
of this section point to a specific shortcoming associated with the toleration-based approach to 
diversity. However, two distinct features characterise each of the two sets of objections. On the 
one hand, the moral objections to toleration refer primarily to the morally troubling value of the 
toleration-based approach to diversity. For example, the notion that toleration is insufficiently 
inclusive in confronting claims associated with equal civic respect for diversity, i.e. that it does 
not give equal weight to the different, values, beliefs and conceptions of the good present in a 
plurally diverse polity. Furthermore, two distinct puzzles associated with the morally troubling 
character of toleration identified by the moral objections against the toleration-based approach 
to diversity need to be emphasised here, i.e. [a] the process-based puzzle; and [b] the goal-
based puzzle. The process-based puzzle refers to the morally troubling nature of the toleration-
based approach to diversity, e.g. that the mere act of toleration including non-interference with 
conceptions of the good, practices or values that are the object of toleration is in itself 
problematic. On this interpretation, the very toleration of diversity is morally problematic as it 
might contribute to social fragmentation and a reduced degree of civic unity among citizens. In 
contrast, the goal-based puzzle is primarily concerned with the outcome of the toleration-based 
approach to diversity. On that view, toleration fails to develop in citizens the basic civic virtues 
including public responsibility to maintain the basic institutional framework of a plurally 
diverse polity that provide us with the 'conditions of liberty'. On the other hand, the conceptual 
objections against toleration refer primarily to the puzzling nature of the toleration-based 
approach to diversity. For example, the inegalitarian objection against toleration points toward 
an inconsistency between a liberal conception of toleration and the social, cultural and political 
pluralism that is the result of the toleration-based approach to diversity. I examine below the 
two sets of objections to toleration separately. 
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III. 1 Moral objections to toleration 
III.1.1 The social fragmentation objection 
Advocates of the social fragmentation objection argue that accommodation of diversity 
associated with the toleration-based approach to diversity fails to take into account the degree 
of moral convergence it takes to sustain a plurally diverse polity and its basic institutional 
framework. As Chandran Kukathas has eloquently elaborated the principal characteristics of 
this objection, `[t]he greater the diversity of cultural groups with independent moral traditions 
within a polity, the less the extent of social unity within that political society' (Kukathas, 2003: 
160). The morally troubling character of toleration associated with this objection is premised 
on the assumption that the presence of different and competing values, beliefs and practices 
undermines both civic unity and social cohesion upon which the stability and the maintenance 
of a plurally diverse societies is based. As Will Kymlicka points out, 
if society accepts and encourages more and more diversity, in order to promote cultural 
inclusion, it seems that citizens will have less and less in common. If affirming difference is 
required to integrate marginalised groups into the common culture, there may cease to be a 
common culture. (Kymlicka, cited in Beiner, 1995: 6) 
Furthermore, the social, cultural and doctrinal diversity would undermine the equitable 
distribution of resources due to the lack of a sense of civic unity and social cohesion among 
citizens of a political community.9 
111.1.2. The virtue-based objection 
The virtue-based objection to toleration consists of the claims that toleration of diversity fails 
to develop in citizens the basic civic virtues and public responsibility to maintain the basic 
institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity that provide us with the 'conditions of 
liberty'. On this interpretation, the social consequences of toleration would challenge and 
potentially undermine citizens' allegiance to our shared institutions as well as the capacities 
and dispositions conducive to active engagement in the activities of shared public interest. 
Furthermore, social conservative and civic republican scholars advance a criticism, that the 
toleration-based approach to diversity is basically ineffective in itself as instead of producing 
citizens equipped with the virtues, capacities and dispositions for active involvement in public 
life, it creates citizens without a sense of community and membership within a polity, without a 
sense of solidarity and citizens who are not likely to participate in the associative networks of 
civil society. On this interpretation, the morally troubling character of toleration creates the 
very conditions that would undermine both civic unity and social stability. 
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111.1.3 The justice-based objection 
In contrast to the previous two moral objections advanced primarily by social conservative and 
civic republican critics of the toleration-based approach to diversity, the justice-based objection 
to toleration is advanced by multiculturalists (e.g. Parekh, 2000). Its main argument is that the 
toleration-based approach to diversity does not give enough weight to the distinctive character 
of those groups and individuals that are — in one way or another — not part of society's broader 
social arrangements. More precisely, multiculturalist scholars argue forcefully that toleration is 
insufficiently inclusive in confronting claims associated with equal civic respect for diversity. 
The accommodation of diversity based on the principle of toleration, so the criticism goes, 
offers an inadequate response to the circumstances of multicultural democratic societies as it 
fails to pay equal civic respect to all citizens in the design of its basic institutional framework, 
including public education. Contrary to the social fragmentation objection, the justice-based 
objection claims that the toleration-based approach to diversity has deleterious effects on 
tolerated agents. In this sense, oppressed minorities' claims for recognition need to be 
articulated as justice-based claims for public recognition of their distinctive identities so that 
these members of a plurally diverse polity can enjoy the same basic conditions associated with 
cultural diversity. 
The basic objection of multiculturalism is that the toleration-based approach to diversity 
as a liberal response to the claims for accommodation of diversity fails to address the 
complexities of the problems posed by cultural and value pluralism. While multiculturalists 
have a point that the equal treatment of individuals irrespective of their background conditions 
can result in an unjust outcome, their proposed model for the accommodation of diversity — as 
is to be examined in section V of this chapter — raises more problems than it solves. As was 
emphasised in Section IV of the previous chapter, the traditional critique that liberal scholars 
have raised is that multiculturalists' accommodation of diversity creates the 'paradox of 
multicultural vulnerability' (Shachar, 2001). In this sense, accommodation of diversity along 
multiculturalist lines including minority rights potentially oppresses the most disadvantaged 
members of these minority communities and therefore creating a paradoxical situation. While 
this objection holds much relevance and has opened an important area of criticism addressed to 
multiculturalism by both feminist and liberal egalitarian scholars, another problem is likely to 
arise. I will argue that accommodation of diversity in the school curriculum, i.e. 'inclusion of 
diversity' advocated by both multiculturalists and some proponents of `transformative 
liberalism' (Gutmann, 1999; M. Levinson, 1999a; Macedo, 2000; Reich, 2002) raises two 
interrelated problems. The first problem is that accommodation of diversity by enlarging the 
school curriculum to represent a perspective from a formerly oppressed minority might create 
internal disputes among members of this group over what actually characterizes the very 
identity or tradition of this group. At the same time, it can potentially reduce the internal 
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pluralism of a minority community. By creating and sustaining a more egalitarian plateau 
between minorities and the majority or between different minorities within a particular society, 
the internal diversity of this very group is put at risk. The other problem is the issue of privacy 
which is raised against the transformative liberal agenda of engagement with diversity. I 
examine both problems at length in Part II and Part III of the thesis. 
The moral objections identified above could lead to the conclusion that the social 
consequence of tolerating diversity is morally problematic. While the first and the second 
objection identified above share the claim that the toleration-based approach is basically 
ineffective, the third objection claims that toleration is unjust. 
III. 2 Conceptual objections to toleration 
Several conceptual objections to toleration can also be identified. They differ from the moral 
objections against toleration examined in the previous section of this chapter primarily in terms 
of the criticisms of the various aspects of the nature of toleration. Four basic conceptual 
objections against the toleration-based approach to diversity can be identified here, i.e.: [i] the 
strategy of privatisation objection; [ii] the redundancy objection; [iii] the inegalitarian 
objection; and [iv]; the paradoxical objection. Let me examine each of them in turn. 
111.2.1 The strategy of privatisation objection 
One important aspect of toleration consists in the removal of the disrupting source of potential 
conflict between the two or more agents of toleration from public and political life thus 
neutralizing the potential conflict. Its protection of religious freedom and freedom of thought in 
general, cannot be subsumed under the protection of other forms of diversity, such as 
ethnocultural diversity. On this interpretation, as some scholars have argued, its 'strategy of 
privatisation' functions as a kind of limit on accommodation of diversity. Rather than requiring 
that people give up their membership in a religious community or the associative network of 
civil society, the toleration-based approach to diversity basically requires that any doctrinal 
allegiance be kept out of public life. At the same time, some critics even argue that what 
liberalism and its toleration-based approach to diversity does is that it disvalues the object over 
which there is a dispute, for example a religious belief or a conception of the good. 
111.2.2 The redundancy objection 
Another important objection to the toleration-based approach to diversity is that toleration as a 
political principle is redundant as with the introduction of equal basic rights, the issue of 
opposition towards a particular practice or value would not arise (Galeotti, 2002). On this 
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interpretation, toleration written about by Montesquieu, Locke and Voltairel° was toleration 
situated in an absolutist monarchy and not a liberal and democratic polity characterized by 
religious pluralism, nondiscrimination policies and other basic rights. According to this 
objection, toleration as a political principle is irrelevant to the functioning and justice of a 
plurally diverse polity and its basic institutional framework and therefore redundant. A related 
objection against toleration has been that it is not appropriate for a plurally diverse polity. In 
this sense, toleration is basically what remained from a previous public order, e.g. absolutism. 
As Monique Deveaux emphasises, 'weak toleration', i.e. a model of toleration that relies 
exclusively on non-interference 'is perhaps best suited to the contexts of nondemocratic states, 
where discrimination and persecution on religious and ethnic grounds are still much in 
evidence' (Deveaux, 2000: 46). On this interpretation, toleration is an institutional mechanism 
which is not appropriate for a modern liberal and democratic polity as it is inconsistent with 
common principles and shared public values together with the liberal version of the rights-
based conception of citizenship. 
111.2.3 The inegalitarian objection 
The objection that toleration is basically inegalitarian can be further divided into two basic 
views. The first view consists in the claim that toleration reflects a hierarchical position of 
power. On this interpretation, Samuel Scheffler emphasises, the asymmetrical character of 
toleration reveals that 'it is the prerogative of the strong to tolerate the weak, but the weak are 
not in a position to tolerate the strong' (Scheffler, 2010: 315). The other critical part of the 
inegalitarian objection argues that toleration is an inadequate model for accommodating 
diversity since the liberal model of citizenship is based on the ideal of civic equality thus 
making toleration in a plurally diverse polity both logically and politically contradictory. 
Another element characterizing the circumstances of toleration is that the tolerating agent has 
the power to interfere with the offending practice whereas the tolerated agent does not. On this 
interpretation, toleration is a one-way relationship with an asymmetry of power between the 
two parties and is therefore implicitly an inegalitarian principle since it does not presuppose 
some sort of equality between the two agents [agent A and agent B]. 
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111.2.4 The paradoxical objection 
The paradoxical objection against toleration needs to be divided in two separate criticisms that 
refer to some paradoxical character of the toleration-based approach to diversity. First, the 
paradoxical nature of toleration refers to the temporary nature of toleration and is connected 
with the malleability condition of toleration identified in Section II of this chapter. Once the 
tolerated agent accepts the doctrinal perspective of the tolerating agent, toleration would no 
longer be necessary. Second, one of the strongest objections to toleration has been advanced by 
scholars who are sympathetic to liberalism or come from within liberal circles themselves 
(Williams, 2007 [ch. 10]; Scanlon, 2003 [ch. 10]). According to this version of the paradoxical 
objection associated with the nature of toleration, the very status of toleration as a virtue is 
questioned since it is being depicted as negative in nature. On this interpretation, exercising 
toleration, i.e. not interfering with a particular value, belief or practice we dislike or disapprove 
of, is in itself seen as paradoxical. We react negatively and we tolerate either choices, practices 
or actions of the tolerated agent [on a very limited interpretation we do not interfere with this 
particular practice] for their failure to comply with a morally unobjectionable perspective we 
would not have any motivation to disapprove of. In this sense, tolerating the choices, practices 
or actions of the tolerated agent we find wrong or false would therefore not qualify as a virtue. 
To summarise: there are two ways to understand the moral and the conceptual 
objections to the toleration-based approach to diversity. First, at one level, toleration is 
characterised by inconclusivess as it does not and cannot generate agreement on fundamental 
values or beliefs which are the object of disagreement between the two agents (the tolerating 
agent [agent A] and the tolerated agent [agent B])." Despite the absence of agreement on the 
true or the right character of the dividing value, belief or practice, the two agents remain 
divided on the foundational value of the object of toleration. 'Toleration rightly understood', 
writes William Galston, imposes 'the principled refusal to use coercive state instruments to 
impose one's own views on others' (Galston, 1995: 528), a commitment 'to moral competition 
through recruitment and persuasion alone' (Galston, 2009: 98). Contrary to our intuitive 
understanding of toleration and the common everyday usage of the term, toleration does not 
require us to abandon our disagreement with the value or practice we find false or wrong but 
merely places limitations on how a conflict over a particular contested issue that presents itself 
as the object of toleration can be managed. As Barbara Herman rightly emphasises, 
[i]n moral theory influenced by classical liberal values, toleration is sometimes offered as a 
reasonable strategy of response to a wide range of moral disagreements in circumstances of 
pluralism. Its value is defended as both pragmatic and instrumental: it does not require the 
resolution of all moral disagreements, and it enables other liberal values such as autonomy, 
pursuit of truth, and privacy. (Herman, 2007: 30) 
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Second, and more radically, some critics have claimed that toleration is characterised by 
indeterminacy because it cannot provide the tolerating agent with sufficient reason(s) for 
rejecting the morally objectionable/false belief or particular practice. As William Galston 
emphasises, jo]bviously, restraining ourselves from translating disagreement into coercion is 
good whenever we lack an adequate basis for suppressing such differences' (Galston, 2005b: 
585). On this interpretation, the principled dependence of toleration on an independent 
normative resource, as Rainer Forst emphasises eloquently (2007), exemplify that toleration in 
itself cannot qualify as positive or negative.'2 
Against the first of these two objections, I argue that the purpose of toleration is not to 
end disagreement as one of its foundational aims is to provide a way how citizens as free and 
equal members of a polity can resolve their moral, doctrinal and political differences or 
disputes that might arise from them. Against the second objection, the difficulty with toleration, 
as Thomas Scanlon emphasises, is concerned with 'the costs of having certain rights generally 
recognised, and with the problems posed by their open-ended character' (Scanlon, 2003: 3). 
What toleration expresses, he furthermore argues, is 'a recognition of common membership 
that is deeper than these conflicts, a recognition of others as just as entitled as we are to 
contribute to the definition of our society' (ibid.: 193). 
The moral and the conceptual objections against toleration examined in this section of 
Chapter 2 raise two separate questions associated with the foundations, nature and the value of 
toleration in a plurally diverse polity, i.e. [i] what are the limits of toleration; and [ii] what is 
the alternative to toleration. I examine these two questions in Section IV and Section V of this 
chapter respectively. 
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IV. 	 The limits of toleration 
The moral and the conceptual objections to toleration open two separate dimensions of the 
limits of toleration in politically relevant contexts that need to be emphasized here, i.e. [i] the 
logical dimension of the limits of toleration; and [ii] the moral dimension of the limits of 
toleration. I explicate both of them below. 
IV.] . The logical dimension 
The logical dimension of the limits of toleration delineates the conditions a particular act needs 
to fulfill in order to qualify as an act of toleration as exemplified in section II of this chapter. 
For example, the liberal and the multicultural conception of the logical dimension of the limits 
of toleration differ primarily over what can count as a relevant object of toleration. As has 
already been emphasised, toleration traditionally dealt with religious and moral conflicts. In 
contrast, a multicultural conception of toleration is to be directed at identities rather than beliefs 
and other conscience-based commitments of individuals. The logical dimension of the limits of 
toleration is therefore linked to the status as well as the nature of the object of toleration. 
IV.2. The moral dimension 
Unlike the logical dimension explicated above, the moral dimension of the limits of toleration 
addresses the problem which differences should be tolerated and what are the principled bases 
delineating the limits of toleration. The moral dimension, then, defines the situation where the 
reasons for the rejection of certain beliefs, practices or conceptions of the good are stronger 
than the reasons for its adoption. The moral dimension determines the limits of toleration and 
what is not to be tolerated. The classical liberal principle associated with the moral dimension 
of the limits of toleration is best represented by Mill's 'harm principle' introduced in On 
Liberty (Mill, 1859). Unless certain actions, practices, values and beliefs or conceptions of the 
good violate the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of others, they are to be tolerated. 
At the same time, both the logical and moral dimension of the limits of toleration raise 
the question of the alternative to toleration. In fact, over the last two decades the inadequacy of 
toleration has been argued from this very perspective. Two interpretations of this inadequacy 
can be identified. On the one hand, according to those sympathetic to it, toleration is 
insufficiently inclusive and should be expanded [internal criticism]. On the other hand, 
according to those who oppose it [external criticism], toleration should be replaced. Rejecting 
toleration, so these critics emphasise forcefully, would be more respectful of diversity and 
consistent with the common principles of a plurally diverse polity. These two positions generate 
two separate alternatives to toleration. I examine them in the following section of this chapter. 
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V. 	 Toleration, mutual respect and recognition: some tensions 
This section of Chapter 2 provides a theoretical examination of two competing approaches to 
toleration advanced by the internal and the external critique of toleration, those of mutual 
respect and recognition. I then move to the examination of the tensions between toleration, 
mutual respect and recognition and their implications for the project of educating citizens as 
fully cooperating members of a polity. 
V.1 	 Mutual respect 
In order to respond to the criticisms over the inadequacy of toleration and of the liberal 
institutional framework in general [e.g. the social fragmentation objection, the virtue-based 
objection, the justice-based objection] we need first to examine the notion of respect. At the 
outset, it is useful to note a basic distinction between two different kinds of respect advanced 
by Stephen Darwall in his article 'Two Kinds of Respect' (1977): [i] appraisal respect; and [ii] 
recognition respect. Appraisal respect, as he emphasises, has as its object 'persons or features 
which are held to manifest their excellence as persons or as engaged in some specific pursuit' 
(Darwall, 1977: 38). On the other hand, the other form of respect identified by Darwall as 
`recognition respect' implies that individuals 'are entitled to have other persons take seriously 
and weigh appropriately the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do' (ibid.). 
What this form of respect entails, writes Thomas Hill Jr, is the 'full recognition as a person, 
with the same moral worth as any other, co-membership in the community whose members 
share the authority to determine how things ought to be and the power to influence how they 
will be' (Hill, 1994: 4). To respect another individual as a moral person, Rawls emphasises, 'is 
to try to understand his aims and interests from his standpoint, and to present him with 
considerations that enable him to accept constraints on his conduct' (Rawls, 1971: 338). 
Among the most important advocates of an approach that would extend toleration13 and 
make it consistent with common principles and shared public values of a plurally diverse polity 
is that of Amy Gutmann as well as other scholars who identify with a broadly liberal outlook. 
The conception advanced is that of mutual respect. Gutmann defines mutual respect as 'a 
reciprocal positive regard among citizens who pursue ways of life that are consistent with 
honoring the basic liberties and opportunities of others' (Gutmann, 1995: 561). As she 
eloquently emphasises, 
Mutual respect requires a widespread willingness and ability to articulate our disagreements, to 
defend them before people with whom we disagree, to discern the difference between 
respectable and disrespectable disagreement, and to be open to changing our own minds when 
faced with well reasoned-criticism. (Gutmann, 1994: 24) 
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At the same time, she advances the conception of mutual respect as a more distinctive 
democratic virtue as mutual respect, 'demands more than the attitude of live and let live; it 
requires the willingness and ability to accord due intellectual and moral regard to reasonable 
points of view that we cannot ourselves accept as correct' (Gutmann, 1989: 75). An integral 
part of mutual respect is the 'exposure to diversity' argument whose basic claim is that 
exposing students to diverse ways of life either through a school curriculum or via the school 
ethos is important in the development of students' moral competence and responsibility since it 
challenges one's set of values and has an important interaction effect in understanding 'the 
diverse ways of life of their fellow citizens' (Gutmann, & Thompson, 1996: 66). Teaching 
mutual respect, writes Amy Gutmann, entails the exposure of children 'to diverse ways of life' 
(Gutmann, 1995: 561). 
However, the point neither Gutmann nor other advocates of mutual respect raise is that 
what differentiates toleration from mutual respect is that toleration imposes itself without 
intending to interfere with another's beliefs, values or conceptions of the good which are 
inconsistent or otherwise incompatible with common principles and shared public values of a 
plurally diverse polity. While part of this reasoning is unproblematic, exposing students to 
diverse ways of life is likely to pose a tensions for those students coming from a culturally 
disadvantaged background. A crucial limitation of the mutual respect argument, I maintain, is 
its insistence on the moral acceptance of the point of view which is a clear difference with 
condition (iii) the acceptance of the source of our disagreement as a legitimate source of 
disagreement that is found in the principle of toleration. What the mutual respect argument 
fails to acknowledge is the persistence of disagreement. 
I also argue that the argument advanced by Gutmann is open to question in at least two 
respects. First, it overestimates the convergence between basic intellectuall skills, knowledge 
and critical rationality and the development of democratic values, including mutual respect. 
Second, it assumes that exposure to diversity and possible mutual respect will necessarily 
result in the understanding of the 'other' point of view and its appreciation. In contrast, I 
maintain, 'exposure to diversity' might just as well lead to the reinforcing of the stereotypes 
and prejudices associated with a particular social, cultural or religious form of diversity. 
Moreover, this particular model of mutual respect is likely to have some negative implications 
concerning the basic attitude that citizens as free and equal members of a polity might take 
toward each other. As Will Kymlicka rightly emphasises, 
[...] 'understanding' is no guarantee of 'appreciation' or 'respect'. On the contrary, where 
people have deeply-held beliefs about true faith, discovering that other people have quite 
different views may simply reinforce the belief that they are misguided and/or corrupt. 
(Kymlicka, 2003a: 163-164) 
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And he continues with an exposition of toleration: 
The historic basis for toleration is not any sort of deep understanding or appreciation of the 
nature of other religions. Protestants do not have a deep understanding of the tenets of 
Catholicism, let alone Islam or Hinduism (and vice versa). If Protestants did somehow acquire a 
deeper understanding of the tenets of other religions, I doubt this would increase their 
appreciation of them. The basis of religious tolerance, I think, is quite different. Protestants 
recognise that Catholics and Muslims have deeply-held religious beliefs that matter as much to 
them as Protestant beliefs matter to Protestants. (Kymlicka, 2003a: 164) 
I argue that Gutmann's principle of mutual respect is not founded on the foundational liberal 
principle of toleration since toleration, by definition, addresses questions about how we should 
respond to things that we not only dislike but find morally wrong. The demands of mutual 
respect as advanced thus far might have serious implications for the regulation of students' 
private conduct since it can possibly use public schooling as a means for an authoritative 
statement of disapproval. These considerations of transformative citizenship education which 
could possibly result in the imposition of an overly restrictive account of citizenship education 
on all citizens open the possibility for the development of an intrusive or restrictive ethical 
environment. A crucial limitation of mutual respect, I maintain, is its insistence on the moral 
acceptance of a particular point of view. 
V.2 	 Recognition 
As part of the multiculturalist position, recognition is a key conceptual and practical alternative 
advanced under the banner of equal respect of diversity. Among the most distinctive arguments 
advanced by advocates of multiculturalism is that of Charles Taylor (1997). The multicultural 
conception of recognition as a positive public valorisation of a particular culture maintains that 
individuals' identity-based differentiated characteristics should be counted as having a valid 
claim for public recognition:4 In order to clarify this assertion a distinction should be pointed 
out. The liberal conception of public recognition is an example of a status-based model of 
recognition, where individuals are seen to possess shared status as free and equal members of a 
polity. In contrast, the multiculturalist model of recognition is identity-based as its justification 
consists in the claims for the public recognition of the difference of a particular individual or 
cultural group. The status-based model of recognition, as some scholars have argued, addresses 
the political conception of the person as a civic equal whereas the identity-based model of 
recognition addresses the value of a particular comprehensive conception of the good or 
ascriptive diversity and the related claims for the public recognition of its distinctive positive 
value. I5  
72 
The differences between toleration, respect and recognition have been formulated in a 
variety of ways. The first is conceptual. On one interpretation, toleration refers to a negative 
attitude of disapproval whereas recognition is a positive attitude of recognition of a distinctive 
element associated with a particular culture. The second refers to the sphere it addresses. More 
precisely, toleration addresses differences that are part of the private sphere, e.g. a religious 
belief. On the other hand, recognition consists in the public acceptance of a particular element 
of a culture. Third, toleration, respect and recognition differ also in the object they address. The 
object of toleration is or can be temporary in nature and this is one of the conditions, on some 
interpretations, for why we tolerate a particular belief, practice or conception of the good. At 
the same time, the very object of toleration and recognition differ since we are basically 
tolerant of something that pertains to individuals' choice, like religious belief and recognise 
what relates to one's circumstance, like cultural membership. One of the tensions between 
toleration and recognition is therefore primarily related to the status of the object of toleration 
and recognition. We tolerate what we basically can change and this is the motivational 
foundation to tolerate it. On the other hand, the notion of recognition has been associated with 
the recognition of culture or ascriptive elements of an identity. In contrast, the object of respect 
is the very status of a particular individual or group. The object of recognition can be the same 
and in this case recognition would act as an extension of either toleration or respect. However, 
the object of recognition can depart significantly from the previous two cases. To illustrate this 
point, we may consider the example of the inclusion and recognition of diversity in a 
multicultural educational environment, e.g. that our plurally diverse society consists of groups 
who are different from society's broader social arrangements (a particular religious or 
ethnocultural minority). In this case we recognise their different culture, beliefs or values while 
they do not differ from us in the status as they are equal members of our society. 
To summarise: what contemporary issues of pluralism and diversity largely amount to 
is that both civic equality and its 'uniform treatment approach' fail in different ways to give 
those who might be disadvantaged, oppressed or marginalised an equal standing as members of 
a polity. Part of the answer to these issues comes from the traditional divide between choice 
and chance. Difference stemming from individual choices can be tolerated, whereas difference 
stemming from 'objective' or ascriptive facts cannot. The latter needs to be compensated 
through a particular mechanism, such as redistribution. On this interpretation, recognition of 
diversity has two important implications. The first is that the recognition of particular ways of 
life provides individuals with the 'context of choice' within which to form and pursue their 
ideas of the good life. Cultural membership, writes Kymlicka, 
is not a means used in the pursuit of one's ends. It is rather the context within which we choose 
our ends, and come to see their value, and this is a precondition of self-respect, of the sense that 
one's ends are worth pursuing. (Kymlicka, 1989: 192-193) 
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Second, the view advocated by some proponents of autonomy-based liberalism adds that not 
only does diversity matter to the individual adherents of these ways of life or cultures, but 
nonmembers benefit also as they have a larger/broader range of options to choose from. On 
this interpretation, diversity is to enrich both a polity as a whole as well as its individual 
members. The controversies over the suitability of toleration is therefore not confined only to 
toleration as a political principle but extends also to other aspects of the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship itself, such as freedom of association and freedom of 
expression (Kukathas, 2003). 
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VI. 	 Conclusion 
What I have argued in this chapter is that the toleration-based approach to diversity cannot and 
should not be eliminated — as multiculturalists and other critics of the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship would like to convince us — in favour of other models of 
accommodation of diversity. As Michael Walzer rightly emphasises, 
[t]oleration itself is often underestimated, as if it is the least we can do for our fellows, the most 
minimal of their entitlements. In fact, [...] even the most grudging forms and precarious 
arrangements [of toleration] are very good things, sufficiently rare in human history that they 
require not only practical but also theoretical appreciation. (Walzer, 1997: xi) 
In particular, what has not been acknowledged or recognised is that toleration as a political 
concept allows a particular practice to exist due to the value it has for a particular subject and 
the value this has for the political community. A closer inspection of the conditions of 
toleration as identified in Section II of this chapter reveals that toleration includes a positive 
depiction of the difference it tolerates. In this sense, the positive view of the object and the 
tolerated agent can have a twofold importance in terms of the difference of toleration, i.e. [i] 
the intrinsic positive view; and [ii] the instrumental positive view. In the first view, we tolerate 
the difference we find wrong because the difference has positive implications for the tolerated 
agent, i.e. might be part of his culture and is an important element of self-respect. In the second 
view, we tolerate the difference we find wrong because its toleration has some positive 
implications for the political community itself [despite its conflict with the shared public values 
of a polity] as well as not violating the principles of nondiscrimination. Despite the fact that the 
moral and the conceptual objections to toleration raise a set of potential shortcomings of a 
toleration-based approach to diversity, toleration is basically capable of producing two kinds of 
benefits: [i] direct individual benefits and [ii] social benefits contributing to the stability and 
social cohesion [therefore forming an indirect individual benefit] of a polity. 
It is because of the value of the object of toleration both for the tolerated subject, i.e. a 
person holding a particular belief [intrinsic value] and the value of this object of toleration for 
the political community he/she lives in [instrumental value] that toleration counts both as 
valuable and permissible. Toleration, I maintain, is therefore not primarily negative or 
inegalitarian in nature. In fact, it should be pointed out that at one level toleration is an act of 
recognition as some scholars have argued (Galeotti, 2002). The tolerating agent recognises the 
value of the object of toleration either for its bearer [intrinsic] or for the society as a whole 
[instrumental]. At the same time, the inability of both moral and conceptual objections to the 
toleration-based approach to diversity to provide conclusive arguments that would enable us to 
reject toleration that there are various options available to advance an alternative conception of 
engagement with diversity that is founded on the toleration-based approach to diversity. 
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Nevertheless, a conception of toleration that claims to be consistent with the liberal version of 
the rights-based conception of citizenship, I maintain, needs to take into account another 
dimension of citizenship as a political conception of the person, i.e. civic integrity [I develop the 
integrity-respecting conception of toleration in detail in Part III of the thesis]. In this respect, 
the toleration-based approach to diversity, far from being morally problematic, provides a 
morally sound basis of equal civic respect for diversity. 
The challenges, problems and tensions between the two principled commitments 
associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship examined in 
this part of the thesis raise a number of theoretical and normative questions about the 
justification of an educational agenda of citizenship that claims to educate citizens so as to 
recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. Moreover, these 
issues have a direct normative impact on the status, scope and justification of citizenship 
education in a plurally diverse polity as all contemporary conceptions of citizenship education 
that claim to be consistent with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
take the cultivation of toleration as one of its basic aims. I examine these issues at length in the 
next part of this thesis [including Chapter 3 and Chapter 4]. 
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Notes 
A comparative perspective on different 'regimes of toleration' is presented by Michael Walzer in 
his book On Toleration. For a historical insight into the transformation of toleration from a 
prudential mechanism into a mechanism that establishes religious pluralism, see Kymlicka (1996) 
and Dees (2004). 
As Jon Elster observes of Tocqueville's Democracy in America 'the spillover effect was a major 
conceptual tool, perhaps the most important single tool, in Tocqueville's analysis of democracy' 
(Elster, 1993: 186). 
For the assertion that autonomy is neither sufficient nor necessary in the justification of toleration 
as a political principle, see Newey (1999: 152-153). 
4 	 For a somewhat different set of background conditions of toleration, see Deveaux, 2000: 43; 
Laegaard, 2010: 18; McKinnon, 2006: ch.1; Newey, 1999: chs.l-2; and Shorten, 2005. 
5 	 The formula that presents the general structure of a toleration-based approach to diversity is based 
on some aspects of Alan Gewirth's article 'Why Rights are Indispensable' (1986). 
6 	 An argument for toleration, writes Jeremy Waldron, 'gives a reason for not interfering with a 
person's beliefs or practices even when we have reason to hold that those beliefs or practices are 
mistaken, heretical or depraved. (Questions of toleration do not arise in relation to beliefs or 
practices which are regarded as good or true.)' (Waldron, 1993: 90). 
7 	 The dispute over the viability of the toleration-based approach to diversity has part of its origin in 
the nature of the object of toleration. Is what we tolerate a matter of choice or is it a matter of one's 
circumstance and therefore out of the volitional power of the tolerated agent? It is precisely 
because the object of toleration can be changed, and is a matter of choice that we tolerate it. The 
chance/ choice distinction plays a pivotal role in discussions over the toleration-based approach to 
diversity in particular compared to other competing approaches to diversity, e.g. recognition. 
8 	 As Meira Levinson points out, [i]ndividuals can accept other people' s conceptions of the good as 
reasonable and therefore as worthy of toleration and respect only if they are able to see their own 
background and commitments as in some way contingent' (Levinson, 1999: 45). 
9 	 For the discussion of the tensions between the poltics of redistribution and the politics of 
recognition, see Banting & Kymlicka (eds.) (2006). 
10 Another important difference between the classical liberal conception of toleration and its modern 
version is that in the times Spinoza, Locke and Montesquieu advanced toleration this was 
toleration in an absolutist state and not toleration in a liberal and democratic polity. Toleration of 
religious diversity in the Ottoman Empire, as Will Kymlicka emphasises (1996), was justified on 
legal and pragmatic grounds, whereas a Lockean justification of toleration is primarily sceptical 
and prudential in nature. 
11 	 On the notion of the inconclusiveness of disagreement over the object of toleration, see 
McLaughlin (1995) and Macedo (1995b). 
12 For the examination of toleration as a normatively dependent concept, see Forst (2007) and Newey 
(1999 [ch. 1]). 
13 As Michael Walzer emphasizes, `[w]e should aim at something [...] beyond toleration, something 
like mutual respect' (Walzer, 1997: 52). 
14 For a conception of toleration that aims to bridge the liberal model of toleration with the 
multicultural conception of recognition, see Galeotti (2002). 
15 	 For a delineation of the limits and shortcomings of multiculturalism and 'the politics of recognition' 
in education, see Blum (2001). 
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PART H 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN A PLURALLY DIVERSE POLITY 
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CHAPTER 3 
STATUS, SCOPE AND JUSTIFICATION OF CITIZENSHIP 
EDUCATION IN A PLURALLY DIVERSE POLITY 
The terms of debate over the civic purposes of public education in a plurally diverse polity have 
been centred around the educational significance of engagement with forms of diversity that 
are plural and heterogeneous and the justification of the civic priorities and the individual 
interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity as the stability of a 
plurally diverse polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework depend in large 
part on the success of its public, political and educational institutions in reconciling the diverse 
commitments of its citizens with common principles and shared public values. As James A. 
Banks emphasises, multicultural societies 
are faced with the problem of creating nation-states that recognise and incorporate the diversity 
of their citizens and embrace an overarching set of values, ideals and goals to which all citizens 
are committed. [...] Citizens who understand this unity-diversity tension and act accordingly do 
not materialise from thin air; they are educated for it. (Banks et al., 2005: 7) 
Two contrasting approaches to citizenship education have recently been advanced, i.e. [i] the 
autonomy-based conception of citizenship education; and [ii] the toleration-based conception 
of citizenship education. The commitment to individual autonomy associated with the first 
account of citizenship education maintains that individuals' capacity to form and revise their 
ends should be respected and protected. In contrast, the latter account of citizenship education 
argues that a toleration-based approach to diversity protects the right of individuals to dissent 
from any orthodoxy that might be imposed upon them. Crucially, I maintain, both accounts of 
citizenship education fail fully to grasp the moral significance of individuals' diverse 
commitments and allegiances and, relatedly, the capacity of our basic institutional framework 
including public education to educate students so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity. On the one hand, the autonomy-based account of 
citizenship education leaves us without a legitimate justification for the imposition of the basic 
civic virtues and shared public values that are consistent with basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms. On the other hand, the toleration-based account of citizenship education fails to build 
a set of principles about how we are supposed to ensure that the institutional design of public 
education will accommodate diversity in a plurally diverse polity. In this respect, the two 
conceptions of citizenship education identified above largely misrepresent our commitment to 
civic equality as well as fail to treat with equal civic respect the normative significance of 
individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances. 
This chapter of the thesis consists of four sections. I start in section I with some 
preliminary considerations over the motivational foundations associated with the justification of 
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any educational agenda of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity as there are different ways of 
determining the value of citizenship education and its basic civic aims to educate citizens as 
fully cooperating members of a polity. A pragmatic answer would be formulated along the 
priority or the urgency argument. In the first case, citizenship education is part of a more 
general problem about civic unity and social cohesion as is the stability of a plurally diverse 
polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework. In the latter case, there are a 
host of problems that need to be addressed urgently, so an interventionist conception of 
citizenship education might be needed since both the stability of a plurally diverse polity and 
the maintenance of its basic institutional framework depend in large part on the success of its 
public, political and educational institutions in educating citizens as fully cooperating members 
of a polity. I then proceed with the identification of the three foundational elements of any 
educational agenda of citizenship. These are the [i] status; [ii] scope; and [iii] the justification 
of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a plurally diverse polity. This threefold 
characterisation of citizenship education serves a twofold purpose. First, it offers the possibility 
of clarifying the different elements constituting any educational agenda of citizenship. Second, 
it serves as an evaluative tool to examine the internal coherence of existing conceptions of 
citizenship education and their consistency with the two principled commitments associated 
with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. The status, scope and 
justification of any conception of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity, I maintain, 
is premised on how it defines and connects the two principled commitments associated with 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. 
Next, I evaluate in Section II two prevailing models of citizenship education, i.e. [i] the 
strong model of citizenship education associated with the autonomy-based account of 
citizenship education; and [ii] the weak model of citizenship education associated with the 
toleration-based account of citizenship education.' I first outline the foundational elements of 
each of the two accounts of citizenship education and then identify a number of conceptual, 
normative and educational problems each of these two accounts of citizenship education is likely 
to raise. In Section III of this chapter, I challenge the two approaches to citizenship education 
on both theoretical and practical grounds. At the theoretical level, I challenge the internal 
coherence of both approaches and their consistency with the two principled commitments 
associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. At the practical 
level, I examine the pedagogical implications of the two approaches of citizenship education 
and the limits to engagement with diversity that each of the two models is faced with. In the 
final section of this chapter, I outline the different possibilities associated with the education of 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity as 
part of the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. 
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I. 	 Motivational foundations of citizenship education 
During the last two decades, a disparate range of discussions over the civic purposes of public 
education have been particularly invigorated by the increasing attention of scholars working in 
political philosophy, jurisprudence and feminist political theory devoted to education (e.g. 
Rawls, 1993; Waldron, 2003; Young, 2006). These discussions have had a profound impact on 
normative theorizing about the role and function of public education in balancing between the 
two principled commitments associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship identified in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this thesis. Some of the problems arising 
out of the tension between civic equality and equal civic respect for diversity have come to 
dominate theoretical debates over the status, scope and justification of citizenship education in 
a plurally diverse polity. These include issues about the aims, means and expected outcomes of 
public education in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity; how best to 
accommodate diversity in the institutional arrangements and curriculum design of public 
education; what means are available to public education in the maintenance of the basic 
institutional framework including political, public and educational institutions, the perpetuation 
of shared public values together with the promotion of civic unity and the stability of a plurally 
diverse polity. 
This development reflects two major changes in our understanding of the civic purposes 
of public education and the role of citizenship education in the education of students as fully 
cooperating members of a polity. The first change marks a transition in our understanding of 
citizenship as a shared political status associated with free and equal membership in a political 
community. As emphasised in Chapter 1 of this thesis, claims for the accommodation of 
diversity in the basic institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity — including public 
education — have been advanced as rights claims associated with the status of citizenship and 
its commitment to civic equality. The second and related change marks a transition from a 
purely functionalist understanding of the functioning of a polity and its basic institutional 
framework to an approach that emphasises also the role and the importance of civic virtues. 
At one level, there is widespread consensus among scholars from divergent theoretical 
positions that the development of civic virtues in students is an important overall goal of public 
education. However, three separate questions arise here.2 First, what virtues should be developed 
in students? At this level, the terms of debate are set between two competing camps. On the 
one hand, there are those that advocate a more minimalist account of citizenship education and 
the related account of the moral and political capacities associated with citizenship as free and 
equal membership in a polity. This minimalist account of citizenship education gives priority 
to the virtue of toleration. On the other hand, there are scholars that advocate a more expansive 
account of citizenship education and the associated set of civic virtues. Here, the primary aim 
of citizenship education is the development of the capacity for autonomy and the independent 
critical reflection and engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous. 
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Moreover, a set of other civic virtues is also adjacent to this position, including public 
reasonableness and mutual respect. At stake between these two accounts of citizenship education 
is the very character of citizenship as a political conception of the person. 
Second, the main contrast dividing different conceptions of citizenship education is 
associated with the institutional framework that plays a role in the development of civic virtues, 
including public education, the associative networks of civil society, the market or the family. 
As Will Kymlicka emphasises clearly, 
[p]eople learn to be responsible citizens not only in schools, but also in the family, 
neighbourhood, churches, and many other groups and forums in civil society. Schools are not 
the only, or perhaps even the primary forum for learning citizenship, but they are, I believe, 
indispensable. These other institutions supplement, but cannot replace, the provision of 
citizenship education in schools. (Kymlicka, 2001: 293) 
Two distinctions need to be made here. First, which of these spheres, if any, should have 
primacy in the development of civic virtues in students and the different reflective and 
deliberative capacities associated with the exercise of basic rights and fundamental freedoms? 
Second, what is the motivational foundation for the role of developing civic virtues in students? 
One rationale would hold that neither of these spheres is plenipotentiary and thus each of these 
spheres should play a certain role in the development of civic virtues. For example, markets 
should play an important role in the development of individual initiative and responsibility, the 
family in the development of care, the associative networks of civil society in the development 
of associative duties and public education in the development of public reasonableness and 
mutual respect. A completely different rationale is employed by those who argue that a 
particular social sphere should have primacy in the development of civic virtues due to the 
limits or shortcomings of other social spheres. To illustrate: market failure in the development 
of civic virtues implies that public education should play a compensatory role in the 
development of responsibility or solidarity. A related contrast dividing different conceptions of 
citizenship education concerns the main characterisation of a particular social sphere. For 
example, is the principle of nondiscrimination to be instilled in other social spheres, e.g. the 
associative networks of civil society, or should gender equality be a guiding principle in the 
distribution of religious office within a particular religious community? At stake at this level is 
the role of a particular sphere in the development of basic civic virtues. 
Third, the dividing point between different proponents of citizenship education concerns 
how civic virtues, including public reasonableness or toleration and mutual respect together 
with other reflective and deliberative capacities associated with citizenship as free and equal 
membership in a polity should be developed in students and what is the content of citizenship 
education in general, e.g. political education, human rights education, intercultural education etc. 
In this sense, public schools face several problems and challenges in the promotion of 
common principles and shared public values due to the competing and variegated commitments 
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and attachments of their citizens as well as due to the substantial inequalities that continue to 
exist in our societies. Any conception of citizenship education is therefore faced with a 
dilemma. The elimination of socio-economic, cultural or other disadvantages that might have 
an impact on the education of students in public education needs to employ considerable 
intervention from the state and its public institutions to minimise any asymmetry that affects 
equal educational opportunities between students in public schools. However, the commitment 
to basic rights and fundamental freedoms and the toleration of diverse ways of life, beliefs and 
values, places considerable limitations on the means available to public education in the 
promotion of shared public values and the contribution to the stability and social unity of a 
plurally diverse polity. The fundamental challenge of citizenship education, then, is to 
minimise the tension between the promotion of a common set of shared public values and the 
associated requirements of the rights-based conception of citizenship and the proper 
accommodation of diversity in the institutional arrangement and curriculum design of public 
education.3 While engagement with diversity is an important educational aim of public 
education, the realisation of this aim in everyday pedagogical practice differs substantially 
among contemporary scholars working in this area of research. The two issues emphasised 
here, namely the accommodation of diversity in the basic institutional framework of a plurally 
diverse polity and the extension of the obligations of citizenship, have had a major influence on 
the discussions over the status, scope and justification of citizenship education and remains a 
crucial dividing issue between different accounts of citizenship education. 
In order to articulate an alternative educational agenda of citizenship that offers a 
distinctive response to the theoretical problems and practical difficulties that arise out of the 
project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity, three different dimensions of the civic purposes of public education need 
to be distinguished here. The first concerns the justification of citizenship education, 
identifying the motivational foundations associated with the nature and the value of citizenship 
education in a plurally diverse polity. Two separate and divergent views can be identified, i.e. 
[i] the functionalist view associated with the classical Aristotelian justification of citizenship 
education; and [ii] the compensatory view associated with various contemporary forms of 
justifying the urgency for citizenship education in public education. 
The second level of discussion associated with the civic purposes of public education 
concerns two distinct dimensions of the status of citizenship education. Firstly, what is the 
relationship between citizenship education and education in general? And secondly, who should 
educate students for their future role as citizens, e.g. public education, the associative networks 
of civil society, the family or the market? 
The third dimension deals with the aims of citizenship education in a plurally diverse 
polity, i.e. what are the capacities for citizenship that need to be developed in students. Two 
prevailing conceptions of citizenship education can be identified here: [i] the weak model of 
citizenship education associated with the toleration-based account of citizenship education; and 
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[ii] the strong model of citizenship education associated with the autonomy-based account of 
citizenship education. I examine below the basic characteristics of the two prevailing views on 
the justification of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity and proceed then with the 
examination of the status and the aims of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a 
polity. 
I.1 	 The functionalist view 
As a broadly philosophical problem and as a matter of educational policy, educating citizens as 
fully cooperating members of a polity is part of a more general problem about the civic unity, 
social cohesion and stability of a plurally diverse polity. As citizens, writes Walter Feinberg, 
`our primary obligation is to maintain the institutions, practices, and values that provide the 
conditions for a useful and productive life for all other citizens [...]' (Feinberg, 1998: 211). In 
the Introduction to Political Liberalism John Rawls poses the problem of stability of a diverse 
democratic society as follows: 
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal 
citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and 
moral doctrines? (Rawls, 1993: 4) 
Part of the answer to the question of what does citizenship education in a plurally diverse 
polity require is primarily contextual since what constitutes citizenship and what constitutes 
good citizenship is a philosophical as well as a contextual issue.4 Any regime — a liberal 
democratic one included — needs the conditions necessary for the promotion of common 
principles and shared public values and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework. As 
Judith Shklar emphasises succinctly, [g]ood citizenship simply is not separable from the sort of 
society in which it functions' (Shklar, 1989: 12). Any political community, then, has its own 
institutional framework that aims to perpetuate common principles and shared public values 
that aim to support its ethical environment. The locus classicus for the thesis that public 
education is central to the cultivation of beliefs, values and virtues that in turn support its basic 
institutional framework is to be found in the introductory paragraph of Book VIII of Aristotle's 
Politics. I quote him here at some length: 
The citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under which he lives. For each 
government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to preserve 
it. The character of democracy creates democracy, and the character of oligarchy creates 
oligarchy; and always the better the character, the better the government. (Aristotle, 1999: 195) 
As William Galston eloquently summarizes the classical Aristotelian justification for citizenship 
education in public education, `[s]ince Plato and Aristotle first discussed the matter, it has been 
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clear that citizenship education is relative to regime type' (Galston, 2001: 217). As Harry 
Brighouse rightly emphasises, standard arguments for citizenship education 
often start with the need to maintain the state in some prescribed form, and then prescribe 
education of a certain kind to cultivate in children the characters likely to stabilize that state. 
(Brighouse, 2000: 71) 
Citizenship education, writes Galston, 'aims towards practice and is relative to specific regime-
types and particular communities' (Galston, 2006: 331).5 Given the fact that public education is 
a central institution in contemporary societies, attitudes to citizenship education are dependent 
on the particular conception of a citizen as a fully cooperating member of a polity. John Tomasi 
advances an even firmer connection between the virtues of citizens and a regime type: 
Different kinds of attitudes and activities are required of people as citizens within different 
types of regimes. Norms of good citizen conduct vary, for example, across theocratic, fascist, 
communist, and liberal regimes. But in every case, the norms applicable to people as citizens 
are given in terms of each regime's underlying ideal of societal success. (Tomasi, 2001: 57) 
A basic aim of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity, then, includes the promotion 
and maintenance of the basic institutional framework including public education that will 
create a common ground between different ethnocultural, religious and cultural identities of its 
citizens as well as contribute to the maintenance of the basic institutions, practices, and values 
that provide the conditions for a stable ethical environment for all members of a political 
community. As Walter Feinberg rightly emphasises, public schools in contemporary liberal 
democratic societies perform two critical functions6: 
First, in complex societies they advance public safety and development by socializing children 
into the general rules of the society, by establishing in them a commitment to the safety and 
well-being of their fellow members, and by providing them with the skills to advance both their 
individual and the social interest. Second, schools are critical instruments for reproducing the 
basic values of liberal society itself and of assuring its continuation across different generations. 
(Feinberg, 1998: 9) 
Citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity shares with other models of citizenship 
education the requirement of stability, the requirement of civic unity and the requirement of 
sustainability. This entails the maintenance of a plurally diverse polity and the maintenance of 
its basic institutional framework. I maintain that these are 'generic' requirements any model of 
citizenship education should perform in order to qualify as performing the civic aims 
associated with the educational agenda of citizenship. They are therefore a necessary 
prerequisite for the viability of a plurally diverse polity but not a sufficient prerequisite to 
match with the two principled commitments associated with the liberal version of the rights- 
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based conception of citizenship, namely the commitment to civic equality and the commitment 
to equal civic respect for diversity. 
1.2 	 The compensatory view 
It is a commonplace in contemporary discussions over the civic aims of public education to 
advance some sort of alarmist proclamation associated with social fragmentation or civic 
erosion of a plurally diverse polity that would require some sort of citizenship education in 
public education. Two broadly consequentialist arguments have gained considerable currency 
among those scholars who write about the necessity and importance of citizenship education in 
a plurally diverse polity. They primarily argue that we need citizenship education [I] due to the 
increasing diversity within contemporary multicultural societies and the competing and 
variegated commitments, attachments and obligations of their citizens; and [ii] due to 
increasing civic disengagement in the associational networks of civil society and a negative 
trend in political participation among citizens as well as the increasing distrust in the justice 
and the overall effectiveness of the basic institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity. 
Let me examine each of these claims in turn. 
First, liberal democracy's basic premise of free and equal citizenship has been seriously 
challenged on a number of grounds associated with cultural, ethnic and religious diversity and 
value pluralism, e.g. the claims for recognition and the public acceptance of a group's specific 
character by multicultural advocates of 'identity politics' and the 'politics of difference' and by 
demands for the special treatment of non-dominant minority groups based either on 
accommodation-based or exemption-based claims. Furthermore, the social unity of 
contemporary diverse societies has been seriously undermined due to an increasing level of 
deep value pluralism which is supposed to have corrosive effects on common principles and 
shared public values of liberal and democratic societies. Second, the stability and legitimacy of 
contemporary pluralist democracies has been considerably challenged by an increasing level of 
voter apathy and low turn-out at elections (be it regional, national or at the European level), 
decreasing levels of civic participation and a general carelessness about community 
involvement and the common good. At the same time, this trend, most commonly characterized 
as civic disengagement and 'democratic deficit', has been accompanied by distrust in 
democratic institutions and the media. Finally, an increasing level of violence, hatred and 
intolerance towards and between racial, ethnic, religious and cultural minorities threatens the 
stability of a plurally diverse polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework. 
The cultural and social fragmentation of traditional communities and their shared set of beliefs 
and values seriously undermines the basis for civic cooperation and solidarity necessary to 
sustain our plurally diverse societies. 
Second, a number of arguments depend also on the assumption of 'the educative 
function of participation' (Kymlicka, 2002: 303). To offer an example, civic republican 
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advocates of citizenship education see political participation as an intrinsically valuable 
political virtue or a personal trait of character and not as an activity which enables the 
perpetuation of democratic institutions and confers legitimacy to the public decision making 
process (Beiner, 2003).7 When we talk about civic disengagement and the lack of active 
participation as the result of alienation from or indifference to politics in general, we must bear 
in mind that the majority of citizens in contemporary pluralist democracies often fear the active 
participation of some groups of citizens, such as the case of religious fundamentalist groups in 
the US and elsewhere.8 Also, their arguments emphasising civic participation and community 
involvement in schools and other public institutions support the conclusion that students' 
community involvement and participation in their school environment will have a similar 
effect and favour participation in the larger political community. The participation — active 
citizenship — debate oversimplifies the issue by focusing solely on one element of citizenship 
by largely overlooking the issue of a citizen as a fully cooperating member of a polity also as 
an individual who is active within the private sphere and in the associative networks of civil 
society. For example, a person not active politically or in the public sphere can still be active in 
the private sphere or in the associational network of civil society. Participation, I maintain, 
needs to be defended on a broader ground since a purely instrumental defence of political 
participation or community involvement as one of the basic civic virtues, fails to offer 
sufficient ground for the maintenance and stability of a plurally diverse polity. It should be 
combined with the cultivation of other political virtues, e.g. public reasonableness and 
toleration. These alarmist and often unreflected proclamations on the importance and urgency 
of citizenship education, I argue, turn out to be conceptually incoherent, theoretically 
incomplete as well as empirically inadequate. They fail to offer a principled justification for a 
balanced content and a coherent curriculum of citizenship education and its provision in public 
schools. As Nancy Rosenblum poignantly emphasises: 
[o]ne of the tasks of political theory is to refuse to take at face value alarmist proclamations of 
either religious or democratic decline, and to think soberly about the conditions that actually 
threaten the viability of particular religious communities on the one hand and the stability and 
legitimacy of particular democratic governments on the other. (Rosenblum, 2000: 4) 
These consequentialist arguments share in common a set of assumptions related to the status, 
scope and justification of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity. They argue that 
citizenship education can be either [i] a prerequisite of stability; or [ii] a contribution to the 
overall well-being of a polity. Despite a prima ,facie attractiveness of these consequentalist 
justifications for a more robust model of citizenship education necessary to overcome social 
fragmentation and civic erosion which are seen as the most pressing threats to the stability and 
cohesion of contemporary complex societies, they are vulnerable to a number of criticisms. In 
particular, the two competing justifications identified above have given little consideration to 
the overall coherence and limits of the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating 
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members of a polity. 
Ever since Antiquity, the role of public education in general and of citizenship education 
in particular has been to support the polity and its basic institutional framework by creating a 
virtuous citizenry. The classical understanding of citizenship education as exemplified by 
Aristotle (1999) linked the ideal of a citizen as a fully cooperating member of a polity with a 
particular model of a political community. In contrast, contemporary arguments for the 
necessity of citizenship education depart significantly from this classical understanding of the 
aims of educating citizens as the different forms of justification for the necessity of citizenship 
education rest on the failure of our shared institutions to educate citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity as well as to generate the support necessary for a stable political 
community. While it certainly holds true that citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity 
would require citizens who would know and exercise their rights, be tolerant and respectful as 
well as able to deliberate reasonably on public matters, the basic motivational foundations for 
the education of citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity remain largely unaddressed. 
The prevalence of alarmist proclamations about the civic erosion and social fragmentation of 
our modern societies poses a range of separate problems at the level of justification of an 
educational agenda of citizenship. On this interpretation, the primary role of citizenship 
education is therefore not constitutive but merely compensatory9 in nature. The absence of a 
convincing response to the problems confronting the education of citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity generates different challenges associated with the education of citizens so 
as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
To summarise: the motivational foundation associated with citizenship education is 
therefore primarily one of purpose: why should public schools engage in citizenship education? 
A straightforward answer is basically uncontroversial and contains two separate propositions. 
First, any polity needs to create and support the conditions of its stability and the maintenance 
of its basic institutional framework. Second, due to a range of contemporary problems, e.g. 
immigration, diversity, civic disengagement, there is a need to cultivate in students a range of 
virtues and capacities including intercultural dialogue, active citizenship, etc. Yet, both of these 
arguments and their justifications hardly satisfy. A purely functionalist view of citizenship 
education that characterizes the first proposition posed above fails to differentiate citizenship 
education in a plurally diverse polity from citizenship education in an authoritarian regime. At 
the same time, the compensatory view associated with the latter proposition delimits the scope 
of citizenhip education as exclusively remedial. Taken together, the two arguments prove to be 
both inconclusive as well as only partial at best. In the first sense, citizenship education has a 
basic task of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. In contrast, the second 
sense is primarily concerned with the failure of the market to cultivate competitiveness, the 
family to develop reciprocity and the associative network of civil society to instill civility, 
solidarity and toleration. The limitation of each of these spheres points toward the need for an 
educational agenda of citizenship that would educate students so as to recognise and respect 
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one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
In the next section of this chapter, I take up the central contrast dividing autonomy-
based citizenship education and toleration-based citizenship education and examine the internal 
consistency of their basic civic aims with the project of educating citizens so as to recognise 
and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. I explore the justification of the 
cultivation of the capacity for autonomy and other dispositions on students as future citizens 
and the commitment of a plurally diverse polity and its basic institutional framework for 
tolerating diverse schemes of value, beliefs and conceptions of the good. 
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IL 	 Citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity 
From the existing literature on citizenship education, two divergent responses to the challenges 
raised by the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity have been 
advanced: [i] the demanding model of citizenship education associated with the autonomy-
based account of citizenship education; and [ii] the weak model of citizenship education 
associated with the toleration-based account of citizenship education. These two approaches 
have been identified in the scholarly literature in relation to the dilemma over the relationship 
between autonomy and toleration as that of either-or options and constructed in terms of 
priorities between two different values. On the one hand, there are scholars who stress 
individual autonomy and the development of the capacity for critical reflection as the basic aim 
of citizenship education, whereas on the other, there are scholars who take toleration of diverse 
ways of life and schemes of value to be the fundamental commitment that defines the very 
character of a liberal conception of citizenship. On the first variation of citizenship education, 
i.e. the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education, accommodation of diversity 
should come only after the promotion of civic unity and the development of autonomy. While 
claiming legitimacy for accommodation of diversity, its role is both logically and politically 
dependent on the priority of promoting unity, autonomy and critical self-examination. On the 
second variation of citizenship education, i.e. the toleration-based conception, accommodation 
of diversity should be maximally expanded in both the institutional arrangements and 
curriculum design of public education. Moreover, this view rests on the assertion that 
accommodation of diversity will create allegiance to the basic institutional framework of a 
plurally diverse polity. I examine below the defining differences between the two accounts of 
citizenship education and their basic outlook and conclude in the next section of this chapter 
with an analysis of the limits of both approaches to citizenship education. 
I1.1 	 Autonomy-based vs. toleration-based citizenship education: some distinctions 
The difference between autonomy-based citizenship education and toleration-based citizenship 
education can be characterized in a number of ways as both accounts of citizenship education 
depart in some significant ways from one another.1° The central contrast dividing these two 
models of liberalism and their accounts of citizenship education, I maintain, is over the value 
and the justification of common principles and shared public values. On this interpretation, the 
maximal congruence view advocated by autonomy-based liberalism argues for a maximal 
convergence between the public and the private sphere, in which as many elements of a culture 
or association converge with shared civic principles. As Stephen Macedo firmly points out: 
The civic health of liberal democracies depends not simply on a clear division of spheres, but on 
a deeper convergence of public and private values: a convergence of individual consciences and 
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the public good powerful enough to ensure the political supremacy of public values and 
institutions against competing imperatives. (Macedo, 2000: 33) 
In contrast, the minimal congruence view advocated by toleration-based liberalism maintains 
that accommodation of diversity should be maximally expanded and should be limited only in 
relation to a compelling public interest. In this respect, a plurally diverse polity is characterised 
not only by the existence of 'a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines' (Rawls, 1993: xvi) but by the existence of social spheres whose internal organisation 
and its ethical environment does not conform to public principles and shared public values. 
They argue that this is consistent with liberalism's core commitment to freedom of association 
and freedom of expression. Proponents of toleration-based liberalism argue that associations 
and networks of civil society can advance claims to non-interference with their internal 
organization and ethical environment since members of these groups and associations have a 
formal right to exit. As William Galston emphasises, 
[...] the state may not impose public norms on the internal life of groups so long as membership 
in these groups is voluntary and groups refrain from forbidden forms of coercion. (Galston, 
2005a: 182) 
A second — and related — difference between the autonomy-based and toleration-based model 
of liberalism and their conceptions of citizenship education is what claims for accommodation 
of diversity should be taken into account and what are the limits of toleration. The proponents 
of autonomy-based liberalism argue that a plurally diverse polity should not tolerate groups or 
associations whose view on other members of a polity contrasted with the members of their 
group is in some respect oppressive and discriminatory or whose internal rules are illiberal, 
undemocratic and therefore inconsistent with common principles and shared public values of a 
polity. Autonomy-based liberalism, as Susan Mendus emphasises eloquently, justifies toleration 
only towards 'those diverse forms of life which themselves value autonomy and thus makes 
toleration a pragmatic device' (Mendus, 1989: 108). On this interpretation, the existence of 
groups and associations whose practices might be incompatible or in tension with society's 
broader social arrangements can exist in a plurally diverse polity and should be tolerated as 
they present — with limits — a source of well-being for those members of a plurally diverse 
polity who choose to freely associate with others on these conditions and rules.' I Furthermore, 
while both autonomy-based and toleration-based liberalism advocate toleration among the 
basic aims of its educational agenda of citizenship, the conception of toleration advocated by 
each of the two positions departs considerably from each other. 
Another crucial difference between these two models of liberalism and their accounts of 
citizenship education is over the competing understanding of the liberty of citizens as free and 
equal members of a polity. Toleration-based liberalism maintains that basic rights and 
fundamental liberties provide a constraining supplement to the basic structure of a plurally diverse 
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polity. The primary function of basic rights and fundamental freedoms is to protect individuals 
both from interference of government as well as from the will of (democratic) majority.12 As 
William Galston emphasises, `[1]iberal governance [...] stands as a barrier against all forms of 
total power, including the power of democratic majorities' (Galston, 2009: 95). On this 
interpretation, liberalism is primarily characterized by the protection of basic civil and political 
rights. Equal basic liberties are therefore a constitutive element of the liberal conception of 
citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity. On the other hand, autonomy-based 
liberalism views democracy and its basic institutional framework as decisively more 
constraining on individuals. As Will Kymlicka emphasises, `[b]asing liberal theory on 
autonomy threatens to alienate these groups and undermine their allegiance to liberal 
institutions, whereas a tolerance-based liberalism can provide a more secure and wider basis for 
the legitimacy of government' (Kymlicka, 1995: 154). 
At the same time, autonomy-based liberalism is also more specific in the requirements 
it imposes on individuals and social groups as it provides only limited protection from 
interference by others. Objections to this version of citizenship education focus largely on its 
demanding and potentially intrusive character. On the other hand, I maintain, toleration-based 
liberalism gives individuals and social groups a greater range of accommodation. However, as 
the advocates of autonomy-based liberalism argue, these goods have some costs that might 
outweigh the benefits it brings to either individuals or groups. Furthermore, as some scholars 
argue (Barry, 2001; Kymlicka 1995), granting cultural rights is conditional upon the internal 
organisation of groups according to liberal and democratic principles [the requirement of 
convergence]. However, the demands for convergence — the demands that the internal 
organisation and norms mirror and support the common principles and the shared public values 
of democracy, equality and nondiscrimination — pose a number of different challenges. 
Yet as I argue, the foundational difference dividing the two acounts of citizenship 
education is over the status, scope and justification of engagement with forms of diversity that 
are plural and heterogeneous. While autonomy-based citizenship education maintains that 
engagement with diversity enhances the cultivation and the exercise of the capacity to form and 
revise one's ends, toleration-based citizenship education argues that engagement with diversity 
contributes significantly to the development of toleration and mutual respect between members 
of a plurally diverse polity. For the first, the basic aim of citizenship education is primarily that 
of cultivating critical reflection and the development of an autonomous character. In contrast, 
the basic aim of citizenship education for advocates of toleration-based citizenship education is 
that of the cultivation of toleration as a basic virtue associated with the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship. 
In order to articulate the limits and the shortcomings of the autonomy-based and the 
toleration-based conception of citizenship education I turn now to the defining features of these 
two accounts of citizenship education. 
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112. The autonomy-based conception of citizenship education 
The autonomy-based conception of citizenship education comprises two basic elements: [i] the 
virtue-related element that requires citizens with a particular set of civic virtues and a set of 
intellectual capacities for citizenship; and [ii] the educational environment that would facilitate 
the cultivation and the exercise of the capacities and dispositions associated with the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. 
As advocated by Eamonn Callan (1997), Amy Gutmann (1995, 1996, 1999), Meira 
Levinson (1999b), Stephen Macedo (1995a, 1995b, 2000), Rob Reich (2002), John Tomasi 
(2001) and other liberal scholars, the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education is 
generally characterized by two separate core commitments associated with its virtue-related 
element. On the one hand, the first core commitment of the autonomy-based conception of 
citizenship education is associated with the development in students of the capacity for 
autonomy, i.e. the idea that individuals should be free to form, assess and revise their existing 
values, beliefs and conceptions of the good. The other core commitment associated with the 
autonomy-based conception of citizenship education concerns the virtues of living together 
with other members of a polity. Citizenship education, writes Amy Gutmann, 'should give 
children the skills and virtues that enable them to consider what constitutes fair terms of social 
cooperation among citizens' (Gutmann, 1995: 578). 
Defenders of the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education share the 
assertion that the primary goal of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity is to develop 
in students the capacity for autonomy and self-examination. In other words, political institutions 
and procedures should primarily aim to promote in students their capacity for choice and 
critical reflection. The primary aim of state-regulated schooling should therefore be 'that of 
helping children to develop their capacity for autonomy' (M. Levinson, 1999b: 64). As Stephen 
Macedo emphasises succinctly: 
Liberal politics and liberal autonomy are complementary: both converge on an ideal of character 
that is actively reflective, self-critical, tolerant, reason-giving and reason-demanding, open to 
change, and respectful of the autonomy of others. (Macedo, 1990: 251-252) 
On this interpretation, 'weighing evidence and considering alternatives' (Wingo, 2003: 109) to 
the choices available or decisions to be taken enables individuals to make better choices. As 
Harry Brighouse summarized the basic aim of the autonomy-based conception of citizenship 
education: 'children will be significantly more able to live well if they are able rationally to 
compare different ways of life' (Brighouse, 1998: 729). On that view, 'children cannot be good 
citizens of a liberal polity', writes Stephen Macedo, 'unless they are taught that critical thinking 
and public argument — reason-giving and reason-demanding in public — are the appropriate 
means of political justification' (Macedo, 1995b: 68). 
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The exercise of the capacity for autonomy can be exerted in two different directions and 
develops two distinct virtues: [i] internal; and [ii] external. Advocates of the autonomy-based 
conception of citizenship education argue that the internal exercise of the capacity for 
autonomy equips individuals with the capacity to critically evaluate, revise and potentially to 
reject the values, beliefs and conceptions of the good they were raised into. On this 
interpretation, Francis Schrag emphasises, autonomy is to be 'understood as the ability to 
revise one's conception of the good' (Schrag, 1998: 39). On the external exercise of the 
capacity for autonomy, individuals exert the capacity of public reasonableness, so as to be able 
to assess the performance of politicians and other public figures. The second goal associated 
with the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education is the development in students of 
the virtue of mutual respect as has been emphasised in Section IV of Chapter 2. On this 
interpretation, mutual respect requires 'exposure to diversity', i.e. exposing students to diverse 
visions of the good life and at the same time reflecting over their own commitments. 
The cultivation of the virtues and the capacities associated with the autonomy-based 
conception of citizenship needs a specific educational environment. Their development requires 
an educational environment where students will encounter students from other socio-cultural 
backgrounds as well as be encouraged to evaluate their own cultural tradition and ways of life 
from a critical perspective. As Eamonn Callan rightly emphasises: 
The essential demand is that schooling properly involves at some stage sympathetic and critical 
engagement with beliefs and ways of life at odds with the culture of the family or religious or 
ethnic group into which the child was born. (Callan, 1997: 133) 
In other words, according to this conception of citizenship education, the ideal educational 
environment would offer students the possibility to exercise the virtues and capacities for 
citizenship. Three specific capacities are closely associated with this account of citizenship 
education and will be examined at length in section IV of Chapter 4. In this sense, an 
educational environment where students encounter diversity, offers students the chance to learn 
about others, to exercise toleration of other people's values, beliefs and conceptions of the good 
as well as to exercise the capacity for mutual respect and their capacity for choice among 
different conceptions of the good. Defenders of the autonomy-based conception of citizenship 
education argue for the ideal educational environment in the form of the 'detached school' (M. 
Levinson, 1999b) or an educational environment that would be characterized by a 
`discontinuous ethos' (Brighouse, 1998). 
However, at the same time Brighouse emphasises that this argument 'may even 
undermine stability by setting the state against the values and practices of many loyal citizens' 
(Brighouse, 1998: 729). As Will Kymlicka puts it, the idea that schools should teach children 
`to be sceptical of political authority, and to distance themselves from their own cultural 
traditions when engaging in public discourse, is controversial' (Kymlicka, 2002: 307-308). 
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Furthermore, he observes, `[a] truly 'detached' school, set over and against other social 
institutions, is unlikely to be effective' (2002: 310). Rawls acknowledges this himself: 
The liberalisms of Kant and Mill may lead to requirements designed to foster the values of 
autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life. But political liberalism 
has a different aim and requires far less. It will ask that children's education include such things 
as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights [...] Moreover, their education should also 
prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; 
it should also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of 
cooperation with the rest of society. (Rawls, 1993: 199) 
Rawls's remark on the limits of a liberal conception of citizenship education and its basic aims 
points out that autonomy as an educational ideal introduces a number of separate difficulties 
and potentially illiberal educational outcomes. A problem that arises in contemporary societies 
is that the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education can have two possible illiberal 
outcomes: [i] the imposition of the capacity for autonomy on citizens; and [ii] the reduction of 
social, cultural and religious diversity (M. Levinson, 1999a). Autonomy-based liberalism 
advances a robust educational agenda of citizenship and its conception of a good citizen and 
therefore risks running contrary to the liberal version of the rights-based conception of free and 
equal citizenship. As such it is subject to a number of difficulties when assessed from a liberal 
point of view since the autonomy-based account of liberal citizenship education, I maintain, 
fails to acknowledge the moral equality of persons and to promote and respect the equal worth 
of persons. As William Galston emphasises forcefully, 
[t]he more demanding the conception of citizenship, the more intrusive the public policies 
needed to promote it . . .The more our conception of the good citizen requires the sacrifice of 
private attachments to the common good, the more vigorously the state must act (as Sparta did) 
to weaken those attachments in favor of devotion to the public sphere. (This point, applies 
mutatis mutandis, to other demanding conceptions of citizenship based on ideals such as 
autonomy, critical rationality, and deliberative excellence.). (Galston, 2002a: 17) 
A very similar characterisation has been pointed out by Thomas Nagel: 
The greater the ambitions of those who hold power to supply a certain kind of harmonious 
social environment, the greater will be the pressures on individuality and against variations in 
divisive individual expression. (Nagel, 2002: 43-44) 
As the advocates of 'affiliation liberalism' such as Will Kymlicka and Joseph Raz emphasise 
eloquently — liberal public policies and political institutions put unequal burdens on their 
citizens and their conceptions of the good. This asymmetry objection, i.e. the possible 
cognitive dissonance between a socio-cultural and ethical environment a student comes from 
and the basic aims of liberal citizenship education, and the possible 'unequal psychological 
taxation' of citizens — as articulated by Stephen Macedo — from various non-dominant minority 
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groups raises important justice-based and integrity-based claims the advocates of 
multiculturalism and liberal multiculturalism have advanced.13 Any policy programme, writes 
Stephen Macedo, 'though well justified in shared public aims and values, will impose disparate 
burdens on adherents of different comprehensive religious and moral views' (Macedo, 2000: 
188). However, as Judith Shklar forcefully argues: 
[...] no system of government, no system of legal procedures, and no system of public 
education is without psychological effect, and liberalism has no reason at all to apologize for 
the inclinations and habits that procedural fairness and responsible government are likely to 
encourage. (Shklar, 1989: 33) 
Any society — a free one included — should develop the virtues and other dispositions of its 
citizens on which the maintenance of a polity and its basic institutional framework depends. 
However, as Nomi Maya Stolzenberg contrarily emphasises, 
[...] even though the value of maintaining a democratic system of government may be weighty, 
it does not necessarily justify the invasion of personal liberty that citizenship education 
allegedly entails. The genius of civic republican thought is to tie the political value of collective 
self-government to a particular conception of individual freedom, and thus to form a coherent 
whole. (Stolzenberg, 1993: 651) 
Another possible illiberal outcome of the autonomy-based account of citizenship education 
identified by its critics is internal to liberalism itself. The objection is based on the claim that 
the 'liberal expectancy' (Rosenblum, 1998: 53-57) will gradually reduce social, cultural and 
religious diversity due to the spillover of a liberal political culture based on toleration and 
mutual respect and the cultivation of the political virtue of public reasonableness into other 
areas of social and private life. On this interpretation, public principles and shared public 
values of a plurally diverse polity 'will exert a kind of gravitational pull on the associations of 
civil society' (Kymlicka, 2002: 103). Liberals hope and expect, writes Will Kymlicka, 'that 
ethnic, religious, and cultural associations will, over time, voluntarily adjust their practices and 
beliefs to bring them more in line with the public principles of liberalism, which will reduce 
the 'incongruence' between associational norms and liberal principles' (ibid.). Here we have 
what I label 'conflicting diversity'. As David Miller emphasises, 
[...] liberals underestimate the difficulty of 'liberalizing' non-liberal identities; they cannot see 
how much has to be given up if people are going to see their conceptions of the good life as 
freely chosen and revisable. (Miller, 2000: 49) 
While part of this criticism rightly points to the shortcomings of the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship, the differentiated citizenship model and the related 
system of minority rights and other variants of accommodation of diversity for only a fraction 
of the members of a political community, raise three challenges to the egalitarian element of 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. First, the rights granted to a 
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particular minority group may not be extended to other minorities. These include the difference 
between ethnocultural minorities and immigrants. I will call this the inter-minority objection. 
Second, the rights granted to a particular minority could potentially undermine the common 
civil and political rights of the most vulnerable members of this group. I will call this the intra-
minority diversity objection14 . Thirdly, the rights granted to a particular minority could 
potentially undermine the heterogeneity and diversity within a particular minority community. 
I have referred to this issue as the paradox of multicultural diversity [section IV of Chapter /]. 
The autonomy-based conception of citizenship education therefore fails to be consistent 
with the principle of equal civic respect as it is likely to disadvantage those conceptions of the 
good that — in one way or another — are in tension or otherwise incompatible with society's 
broader social arrangements. By facilitating or promoting the development of the capacity for 
autonomy it might create inequality for those groups and/or individuals who do not see the 
cultivation and the exercise of autonomy as their primary goal. A programme of citizenship 
education that advances autonomy either as rationality, independence or any of its variations as 
its basic educational aim, is therefore incompatible with some forms of cultural identity and 
personal values and does not pay equal respect to the members of ethnocultural minorities and 
their culture [equal respect objection]. The congruence between the private and the public 
sphere might have a positive and a negative effect. The positive effect is that there is less likely 
to be some divergence between different social spheres. In contrast, the perverse side effect is 
likely to create a reactive form of diversity that would be far more radical, violent and 
exclusive than the non-congruence version where we would have more diversity but not that 
radically diverse than compared with the other view. On some interpretations, the increase of 
children whose parents decide to opt for homeschooling is a clear example of conflicting 
diversity as these children will normally not be exposed to the diversity of cultures, values and 
traditions they would encounter in schools (Reich, 2002). 
Moreover, there is something paradoxical in the claim of autonomy-based liberalism for 
more congruence between the public and other social spheres: by demanding autonomy as a 
most viable virtue of liberalism, it could restrict the options available to its citizens [the paradox 
of autonomy-based liberalism]. The demands of equal civic respect are much more stringent 
than taken for granted as it puts limits over the aims as well as over the justification for the 
promotion of particular civic aims we want to cultivate in students. 
11.3. The toleration-based conception of citizenship education 
In contrast to the strong model of citizenship education associated with the autonomy-based 
conception of liberalism, the toleration-based conception of citizenship education and its major 
proponents, including William Galston15 (1991, 1995, 2002a; 2006), Francis Schrag (1998), 
Nancy Rosenblum (1998, 2000) and Chandran Kukathas (2003) argue for a maximally 
expansive policy of accommodating diversity in a plurally diverse polity and its basic 
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institutional framework and the recognition of diversity also in the institutional arrangement and 
curriculum design of public education. A maximally expansive policy of accommodating 
diversity, Galston emphasises, is to be limited 'only by the core requirements of individual 
security and civic unity' (Galston, 2002a: 20). It expresses and requires, writes Galston, `the 
practice of tolerance — the conscientious reluctance to act in ways that impede others from 
living in accordance with their various conceptions of what gives life meaning and worth' 
(Galston, 1999: 45). In fact, as Galston emphasises, 'citizens must be disposed to tolerate 
diverse ways of life — not necessarily to approve of them, but certainly to refrain from 
repressing them with private or public force' (Galston, 2006: 334). Toleration, as Galston 
eloquently puts it, presents itself as 'a principled refusal to use coercive state power to impose 
one's own view on others, and therefore a commitment to moral competition through 
recruitement and persuasion alone' (Galston, 2002a: 126). Similarly, Chandran Kukathas 
argues, 
[l]iberalism is one of the modern world's responses — indeed, its most plausible response — to 
the fact of moral, religious, and cultural diversity. Its response has been to say that diversity 
should be accommodated, and differences tolerated; that a more complete social unity, marked 
by a uniform and common culture that integrates and harmonizes the interests of individual and 
community, is unattainable and undesirable; [...]. (Kukathas, 1998: 690) 
In this sense, a plurally diverse polity is consistent with [...] maximum feasible space for the 
enactment of individual and group differences, constrained only by the requirements of liberal 
social unity' (Galston, 1995: 524). Pluralism, writes Galston, [...] leads to a distinctive 
understanding of the relation between the requirements of unity and the claims of diversity in 
liberal politics' (Galston, 2002a: 10). On this interpretation, the stability of a plurally diverse 
polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework does not require as one of its 
aims either a weak or a strong version of autonomy, since both critical reflection of diverse 
ways of life and exposure to a range of different experiences and perspectives could make us 
even more distant from the communities and cultures that we value and that are important to 
our sense of identity and self-respect. A toleration-based account of citizenship education, as 
Galston emphasises, is characterised by a liberal democratic civic core, i.e. a set of key elements 
that characterise its educational agenda of citizenship. As Galston emphasises, the dispositions 
that would need to be developed in students include: [i] toleration of diverse ways of life; [ii] 
respect for the rule of law; [iii] to do their share to support the basic institutional framework of 
a plurally diverse polity; [iv] to identify with their fellow-citizens; [v] to be loyal to their 
political community; and [vi] to respect one another's basic liberties (Galston, 2006: 334). In 
contrast to the autonomy-based account of citizenship education, autonomy and critical self-
reflection, he furthermore argues, 'are not a necessary basis for political engagement and 
should not therefore form part of the core of civic education for all students' (ibid.: 330). 
The justification of toleration-based liberalism needs to be contrasted with two basic 
claims. First, toleration-based liberalism is supposed to be more inclusive of diversity due to 
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the reduction of some of the demands, duties and obligations of shared membership in a 
political community. According to this interpretation, it is supposed to accommodate a wider 
range of diversity and therefore be more inclusive and potentially more stable, peaceful and 
just. On this view, the difference between the two conceptions of citizenship education under 
examination is primarily a matter of degree. Second, it argues that its accommodation of the 
claims for toleration of diversity is more consistent with the liberal principle of equal respect 
and concern and the requirement of equal basic rights. However, a twofold objection arises 
here. On the one hand, autonomy-based liberalism criticizes the first claim by arguing that the 
toleration-based conception of citizenship education is in effect equally demanding as the 
autonomy-based account. Political liberalism, writes Amy Gutmann, 'need not, and often does 
not, accommodate more social diversity through its civic educational program than 
comprehensive liberalism' (Gutmann, 1995: 557). On the other hand, multiculturalism in 
general criticizes the second claim arguing that a conception of citizenship education that is 
based exclusively on a toleration-based approach to diversity is basically unjust and 
inegalitarian both in principle and in effect (see Section 111.2.1 and 111.2.2 of Chapter 1). 
However, the internal difference between proponents of the toleration-based conception 
of citizenship education shows the problems this approach to citizenship education is faced 
with. While Chandran Kukathas is opposed to external protections for those groups that want 
to live their lives according to their traditions, practices and values (1992) and supports the 
internal restriction as a legitimate means for cultural groups to reproduce themselves — as long 
as members of these groups have a right of exit'6, William Galston promotes external 
protections in the form of exemptions, such as those granted to the education of Amish children 
in the Wisconsin v. Yoder case. 
To summarise: the basic concern of the autonomy-based conception of citizenship 
education with the development of the capacity for autonomy coincides to a large extent with 
its insensitivity to the problems and difficulties raised by the asymmetry created by the 
spillover effect. On this interpretation, the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education 
threatens the cultural coherence of those groups and communities whose values, beliefs or 
conceptions of the good might be incompatible or in tension with society's broader social 
arrangements. Similarly, the basic concern of the toleration-based conception of citizenship 
education with a maximally expansive policy of accommodating diversity, largely coincides 
with its inattention to the problems associated with the centrality of civic equality and the 
difficulties associated with the reverse spillover effect. In the next section of this chapter I 
examine in detail the limits of both conceptions of citizenship education in order to make space 
for an alternative educational agenda of citizenship I outline and defend in Part III of the thesis. 
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III. 	 Limits of the autonomy-based and the toleration-based conceptions of citizenship 
education 
The two conceptions of citizenship education I examined in the previous section of this chapter 
are faced with a twofold failure. On the one hand, I maintain, the autonomy-based conception 
of citizenship education fails to treat with equal civic respect the normative significance of 
individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances. On the other hand, the toleration-based 
conception of citizenship education largely misrepresents our commitment to civic equality. 
We have therefore to draw a distinction on the justificatory disagreement between the 
autonomy-based and the toleration-based liberalism over the implications of both autonomy and 
toleration and the function of engagement with diversity in education since this will help us 
explain the two possible illiberal outcomes associated with the existing accounts of liberal 
citizenship education, i.e. the imposition of a capacity for autonomy on citizens and the 
associated reduction of social, cultural and religious diversity and the potential failure of the 
liberal framework to create the conditions necessary for the promotion and maintenance of its 
basic social and political institutions. 
The autonomy-based account of citizenship education, I maintain, leaves us without a 
legitimate justification for the imposition of basic civic virtues and shared public values that is 
consistent with basic rights and fundamental freedoms as a form of constraint on the 
production of otherwise valuable consequences. In contrast, the toleration-based account of 
citizenship education fails to build a set of principles about how we are supposed to ensure that 
the institutional arrangement of public education and its curriculum design will accommodate 
diversity in a plurally diverse polity. Both the strong model of citizenship education 
[autonomy-based conception] and the weak model of citizenship education [toleration-based 
conception], I maintain, have failed to offer an adequate response to the challenges associated 
with diversity. This partial inconsistency between the fundamental aims of the two conceptions 
of citizenship education and the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
has raised two separate significant problems that effectively threaten the viability and feasibility 
of both conceptions of citizenship education, i.e. the liberal expectancy problem associated 
with the strong model of citizenship education and the problem of social fragmentation 
associated with the weak model of citizenship education. 
The liberal expectancy problem associated with the autonomy-based conception of 
citizenship education, fails to take into account both diversity and pluralism as relatively fixed 
features of the ethical environment that characterizes contemporary liberal and democratic 
societies in at least three separate respects. First, in terms of distance since it does not 
acknowledge properly the asymmetry between different social groups and their differing 
conceptions of the good including the ethical environment of these groups and the likely 
`spillover effect' of common principles and shared public values into the private sphere. It 
therefore faces the risk to create an intrusive and restrictive ethical environment. Secondly, in 
terms of equal civic respect, it fails to acknowledge the basic moral equality of individuals and 
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the equal concern and respect to citizens with diverse conceptions of the good to be equally 
entitled to play — in principle — a role in determining how their society evolves. Finally, it fails 
to acknowledge the two-way relationship between the public sphere and the sphere of civil 
society and their ideally reciprocally supportive and mutually reinforcing character, instead of 
a one-way relationship that grants priority to the civic sphere and takes the private sphere and 
civil society as exclusively derivative. These three shortcomings of transformative liberalism 
and its conception of citizenship education result in the overall reduction of diversity, the 
imposition of a restrictive course of citizenship education on all citizens and the failure to offer 
a legitimate account of citizenship education that is justified primarily by the benefits it 
provides to its least advantaged citizens. Moreover, the liberal expectancy argument is based 
on two premises, i.e. [i] that the effect will be that any group will be liberalized; and [ii] that 
this process is basically irreversible. 
In contrast, the problem of social fragmentation is associated with the toleration-based 
conception of citizenship education and its promotion of a maximally expansive policy of 
accommodating diversity. The burden of proof, as J.S. Mill wrote in On Liberty, 'is supposed 
to be with those who are against liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition ... [the] a 
priori assumption is in the favour of freedom' (Mill, 1989: 472). However, this weak account 
of citizenship education might jeopardise the civic unity and the maintenance of social and 
political institutions that make freedom possible as well as to develop in students the civic 
virtues and other dispositions to maintain the institutions, practices and values that provide us 
with the 'conditions of liberty'. Moreover, the weak model of citizenship education does not 
consider the burdens of the 'reverse spillover effect', i.e. the impact of inequality and 
discrimination in the private sphere and within civil society on the exercise of basic rights and 
fundamental freedoms associated with citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity. As 
David Archard emphasises, 'inequality in the private sphere subverts public, civic equality' 
(Archard, 2003: 97). While the defenders of the autonomy-based conception of citizenship 
education have pointed out the 'spillover effect' of shared public values and critical 
reasonableness into the private sphere and the sphere of civil society, defenders of toleration-
based citizenship education have not devoted any attention to the 'reverse spillover effect'. 
Enlarging the analysis of citizenship education so as to incorporate these issues is of crucial 
importance for the alternative account of citizenship education and its conception of the fair 
terms of engagement with diversity I advance in Part III of the thesis. 
Moreover, the discussions between autonomy-based liberalism and toleration-based 
liberalism together with the associated accounts of citizenship education, as some scholars have 
argued, basically limit themselves over the controversies which of the common principles and 
shared public values should have priority for citizens as free and equal members of a polity. 
The competing justifications between autonomy and toleration have given little consideration 
to the imposition of disproportionate costs and their justification over those individuals and 
social groups whose values depart from common principles and shared public values of a 
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plurally diverse polity, e.g. various religious groups and other communities of conscience. At 
best, they ensure only a very restricted orientation on how we are to guarantee that the 
institutional arrangement of public education and its curriculum design will reduce the 
alienation of students who are not part of the mainstream and accommodate diversity in a 
plurally diverse polity. Furthermore, I maintain, both versions of citizenship education leave us 
without the adequate conceptual and normative resources to engage in two separate points. 
First, in the examination of the interactive dynamics between the basic constitutive elements of 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship as a shared political status 
associated with free and equal membership in a political community. Secondly, it also leaves 
us without the justification of the basic rights and fundamental freedoms as a form of constraint 
on the production of otherwise valuable consequences, e.g. civic unity and social cohesion. 
The central contrast dividing these two variants of liberalism and their different 
accounts of citizenship education lies therefore in their different scope and in the different 
arguments they offer for the promotion of common principles and shared public values even if 
a likely effect of this imposition of common principles and shared public values might be to 
unfairly exclude many members of a polity and risk their alienation from the shared institutional 
framework. Moreover, another fundamental contrast dividing the two accounts of citizenship 
education lies in the justice and legitimacy of whatever inequality of impact results from the 
promotion of a set of common principles and shared public values. 
The mutual consistency of shaping diversity for basic civic purposes as a legitimate 
means of ensuring the stability of a plurally diverse polity and the maintenance of its basic 
institutional framework on terms that secure the freedom and equality of all students 
irrespective of any morally irrelevant differentiating characteristic, should have a twofold aim. 
First, it should aim to introduce students to the diversity in their own society and educational 
environment with the benefits of critical engagement and understanding of other cultures, 
values and conceptions of the good. At the same time, it should aim at the preservation of their 
cultural coherence together with the conditions necessary for their exercise of their basic rights 
and fundamental freedoms. This strategy should enable the provision of an ethical 
environment" that encourages the cultivation of basic civic virtues as well as promotes the 
discouragement of activities, practices or values that fail to support the common principles and 
shared public values of a plurally diverse polity or be otherwise incompatible or in tension with 
society's broader social arrangements. More specifically, I maintain that this alternative 
conception of citizenship education argues for a reciprocally supportive and mutually 
reinforcing character between the public and the private sphere instead of a one-way 
relationship between different social spheres. 
There are two contending virtues which are in dispute between autonomy-based liberal 
citizenship education and toleration-based liberal citizenship education: the virtue of 'public 
reasonableness', defended by the former and the virtue of toleration promoted by the later 
(Kymlicka, 2003b; Macedo, 2000). While the spillover effect of the virtue of public 
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reasonableness into the private sphere is considerably high and has been acknowledged 
(Gutmann, 1995; Tomasi, 2002), the virtue of toleration does not have this effect on the private 
sphere or if it does it is either inadequate [necessary but not sufficient] or ineffective as civic 
republican and social conservative scholars have long argued. 
There is a further distinction that should be noted here. The virtue of public 
reasonableness is — on some interpretations — disruptive of cultural coherence by reducing 
social and cultural diversity in those communities whose internal arrangement or ethical 
environment might be in tension with common principles and shared public values of a plurally 
diverse polity. As William Galston emphasises, `[t]here is what might be called a paradox of 
diversity: If we insist that each civil association mirror the principles of the overarching 
political community, then meaningful differences among associations all but disappear; 
constitutional uniformity crushes social pluralism' (Galston, 2002a: 20). Similarly, Bhikhu 
Parekh also emphasises, 
`[...] liberals are not and perhaps cannot be liberal in all areas of life, and entertain and live by 
nonliberal ideas, a mixture of liberal and nonliberal ideas, or even by instincts, faith and habits 
in matters relating to intimate interpersonal relations, moral values, ethnic, political or national 
loyalties, and religious beliefs.' (Parekh, 2000: 241). 
On the other hand, the virtue of toleration might also have the effect of being disruptive by 
failing to create the active support necessary for the maintenance of a polity's basic 
institutional framework and of the political community in general. However, even the minimal 
requirement of toleration poses an important effect in a plurally diverse polity by creating a 
more accommodating environment for diversity in society and its basic institutional framework. 
In fact, as some scholars have argued, toleration implies the 'suspension of moral judgment' in 
relation to forms of conscience-based diversity, while the virtue of public reasonableness 
implies an active cognitive engagement with values, beliefs and conceptions of the good by 
other members of our political community. 
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IV. 	 Conclusion 
The critical evaluation of the two predominant contemporary conceptions of citizenship 
education I advanced in this chaper of the thesis yields two distinct and separate objections. 
First, the shaping of diversity for basic civic purposes advanced by the autonomy-based 
conception of citizenship education proves to be both counterproductive and potentially unjust. 
On the one hand, the imposition of common principles and shared public values on other social 
spheres threatens to reduce the overall diversity within a polity. At the same time, it also has 
another possible perverse side effect, i.e. that of creating conflicting diversity. The ambitions of 
the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education, then, neither improve the fair terms 
of engagement with diversity nor alter its requirement of maximal congruence. 
Second, a maximally expansive policy of accommodating diversity advanced by the 
toleration-based conception of citizenship education fails at two different levels, i.e. [i] the 
social level; and [ii] the individual level. At the social level, a maximally expansive policy of 
accommodating diversity basically minimizes the common denominator necessary for civic 
unity and social cohesion of a plurally diverse polity. In this sense, anything that could 
potentially be controversial or disruptive is eliminated from public discourse. One of the social 
effects a maximally expansive policy of accommodating diversity can result in civic erosion 
and social fragmentation. At the individual level, in contrast, a maximally expansive policy of 
accommodating diversity is much more precarious as it undermines the exercise of basic rights 
and fundamental freedoms that are associated with civic equality. The right of exit, critics of 
this conception of liberalism argue, insufficiently protects the most vulnerable members of 
those groups whose ethical environment might be incompatible or in tension with society's 
broader social arrangements. 
Both the autonomy-based and the toleration-based conception of citizenship education 
offer a different interpretation of the basic aims of citizenship education in a plurally diverse 
polity. On the first interpretation, the requirements of citizenship education stem from the ideal 
of free and equal members of a polity and the commitment to civic equality. As an educational 
approach, citizenship education should primarily be concerned with two educational goals, i.e. 
[i] the development in students of the virtues of mutual civic respect and the dispositions and 
capacities of good citizenship; and [ii] the development in students of the capacity for 
autonomy. On the second interpretation of the scope of citizenship education in a plurally 
diverse polity, the basic goal of citizenship education is more modest and is bound to inculcate 
in students the 'willingness to coexist peacefully with ways of life other than one's own' and 
`the minimal conditions of reasonable public judgement' (Galston, 1991: 253). In this sense, 
both the weak model of citizenship education [toleration-based conception] and the strong 
model of citizenship education [autonomy-based conception] have failed to offer an adequate 
response to the question how a conception of the civic purposes of public education that claims 
to be consistent with the two principled commitments associated with the liberal version of the 
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rights-based conception of citizenship is to be squared with the fair terms of engagement with 
diversity. We are therefore left with either a too demanding and homogenizing ideal of social 
cooperation or a too permissive conception of citizenship education that do not offer a coherent 
answer to the justification of the civic priorities and the individual interests in educating 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. Both 
versions of citizenship education examined in this chapter of the thesis, I maintain, rest on an 
incomplete and reductionist conception of engagement with diversity and its educational 
significance as part of the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a 
polity. It is the task of the next chapter of the thesis to examine in detail various issues 
associated with the educational significance of engagement with diversity in the process of 
educating citizens as free and equal members of a polity. 
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Notes 
On the most prevailing interpretation present in the literature on citizenship education, the toleration-
based conception of citizenship education is 'weaker' than the autonomy-based conception of 
citizenship education in the sense that the civic aims advanced by the former [toleration-based 
liberalism] are less demanding than those associated with the latter [autonomy-based liberalism]. 
2 Similarly, Matthew Clayton argues that the argument for the good of citizenship education in 
schools advanced in the Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools 
report prepared by the Advisory Group on Citizenship and chaired by Bernard Crick is 'contentious' 
(Clayton, 2006: 168). He goes on to distinguish two separate issues in this report, i.e. [i] the 
motivational foundation for the introduction of citizenship education into the National Curriculum 
of England for secondary level students (11-16 of age); and [ii] the role of citizenship education in 
the provision of public education. As related to [i], the necessity for the improvement in skills, 
understanding, and motivations related to citizenship is necessary, writes Clayton, 'because of the 
low level of political literacy and participation exhibited by young people in the UK' (ibid., 168). 
On the other hand, as related to [ii], the provision of citizenship education in public schools should 
remedy for the problem identified above. 
3 As Will Kymlicka emphasises, [t]he aim of educating citizens affects what subjects are taught, 
how they are taught, and in what sorts of classrooms. In this sense, education for citizenship is not 
an isolated subset of the curriculum, but rather is one of the ordering goals or principles which 
shape the entire curriculum' (Kymlicka, 2001: 293 [emphasis added]). 
4 As Rawls emphasises in 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus' [t]he aims of political 
philosophy depend on the society it addresses (Rawls, 1999: 421). In this respect, the aims of 
citizenship education depend on the character of the political community it addresses. As William 
Galston rightly points out, 'civic education [is not and should not be] homogenous and universal. It 
is by definition education within, and on behalf of, a particular political order. [...] Nor does civic 
education stand in opposition to its political community. On the contrary, it fails — fundamentally 
if it does not support and strengthen that community' (Galston, 1991: 243). 
5 In book IV of his Spirit of Laws Montesqueiu similarly points out that the laws of education ought 
to be in relation to the principle of each type of government. 'Thus each type of government', 
writes Montesqueiu, 'will have different laws governing education. In monarchies, the object of 
such laws will be honour; in republics, virtue; in despotism, fear' (Montesqueiu, 1977: 197). 
6 	 Two basic conditions must be met for a polity to reproduce itself: [a] the stability condition, i.e. the 
condition that will balance the tension between the requirements of social unity and claims for 
tolerance, respect and recognition of diversity; and [b] the sustainability condition, the condition 
that will assure the durability of liberal institutions and the preservation and development of a 
liberal democratic society and political order over time. In Political Liberalism Rawls identifies 
these two conditions as the 'problem of political liberalism'. 
7 For an examination of the limits of this reasoning, see Pateman 1976. Civic engagement, as Sidney 
Verba et al. (1995) pointed out matters for three distinct reasons independently of the alarmist 
proclamations about social fragmentation and civic disengagement on the one hand and the stability 
and legitimacy of a polity on the other, i.e. [i] the development of the capacities of the individual; 
[ii] the maintenance of community membership and the cultivation of civic virtues; and [iii] the 
equal protection of interests in public life. The first reason matters for both the individual as well as 
has some broader social implications, i.e. the spillover of the virtues, dispositions and other 
capacities into the public sphere. The second set of arguments about the positive effects of civic 
engagement rest on the premise that participation is valued primarily for the consequences it has for 
the shared public life. On this interpretation, civic engagement is conducive to those civic virtues 
associated with social cooperation, e.g. trust and solidarity. The third set of arguments is associated 
with the equal protection of interests of all members of a polity. 
8 	 There are two variants of religious groups, i.e. the active and the passive (see Swaine, 2006). 
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9 	 In a similar vein, Yael Tamir rejects the remedial justification for national self-determination or 
freedom of expression as 'remedial justification must rest on the contingent features of particular 
cases rather than on universal justification' (Tamir, 1993: x). 
10 For a similar characterisation of the points of contrast that mark significant differences between 
these two strands of contemporary liberalism, see Enslin (2003a: 79-80). 
11 
	
It remains disputed among liberal scholars themselves whether the associative network of civil 
society should conform to the principle of nondiscrimination and other common principles of a 
plurally diverse polity. On the one hand, there are liberal scholars who argue that civil society needs 
to conform to common principles and shared public values (Gutmann, 1998; Kymlicka, 2002; 
Macedo, 2000). On the other hand, there are liberal scholars who reject the 'transformative 
ambitions' of the former group of scholars and argue that individuals join the associative network 
of civil society freely and it is therefore not the government's business to limit the associative and 
the expressive liberty of individuals who join various associations (Galston, 2002b; Kukathas, 
2003; Rosenblum, 1998, 2000; Rosenblum & Post, 2002). As Nancy Rosenblum emphasises, 
`[t]he meaning and value of associations is not coextensive with the stability or well-being of 
liberal democracy, with justice, or with cultivating civic virtue. It is as extensive as human 
flourishing, self-development, and self-affirmation' (Rosenblum, 1998: 3). 
12 This can lead to various problems democratic theory is faced with, i.e. the fact that majority rule 
can either [i] lead to decisions that might violate basic rights and fundamental freedoms of its 
citizens or [ii] ignore the interests of minorities in a way that undermines their civic equality. 
13 Brown v. Board of Education was a justice-based dispute over the education of racially different 
children in common schools. On the other hand, both the Wisconsin v. Yoder and the Mozert v. 
Hawkins legal case present a different problem and pose a different set of challenges to the idea of 
common education. Despite many similarities between the later two cases, they present a distinct 
challenge for the idea of liberal citizenship education and for the ideal of common schooling. The 
Wisconsin v. Yoder case presented a challenge to the idea of common schooling since the Amish 
parents wanted to withdraw their children from common schools in order to maintain the 
sustainability of the Amish community [the community/sustainability objection]. Their withdrawal 
of children had nothing to do with the very idea of common education except for the reason that it 
jeopardized their community integrity. In contrast, the Mozert v. Hawkins case raises a different 
challenge to the idea of common education for a wholly different set of objections. The parents 
challenged both the idea of common education and the idea of common schooling from the 
perspective that a practice that reflects the principle of nondiscrimination (e.g. sexual equality) is 
likely to jeopardise the personal integrity of their children. They did not object to the practice on 
grounds that their children's exposure to it would potentially undermine their religious/conscience-
based community. Instead, they argued that reading a text that promotes equality between the sexes 
undermines their children's personal integrity and their belief systems. As Joe Coleman explains, 
`Mozert et al. were not primarily concerned that they would be unable to pass their faith along to 
their children. They were fighting to protect their children's souls' (Coleman, 1998: 761). 
14 For a thorough examination of the different issues related to the problems of internal minorities 
within minorities, see Spinner-Haley and Eisenberg (eds.) (2005). 
15 For an insightful discussion of the different elements of Galston's account of civic education, see 
Schrag (1998) and a symposium on Galston's liberal pluralist account of civic education published 
in Theory and Research in Education (vol. 4, no. 3 [2006]). 
16 On the problems associated with the right to exit from illiberal groups and the [realistic] capacity 
of individuals to exit these communities, see Okin (1998). 
17 For a detailed examination of the conception of the ethical environment in education, see Haydon 
(2006a). 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EDUCATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
ENGAGEMENT WITH DIVERSITY 
As emphasised in the previous chapter of the thesis engagement with diversity is at the heart of 
contemporary discussions over the civic purposes of public education. As I have pointed out in 
Chapter 3, any contemporary conception of citizenship education is primarily focused on a 
range of difficulties arising from the accommodation of diversity in the basic institutional 
framework of a plurally diverse polity, including public education. In fact, as has been pointed 
out in Section II and Section III of the previous chapter, the latitude of accommodation of 
diversity in public education and the approach to how engagement with diversity is to be 
carried out remains the litmus test that defines a particular theoretical position, policy proposal 
or practical implementation of contemporary accounts of citizenship education. As I have 
emphasised in Part I of the thesis, the difficulty in reconciling our commitment to civic equality 
with the demands for toleration, respect and recognition of diversity does not stem primarily 
from the tension between the two principled commitments associated with the liberal version 
of the rights-based conception of citizenship but springs primarily from our understanding of 
diversity itself. Despite its centrality in normative theorizing about the civic purposes of public 
education, the policy proposals that aim to calibrate the balance between the unifying and 
diversifying elements of public education and the practical engagement with diversity in 
schools, various issues associated with the educational significance of diversity in the project of 
educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a 
polity remain largely unexplored. In particular, engagement with diversity, I maintain, is much 
more complex than various intuitive understandings of this process are eager to encompass. 
This chapter of the thesis takes up the issue of the educational significance of engagement 
with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous and the various educational problems 
we are likely to encounter while including diversity in classrooms and other educational 
settings. In particular, it aims to expand our understanding of the educational significance of 
engagement with diversity and its role in the education of citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity. Contrary to existing accounts of citizenship education, I differentiate 
between the benefits and burdens of two separate circumstances associated with engagement 
with diversity, i.e. [i] exposure to diversity; and [ii] exposure of diversity. The basic aim in this 
chapter, then, is to clarify the complexity of the educational significance of engagement with 
diversity as well as to present the various problems, challenges and difficulties engagement 
with diversity brings along. 
Chapter 4 is composed of five sections that address three foundational questions 
associated with the educational significance of diversity in citizenship education, i.e. [i] what 
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are the basic dimensions of diversity; [ii] what is the educational significance of engagement 
with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous and what are the different functions 
of including diversity in education; and [iii] what are the capacities for engagement with 
diversity that need to be cultivated in students. 
Each of these questions challenge our intuitive understanding of engagement with 
diversity and bring to the forefront the complexity of engagement with diversity as part of the 
project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. Building on the 
exposition of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship [Section II of 
Chapter 1] and the two conceptions of citizenship education [Section II of Chapter 3] I outline 
in Section I of this chapter the pluralism of the existing conceptions of diversity. This aims to 
provide an account of when and why inclusion of and engagement with diversity is morally 
desirable as well as a set of principles for guiding the design of educational institutions in how 
diversity should actually be included in the non-ideal cirumstances of any educational 
environment. I then introduce in Section II, the three basic dimensions of diversity we are 
likely to be faced with when discussing inclusion of diversity in any educational environment, 
i.e. [i] richness; [ii] evenness; and [iii] distance. Each of the three dimensions is explained via a 
number of examples in order to articulate the pluralism of diversity as well as to offer this 
threefold characterisation of diversity as an evaluative tool for analysing different educational 
environments in terms of their basic characteristics. Based on the explication of the different 
dimensions of the non-ideal circumstances and levels of encountering diversity I proceed in 
Section III of this chapter with an examination of the educational significance of engagement 
with diversity in education. In other words, this section identifies the various consequentialist 
forms of justification of introducing students to the diversity in their own society and 
educational environment with the benefits of critical engagement and understanding of other 
cultures, values and ways of life. At the same time, I delineate the various limitations each of 
these distinctive functions is faced with. I then discuss in Section IV the basic capacities 
students are likely to need when facing diversity in their ethical environment as well as the 
civic, moral and epistemic limits the development of these capacities puts in front of both 
teachers and students. I maintain that neither the autonomy-based nor the toleration-based 
conception of citizenship education pays sufficient attention to the different shortcomings that 
are likely to emerge in the process of educating students so as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity. They are both insensitive to the different 
dimensions of diversity as well as the disproportionate disadvantage of particular groups of 
students in the development of the basic capacities for citizenship. I then identify in Section V 
the various shortcomings a traditional understanding of engagement with diversity brings along. 
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I. 	 Engagement with diversity 
As the writers of the Ajegbo Report rightly emphasize, 'concepts of citizenship are deficient 
without a substantive understanding of diversity' (DfES, 2007: 23). In fact, the challenge of 
any educational theory, Rob Reich emphasizes, 'is to navigate successfully between protecting 
the pluribus while also promoting an unum' (Reich, 2002: 116). However, part of the difficulty 
associated with diversity and its educational significance stems from the fact that neither the 
contextual factors affecting engagement with diversity nor diversity itself have been articulated 
in all their complexity. It is precisely because of this insensitivity to these constitutive issues, 
that both autonomy-based and toleration-based liberalism fail to provide an educational agenda 
of citizenship that is consistent with the project of educating of citizens so as to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. On the one hand, I argued, the 
autonomy-based conception of citizenship education is insensitive to the normative significance 
of individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances and is therefore facing the risk of 
alienating many citizens from the shared public values and the basic institutional framework of 
a plurally diverse polity. On the other hand, I argued, the toleration-based conception of 
citizenship education misrepresents our commitment to civic equality and is likely to 
undermine the exercise of the rights of those individuals who are not part of the mainstream. 
Similarly, as I have emphasised in Section III of Chapter 1, the multiculturalist project of 
educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity has problems of its own. While it 
rightly emphasises the different shortcomings associated with liberalism's difficulties in 
accommodating diversity according to its two principled commitments, its insensitivity to the 
unequal distribution of the benefits and burdens of accommodation within a particular non-
dominant minority group, reveals that indiscriminate accommodation of diversity fails to 
comply with the commitment to civic equality and equal civic respect for diversity. In this 
sense, engagement with diversity remains the strategic battleground between advocates of 
liberalism and multiculturalism and their conceptions of citizenship education. At the same 
time, I maintain, it remains the most pressing difficulty of any policy that claims to educate 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
These problems and difficulties have repercussions also at the level of educational 
practice and pedagogy. There is no educational setting or learning experience where issues of 
engagement with diversity wouldn't arise. Our intuitive reasoning about the educational 
significance of diversity raises three basic questions associated with the value of diversity in a 
plurally diverse polity, i.e. [i] why diversity matters; [ii] what are the foundational dimensions 
of diversity; and [iii] how diversity should be included in a non-ideal educational environment 
and what are the limits of its accommodation. 
As I have argued, the intuitive reasoning about the educational significance of diversity 
fails to provide a sufficiently elaborated answer to each of the three questions identified above. 
To illustrate: when we talk about a diverse educational setting, such as a classroom, or about 
the inclusion of diversity in the school curriculum, we operate at a level that does not 
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encompass the various dimensions of a particular form of diversity compared to the 
composition of a plurally diverse polity or the composition of the respective educational 
setting. Even after we establish the reasonableness of a particular form of diversity, like its 
consistency with common principles and shared public values, we have only just begun to 
articulate what the different elements of a particular form of diversity are. Next, there are 
several separate and distinctive functions that inclusion of and engagement with diversity 
performs. For example, the inclusion of and engagement with a particular form of diversity that 
is based on an ascriptive element of one's identity, performs a different set of functions 
compared with the inclusion of and engagement with conscience-based diversity. Moreover, 
one of the central controversies that remains largely unexplored is associated with the benefits 
and burdens of exposure to diversity as opposed to the benefits and burdens associated with 
exposure of diversity. Let me clarify on this distinction: by being exposed to diversity, we can 
assume that one is encountering a particular form of diversity [either ascriptive or conscience-
based] that one might be — for whatever reason — unfamiliar with. In contrast, exposure of 
diversity consists in the presentation of a particular element or dimension of one's identity or 
conception of the good to a particular audience, such as the presentation of one's country of 
origin in the case of an immigrant student or a particular language or dialect spoken at home 
that most other students would be unfamiliar with. I call this the pluralism of diversity. 
In order to articulate a conception of citizenship education that is sensitive to the 
pluralism of diversity and that would be at the same time both theoretically coherent as well as 
viable at the level of education policy and pedagogical practice, there is a threefold task that 
needs to be undertaken at this stage. First, I identify the circumstances of diversity, including 
the different constitutive dimensions that are part of the non-ideal circumstances of any 
educational environment. At the same time, a clearer distinction about different sources of 
diversity is to be articulated. Second, I outline the different functions of engagement with 
diversity in everyday educational environment. Finally, I examine the benefits and burdens 
associated with the three capacities associated with engagement with diversity, i.e. [i] critical 
reflection; [ii] reflective distance; and [iii] imaginative engagement/narrative imagination. 
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II. 	 The circumstances of diversity' 
To advance an alternative account of citizenship education and its conception of the fair terms 
of engagement with diversity that would be of the greatest benefit to those students that are the 
least advantaged we need to differentiate between two separate dimensions of diversity in 
education, i.e. [i] the institutional dimension; and [ii] the individual dimension. At the 
institutional level, educational settings can differ from one another along three basic 
characteristics, i.e. [i] richness; [ii] evenness; and [iii] distance. At the individual level, the 
diversity of students can be further distinguished along two foundational elements, i.e. [a] 
ascriptive; and [b] conscience-based. Let me examine each of the two dimensions as well as 
their particular elements below. 
Institutional level 
11.1.1 Richness 
Imagine two different schools of approximately equal enrolment size. Let's label them school 
A and school B respectively. The student population attending school A is composed of four 
different groups (either ethnocultural, racial, religious or linguistic). In contrast, students 
attending school B can be divided into six different groups according to the same criteria used 
to delineate the student composition variability in school A. Using this metric alone, school B is 
clearly more diverse than school A. In other words, by comparing the overall student 
composition of the two schools, we can conclude that school B is more diverse in terms of 
richness compared to school A as it contains a larger number of groups. Yet, few of us have 
attended schools which are diverse only in one particular dimension such as race, ethnicity, 
religion, etc. There is at least another element that offers us the possibility to compare different 
educational environments or other institutional settings in terms of their overall diversity. 
11.1.2 Evenness 
Continuing with the example of the two schools outlined above, the number of different groups 
composing the student population enabled us to conclude that a school composed of students 
coming from six distinct groups [school B] is more diverse than a school composed of students 
from only four groups [school A]. However, there is another element that enables the 
comparison of the two schools in terms of their diversity, that of evenness. Evenness refers to 
the relative size of a group or community that composes a particular environment. In our case, 
evenness focuses on the distribution of diversity between groups that are part of the two 
schools [school A and school B]. We focus upon how large a particular group represented in a 
particular school is. Assume that the four groups in school A are of about equal size, whereas 
the composition of school B is as follows: group 1 [450 members]; group 2 [10 members]; 
group 3 [10 members]; group 4 [10 members]; group 5 [10 members) and and group 6 [10 
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members]. With this additional information we can conclude that, after all, school A is more 
diverse than the nearly homogeneous school B, despite the fact that school B includes more 
groups that differ among themselves. Evenness, as the second differentiating criteria used to 
determine the overall diversity of the two educational environments offers us a better insight 
into the possible comparison of the range of diversity in a particular educational environment. 
However, neither richness nor evenness alone are sufficient to determine the complexity of 
diversity in non-ideal circumstances. 
11.1.3 Distance 
A third element playing a central role in any evaluation of the composition of a particular 
institutional setting including school or classroom is that of distance. In contrast to the two 
preceding dimensions, distance is problematic due to its complex nature. This particular 
dimension can be further differentiated along two distinct dimensions, i.e. [a] divergence 
[vertical level]; and [b] dissimilarity [horizontal level]. Divergence would denote the difference 
between a particular form of conscience-based diversity and the shared public values of a 
plurally diverse polity. In this sense, a doctrinal belief that is either illiberal, undemocratic or 
both, such as racism is much more diverse in terms of distance from the civic values compared 
to a form of diversity that is — in one way or another — reasonable, i.e. consistent with the fair 
terms of cooperation between citizens as free and equal members of a polity. In contrast, 
dissimilarity denotes the difference between a particular form of diversity from the immediate 
set of characteristics that is prevalent in a particular educational setting or one's own 
educational environment. For example: we can consider two groups, e.g. group X [part of the 
majority population in a given polity] and group Y [part of the minority population in the 
respective political community]. School or classroom composition between the two groups 
would be normally distributed in the same way as in other social settings, with schools or 
classrooms composed primarily of members of the majority group [in our case group X] with 
some members of the minority group [in our case group Y] or groups. The difference here is 
one of dissimilarity as well as of divergence. On the other hand, we can have a classroom where 
the composition is the reverse, with the majority constituted by members of group Y and only a 
few members of group X. In this case, the situation is one of dissimilarity without divergence. 
To illustrate: in a predominantly p-believing society, a minority that is part of a q-believing 
group might experience a sense of alienation and disempowerment. 
The evaluation of a particular educational environment in terms of the two dimensions 
of distance, i.e. divergence and dissimilarity, adds an important dimension to the discussion of 
inclusion of and engagement with diversity in two important respects. First, it enables us to 
identify the internal dynamics within the non-ideal circumstances of any educational 
environment. At the same time, it allows us to identify the most disadvantaged and vulnerable 
students in a particular educational setting. 
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To summarise: the partial ordering produced by the intersection of the three dimension 
of institutional-level diversity identified above [richness, evenness, distance] should be 
sufficient to determine the circumstances of diversity in the non-ideal circumstances of any 
educational environment. I call this the circumstances of complex diversity. 
II.2 	 Individual level 
At the individual level, diversity can be either [i] ascriptive and therefore a matter of chance or 
circumstance; or [ii] conscience-based and therefore — in principle — a matter of individual 
choice. In the first case, there are two broad forms of diversity that can qualify as ascriptive: [i] 
natural factors, such as sex, race, disability, ethnocultural membership, abilities and intelligence; 
and [ii] social factors, like class and wealth etc.2 On one interpretation — advanced by advocates 
of multiculturalism — cultural membership is a matter of chance, i.e. an unchosen feature of 
people's circumstances. On this view, it is an ascribed trait of one's identity, i.e. not a choice 
itself but, as Kok-Chor Tan emphasises forcefully, a 'precondition that makes choice possible 
and [...] something into which we are born and socialized' (Tan, 2000: 74). In the second case, 
conscience-based diversity refers basically to those forms of diversity that are a matter of 
individual choice, e.g. doctrinal forms of diversity including religious diversity. 
There are two important differences between the two forms of diversity identified 
above that need to be emphasised. First, in the case of ascriptive forms of diversity that are part 
of one's circumstances they are both [a] unchangeable as well as [b] out of the volitional power 
of the individual to be associated with it. To illustrate: until very recently nobody had the 
possibility to change his or her sex. At the same time, this particular trait of one's identity 
remains out of one's volitional power as we are born male or female, with a disability or not. 
On the other hand, conscience-based forms of diversity can both be changed as well as chosen 
by an individual, at least in principle as well as under certain conditions. For example: despite 
being born into an ethical environment of a family or a religious community, we usually reflect 
on our basic ethical commitments at some stage of our life. As part of this reflection, some 
individuals either cease to be religious, become religious or change their religious affiliation. 
However, it is important to emphasise that the internal heterogeneity of particular groups 
and communities, their interrelationship with other groups and communities as well as the 
variety of individual identities I outlined above is much more complex than can be presented 
here.3 
 For the sake of argument, the distinctions explicated in section II.1 and 11.2 of this 
chapter should suffice to determine the complexity of diversity at both institutional and the 
individual level. I turn now to the educational significance of engagement with forms of 
diversity that are plural and heterogeneous.4 
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III. 	 The educational significance of engagement with diversity5 
Inclusion of and engagement with diversity in the educational environment of public education 
and in society in general is praised by both advocates of toleration-based and autonomy-based 
liberalism as well the advocates of the moderate and the critical multiculturalist view, each for 
a different purpose and each with a different aim and overall educational goal (e.g. Parekh, 
2000: 165-170). Both the advocates of autonomy-based and of toleration-based citizenship 
education claim that engagement with diversity [including both exposure to diversity and 
exposure of diversity] is an important component of an educational agenda of citizenship in a 
plurally diverse polity. While autonomy-based citizenship education maintains that exposure to 
diversity enhances primarily the cultivation and the exercise of the capacity for critical 
reflection, toleration-based citizenship education argues that exposure to diversity contributes 
significantly to the development of toleration and mutual respect between members of a polity. 
At one level, education should enable students to `[...] learn about other ways of life 
and acquire some understanding of the history, practices, and values of diverse cultural groups' 
(Reich, 2002: 116). Despite the basically uncontroversial characterisation of the significance of 
diversity in the educational process, celebratory rationales and the associated arguments for 
inclusion of and engagement with diversity in the educational environment of a plurally diverse 
polity vary considerably from each other and depend on the different characteristics of a 
particular form of diversity as well as a number of contextual factors. 
The value of diversity in the educational environment of a plurally diverse polity and in 
society in general can be distinguished along a predominant function associated with a particular 
form of diversity. Six separate functions of engagement with diversity can be identified here, 
i.e. [i] the integrative function; [ii] the justice-based function [iii] the pragmatic function; [iv] 
the virtue-based function; [v] the self-respect function; and [vi] the epistemic function. 
Some of these functions are primarily social in nature, for example the integrative or the 
pragmatic function and some are primarily individual, like the virtue-based or the epistemic 
function. For example, two different outcomes are commonly associated with the social nature 
of inclusion of and engagement with diversity [including both exposure to diversity and 
exposure of diversity]. First, empowerment of the marginalised, oppressed or otherwise 
disadvantaged social groups or individuals. Second, the improvement in the relationship 
between the majority and those groups and individuals that are — in one way or another — not 
part of the mainstream of society. The first social effect would contribute to the creation and 
the maintenance of stable and sustainable social relationships within a plurally diverse polity. 
The pragmatic social effect would create a sense of social unity and solidarity and the 
improvement of trust among different social groups and individuals. In this sense, a basic aim 
of citizenship education, writes Stephen Macedo, 'should be to impart to all children the ability 
to reflect critically on their personal and public commitments for the sake of honouring our 
shared principles of liberal justice and equal rights for all' (Macedo, 2000: 239). 
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On the other hand, the individual benefits associated with the inclusion of and 
engagement with diversity, refer primarily to the improvement of the character of citizens. This 
can be described as the virtue-based effect or the increase of the options available that is the 
result of being exposed to different experiences and perspectives. At the individual level, 
exposure to diversity primarily encapsulates the development of toleration and appreciation of 
the values, beliefs and different social practices of those students who are diverse. At the same 
time, exposure of diversity is likely to increase the self-respect of those individuals that present 
themselves in the educational environment of public education. By introducing and elaborating 
on these distinct functions of inclusion of and engagement with diversity I aim to bring to the 
forefront several problems associated with inclusion of and engagement with diversity and the 
various difficulties of education policy and pedagogical practice. I examine below the main 
arguments supporting the different functions of the educational significance of engagement 
with diversity that are relevant for both exposure to diversity and for exposure of diversity in a 
non-ideal educational environment. 
III.1 The integrative function 
Public schools bring together students from a wide variety of backgrounds and conditions, 
including socio-economic; residential/legal status; families or social groups whose foundational 
conceptions of the good (including religious or other doctrinal beliefs) might depart 
substantially from the shared public values of a plurally diverse polity; ethnocultural minorities 
and racial groups; special education needs and different abilities. The whole point of a common 
school, writes Stephen Macedo, 
[...] is to be a primary arena where children from the different normative perspectives that 
compose our polity, encounter one another in a respectful setting, learn about one another, and 
discover that their differences do not preclude cooperation and mutual respect as participants in 
a shared political order. (Macedo, 2000: 194) 
At one level, the basic function of the inclusion of and engagement with diversity in public 
education is integrative and is based on civic equality which is the first principled commitment 
associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. Including 
students from diverse cultural backgrounds, marginalized or disadvantaged groups, children of 
immigrants or resident aliens or students with special educational needs performs a basic 
function of giving everyone an equal right to education as well as bringing into one educational 
environment students from different social spheres. In this respect, the benefit of engagement 
with diversity is both for those that are being included as well as for those who accept them in 
their midst. As Ian MacMullen rightly emphasises, 
[i]f we argue thus on civic grounds for keeping religious children in common schools, we are 
not proposing to use them for the benefit of the majority, who need guinea pigs on whom to 
practice toleration. (MacMullen, 2007: 39) 
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This justification for the inclusion of and engagement with diversity, does not make any 
reference to a past injustice associated with a particular form of diversity [either individual or 
group-based]. As Stephen Macedo emphasises, 
[a]ll children should be made aware of the ethnic, racial and religious diversity that constitutes 
our society so that they can think as citizens and so that they will not live in a mental 
straitjacket at odds with freedom. (Macedo, 2000: 240) 
In this sense, engagement with diversity is defended on the assertion that recognition of 
diversity and being in contact with one another in an educational environment that is both open 
and respectful expresses the civic equality of students coming from different social spheres. 
III2 The justice-based function 
The justice-based function of inclusion of diversity in the educational environment of public 
education can perform a twofold task. On the one hand, it can be compensatory such as to 
alleviate some past injustice like discrimination, marginalisation and oppression of Blacks in 
the case of the US. On the other hand, it can serve the purpose of preservation of a particular 
(minority) culture. The justice-based function associated with engagement with diversity has 
been primarily advanced by advocates of multiculturalism based on the many experiences of 
oppression, discrimination or marginalisation. Justifications of inclusion of diversity in public 
education and the claim to include the different perspectives associated with minority groups in 
the school curriculum and other educational materials come in two main types. The first, 
compensatory-based arguments make essential reference to the previous exclusion of a range 
of perspectives associated with minorities and other vulnerable groups from the school 
curriculum and textbooks (Sher, 1999). Examples of these are the exclusion of 'black' history, 
women's contribution to society and the open presence of same-sex oriented individuals in 
public life. These justice-based claims argue that a more inclusive educational programme or 
curriculum would compensate for previous discrimination, oppression and marginalisation and 
would advance a more positive attitude of their distinctive culture to themselves and to others. 
An educational environment that would recognise diversity both in its student composition as 
well as in its school curriculum is said to be just. However, this justification is insufficient in 
two important respects. First, it lacks an examination of the culture it aims to include. We may 
ask if a particular point of view or perspective associated with a particular minority or a 
previously discriminated group is a unified one. Second, is the perspective that is to be included 
equally representative of all members of a particular community or [at least] of its majority? 
1113 The pragmatic function 
Strategically, inclusion of diversity in the classroom or its inclusion in the school curriculum is 
advantageous because it enables students to be exposed to cultures, points of view and social 
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experiences they would otherwise not have the opportunity to be engaged with. For example, it 
exposes students from the majority to a particular form of diversity that was traditionally 
excluded from the school curriculum and other educational materials. Since inclusion of and 
engagement with diversity mixes students who would otherwise not have the possibility of 
contact, it is beneficial in the basic instrumental sense. Still others have endorsed exposure to 
diversity on the proposition that exposure to diversity has beneficial effects on students who 
are exposed to diversity. The view is that mutual respect is being developed instead of mere 
toleration. Since these beneficial effects of exposure to diversity are thought to be worthwhile 
in themselves, they count in favour of exposing students to diversity for the sake of giving 
them more choices among good lives.6 
1114 The virtue-based function 
The virtue-based function is premised on the assumption that exposing students to diverse 
ways of life either through a school curriculum or via the school ethos is important in the 
development of childrens' moral competence and responsibility since it challenges one's set of 
values and has an important interaction effect 'for the sake of learning to respect as fellow 
citizens those who differ with them in matters of religion' (Macedo, 1995b: 68). A society-like 
educational environment, that is nondiscriminatory has a number of social benefits and 
individual gains. First, students encounter one another on equal terms, without the fear of 
prejudice, stereotyping or discrimination. The common school ideal, writes Eamonn Callan, is 
a 'setting that really includes students and teachers whose diverse ethical voices represent the 
pluralism of the larger society' (Callan, 1995: 263). They tend to develop mutual 
understanding, trust, solidarity and toleration irrespective of their religious affiliation, 
ethnocultural background, socio-economic status, racial group or any other background 
characteristic of their identity. As Sanford Levinson points out, 
[i]n order for people to come to tolerate and respect others, it is generally thought that they need 
to interact with these 'others' in close, meaningful ways that enable them to see the 
commonalities among them (that serve to generate mutual respect) and at least to understand 
the reasons for their differences that remain between them. (S. Levinson, 2003: 104) 
Next, the sense of mutual respect and understanding developed among students is positively 
correlated with the maintenance of social cohesion and the development of civic unity. In this 
sense, the stability of a plurally diverse polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional 
framework depend also on students' cooperation with other members of their political 
community who might differ from them. 
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111.5 The self-respect function 
Alongside the justice-based function, the self-respect function points primarily to the value of 
exposure of diversity for the exposed agent that acts as the object of engagement with diversity 
within a particular educational environment. By having one's own diversity publicly exposed, 
the self-respect of the exposed agent is supposedly increased. In this respect, when diversity is 
included either directly or indirectly, those that are exposing themselves are recognised as 
equals. The recognition of the equal standing of a particular form of diversity alongside the 
mainstream culture supposedly increases the self-respect of those that are being exposed or 
present their particular culture to others. However, students coming from an ethical 
environment that might be incompatible or in tension with society's broader social arrangements, 
e.g. does not support the values of gender equality or nondiscrimination are at risk compared to 
those students whose familiar or associative social life supports as well as practices the values 
that are part of the shared public life. These students have therefore to 'correct' their values and 
beliefs and are therefore facing a risk of diminishing their self-respect. 
111.6 The epistemic function 
One of the most important social as well as individual benefits associated with engagement 
with diversity is its factual contribution to the enlargement of one's knowledge. The value of 
diversity, writes Cass Sunstein, 'comes from seeing a range of perspectives, including the 
emotions attached to them — and from being in the actual physical presence of people who have 
those perspectives and cannot be easily dismissed' (Sunstein, 2003: 205). Furthermore, by 
being exposed to the diversity of values, cultures and traditions, students have more options 
available to choose from. At the same time, by having a range of different options available, 
they can reflect more easily and with more precision on their own commitments and allegiances. 
Exposure to other ways of life, writes Will Kymlicka, 'helps people make informed judgments 
about what is truly worthwhile' (Kymlicka, 1996: 89-90). 
However, not all forms of diversity matter for the same purpose. To take an example, 
exposure to or engagement with ethnic or racial diversity might primarily serve for civic 
purposes, and contribute to increased mutual understanding and respect of those who belong to 
a different ethnic, racial or linguistic group. On the other hand, a form of conscience-based 
diversity, such as the examination of different experiences and perspectives associated with a 
particular doctrinal belief or set of values, would primarily serve the promotion and 
development of autonomy and critical reflection since we may find a particular element of a 
particular position in need of further clarification and critical examination. As Samuel 
Scheffler emphasises, 
[t]he rewards characteristically afforded by this way of life might be called the rewards of 
openness to the other. For some people, the most important of these rewards lies in the sense of 
enrichment that comes from developing an appreciation for forms of value that are realized in 
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practices other than one's own. [...] What underlies all of these rewards — what makes them 
available to the participants in a regime of toleration — is the kind of fraternity that is expressed 
in and realized by the practice of mutual deference to one another's values. And for people who 
experience and appreciate the rewards associated with that practice, its value ceases to be purely 
instrumental. (Scheffler, 2010: 333) 
As these examples clearly illustrate, the most common way to defend the engagement of students 
with diversity is premised on the contact hypothesis7, namely the assertion that the exposure of 
students to different practices, customs and religious beliefs fosters interracial, interethnic, 
intercultural, inter-religious respect and solidarity among individuals and is therefore 
conducive to the overall civic as well as individual benefits. In this sense, inclusion of and 
engagement with diversity are generally to be welcomed and praised for a range of separate 
functions identified above. Yet, another component of the educational agenda of citizenship that 
takes the educational significance of engagement with diversity as one of its basic aims needs 
to be examined, i.e. the capacities for engagement with diversity. I turn now to the capacities 
for engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous. In particular, I 
critically examine the three basic capacities linked to engagement with diversity advocated by 
the existing accounts of citizenship education. 
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IV. 	 The capacities for engagement with diversitys 
Engagement with diversity can take place at different levels, through different contexts 
(classroom, textbooks), via different pedagogical strategies and conforming to different 
policies. At the institutional level, inclusion of and engagement with diversity needs to be 
differentiated along two distinct dimensions: [i] direct engagement with diversity; and [ii] 
indirect engagement with diversity. The direct approach of exposure to diversity is usually 
associated with classrooms or other educational settings where students from different 
backgrounds, groups or communities encounter each other in a direct contact. On the other 
hand, the indirect approach of exposure to diversity offers students the possibility to learn 
about other cultures, values and doctrinal beliefs and to come into contact with other forms of 
diversity via the school curriculum, textbooks and other educational materials. While at the 
moral level there is no difference between the two approaches associated with the delivery of 
education for diversity, at the epistemic and the social level there is supposedly an important 
difference between the two approaches in favour of the direct approach to exposure to 
diversity. At the social and epistemic level, students can experience directly the different 
beliefs, values and other forms of diversity. As Meira Levinson argues, 'it is so hard for students 
to learn to be mutually tolerant and respectful of other people, traditions and ways of life unless 
they are actually exposed to them' (M. Levinson, 1999b: 114). Similarly, Ian MacMullen points 
out that 'virtues will only be effectively learned through practice' (MacMullen, 2007: 39). At 
the same time, inclusion of and engagement with diversity via the direct approach in particular 
is faced with a set of difficulties and challenges in case the dissimilarity or distance between 
the different forms of diversity is too large. For example, the more diverse the classroom, the 
less chance there will be of the disproportionate disadvantage or epistemic asymmetry of 
students that come from those groups that are not part of the mainstream. 
Having clarified the circumstances of diversity in section II of this chapter and identified 
in section III the foundational functions of engagement with diversity, it is the task of this 
section to set out the basic capacities needed by students for engagement with diversity in the 
educational environment of a plurally diverse polity. Three basic capacities can be identified 
here, i.e. [i] critical reflection or the capacity for the exercise of public reasonableness (Galston, 
1991; Kymlicka, 1999); [ii] reflective distance or the capacity for a critical examination of 
oneself and one's values and traditions (Brighouse, 1998; M. Levinson, 1999b); and [iii] 
imaginative engagement or the capacity for narrative imagination (Callan, 1997; Nussbaum, 
1997). Each of these capacities needs to be clarified in order to articulate its appropriateness 
for engagement with diversity and to emphasise the potential shortcomings and difficulties 
associated with both the cultivation and the exercise of the capacities for engagement with 
diversity at the level of pedagogical practice. 
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IV.1 Critical reflection 
As emphasised in section III of Chapter 3, the capacity for critical reflection and the virtue of 
public reasonableness are both part of the autonomy-based accounts of citizenship education. 
By comparing different normative conceptions of the good or having at our disposal different 
experiences and perspectives over a particular issue there is a twofold advantage for the agent 
that is exercising the capacity for critical reflection. By having more information and 
knowledge on a particular issue or being acquainted with different experiences and perspectives 
the agents have more options available to choose from [the maximisation of choice view]. At 
the same time, by having more options available, the agent is in a better position to evaluate 
one's own particular perspective or experience [the evaluative significance view]. In this sense, 
the cultivation and the exercise of the capacity for critical reflection contributes significantly to 
the support of the values associated with the classical Millian argument for the development of 
autonomy and individuality, that social diversity and choice are increased or strengthened. 
IV.2 Reflective distance 
On either the autonomy-directed or the autonomy facilitation approach (Brighouse, 2000), 
engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous is most clearly associated 
with Socratic self-examination, as Martha Nussbaum points out in her book Cultivating 
Humanity (Nussbaum, 1997). The capacity for critical reflection outlined above has to be 
differentiated from the capacity for reflective distance/reflective detachment. In contrast to the 
capacity for critical reflection that enables us to evaluate actions, experiences and perspectives 
of others, the capacity for reflective distance is primarily oriented towards one's conception of 
the good or a doctrinal belief. On this interpretation, one can detach oneself from one's basic 
core commitments by applying the capacity of critical reflection to one's values and beliefs. 
One can distance oneself from one's core commitments either by the process of reflective 
distance or by a 'discontinuous ethos', involving an educational environment that distances 
oneself from his or her deeply shared values and beliefs. 
IV.3 Imaginative engagement/narrative imagination 
Imaginative engagement or narrative imagination is a capacity that works as a corollary to the two 
capacities for engagement with diversity examined above. The capacity for narrative imagination 
enables us to imaginatively experience another's conception of the good; enabling us to look at 
a particular experience from his or her position. As Eamonn Callan emphasises: 
My claim is that to understand ethical diversity in the educationally relevant sense presupposes 
some experience of entering imaginatively into ways of life that are strange, even repugnant, 
[...]. (Callan, 1997: 133) 
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This capacity to imaginatively experience a particular conception of the good or value offers 
one the possibility to entertain the same conditions as the agent who holds a particular belief or 
value, and therefore to get a close insight into an individual's motivation, decisions and 
choices. The development of this capacity should offer students the possibility to entertain 
different perspectives over a particular social fact or a possible problem that is present in 
society. Its benefits are therefore primarily epistemic since by asking students to use their 
imagination and exercise critical judgement, writes Amy Gutmann, 'schools can help students 
distinguish between understanding, respecting, and accepting unfamiliar ways of life not their 
own' (Gutmann, 1995: 572). 
The cultivation and the exercise of these three capacities should offer students the 
possibility to learn about diversity in their own society and in their educational environment 
with the benefits of critical engagement and understanding of other cultures, values and 
conceptions of the good. Yet, without a distributive specification and the agent-relative 
specification of engagement with diversity, as I maintain in Part III of the thesis, the cultivation 
and the exercise of the capacity for critical reflection, reflective detachment and imaginative 
engagement face several difficulties each with a set of possible shortcomings, objections or 
straightforward problems. 
I argue that this understanding of the capacities for engagement with diversity is 
questionable as well as incomplete. This is so in at least two respects: first, it overestimates the 
convergence between basic intellectual skills, knowledge and critical rationality and the 
development of democratic values, such as equality and civic virtues, e.g. mutual respect. 
Second, it assumes that exposure to diversity and the possible mutual respect will necessarily 
result in the understanding of the 'other' point of view and its appreciation/acceptance. I argue 
that exposure to diversity and the exercise of the three capacities identified above might just as 
well lead to the reinforcing of the stereotypes and prejudices associated with a particular social, 
cultural or religious group [the subject of exposure, i.e. those that are exposed to diversity] on 
the one hand and to the sense of vulnerability, exclusion or discrimination on the other [the 
object of exposure]. Exposure to diversity might also have an unintended negative impact on 
the reduction of privacy and of personal integrity of those students who expose themselves 
since an extension of shared public values into the private sphere would at the same time 
involve an unjust imposition of civic obligations and responsibilities of citizenship. This 
asymmetry objection — a cognitive dissonance between a cultural and social environment that a 
student comes from and the basic aims of liberal citizenship education, and the possible 
`unequal psychological taxation' of citizens from religious, ethnic or cultural minorities —
raises important justice-based claims that the advocates of multiculturalism and liberal 
multiculturalism have advanced in their arguments for the inclusion of diversity in the 
educational environment of public education. I give some substance to these statements in the 
next section of this chapter. 
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V. 	 Engagement with diversity: the central controversies 
In contrast to our intuitive understanding of the educational significance of engagement with 
forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous, the cultivation and the exercise of the 
capacities for engagement with diversity that should be part of any account of citizenship 
education in a plurally diverse polity, can have a number of potential shortcomings which are 
likely to face a number of difficulties in a non-ideal educational environment. In order to tackle 
successfully the various difficulties that we are likely to encounter while developing the 
capacities for engagement with diversity discussed in Part III of the thesis, it is important to 
make a distinction between two different dimensions present in the educational environment 
articulated previously, i.e. [i] exposure to diversity; and [ii] exposure of diversity. While each 
of the two positions should, in principle, be both encouraged and supported as they generate a 
range of positive functions identified in Section IV of this chapter, each of them can face three 
different shortcomings, i.e. [i] civic shortcomings; [ii] moral shortcomings; and [iii] epistemic 
shortcomings. I elaborate each of them below. 
V.1 	 Civic shortcomings 
The civic shortcomings associated with both exposure to diversity and exposure of diversity 
can be elaborated along a more primordial dimension that determines the value of diversity and 
its significance for citizenship education. Three different approaches can be identified, i.e. [i] 
the containment of diversity approach; [ii] the protection of diversity approach; and [iii] the 
promotion of diversity approach. 
In the case of the containment of diversity approach, engagement with diversity should 
come only after the promotion of unity. While claiming legitimacy for both exposure to and 
exposure of diversity, its educational significance is both logically and politically dependent on 
the priority of the promotion of unity. On this interpretation, the relationship between unity and 
diversity is that of either-or options and is constructed in terms of priority assigned to the 
former. In this case, the role of diversity is exclusively instrumental as it functions primarily 
for the purpose of promoting unity. The cultivation and the exercise of the three capacities for 
engagement with diversity that have been identified in the previous section of this chapter, 
would thus fail to pay equal civic respect to diversity, as those that are diverse do not count 
equally compared to those that are part of the mainstream. To indiscriminately promote the 
cultivation and the exercise of the capacities for engagement with diversity would rule out any 
of those forms of diversity that are inconsistent with common principles and shared public 
values of a plurally diverse polity. 
In the case of the protection of diversity approach, accommodation of diversity should 
be maximally expanded and should be limited only in relation to the stability and unity of the 
political community. On this interpretation, while diversity is positively praised, no positive 
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entitlement alongside freedom of expression and freedom of association should be granted. The 
existence of diversity in a political community depends primarily on the success of its members 
in attracting a viable number of members that would identify with this position and pass it on 
to the next generation. In this case, the cultivation and the exercise of the three capacities for 
engagement with diversity can result in the weakening of the bonding ties of individuals with 
their communities and not necessarily lead to a positive engagement with others. 
In the third approach identified above [the promotion of diversity approach], diversity —
as a matter of justice — should be actively promoted and encouraged. On this interpretation, 
accommodation of diversity is of equal importance as the promotion of civic unity in creating 
an allegiance to the basic institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity and its 
foundational principles. The cultivation and the exercise of the capacities for engagement with 
diversity identified in the previous section of this chapter would disproportionately 
disadvantage those individuals whose conceptions of the good might be incompatible or in 
tension with society's broader social arrangements. 
V.2 Moral shortcomings 
Both the exposure to diversity approach and the exposure of diversity dimension raise a range 
of potential problems for students who come from groups or communities that are part of the 
most vulnerable groups in a plurally diverse polity, such as those who are marginalised or 
disadvantaged. The first problem is associated with exposure to diversity. Two well known 
legal disputes that have examined different elements of exposure to diversity, were the 
Wisconsin v. Yoder9 case and the Mozert v. Hawkins case.10 In the first case, the Amish parents 
insisted on having their children exempted from compulsory attendance in a public school. They 
argued for this on the assertion that their children's exposure to diversity would jeopardise 
their group integrity and the sustainability of their religious community over time [the cultural 
coherence objection]. On the other hand, the Mozert v. Hawkins legal case involved religious 
conservative parents who claimed that the exposure of their children to a particular reading 
material jeopardized the personal integrity of their children and threatened to undermine the 
overall coherence of their ethical environment [the individual vulnerability objection]. Both 
cases have claimed that exposure to diversity can have deleterious effects on the cultural 
cohesion of a religious community as in the case of the Amish community or the exercise of 
freedom of conscience as in the case of a religious conservative group examined in the Mozert 
v. Hawkins case. 
Next, the idea of a discontinuous ethos and the idea of the 'detached school' that would 
offer the ideal educational environment where the cultivation and the exercise of the three 
basic capacities for engagement with diversity should be carried out, faces a twofold risk as it 
fails to take into consideration the potential disadvantages students might be affected by in 
their families and their social environment. On the one hand, it can alienate students coming 
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from a minority from the shared public values and their commitment to the basic institutional 
framework of a plurally diverse polity [the challenge of alienation]. On the other hand, as the 
experiences and perspectives that constitute one's core commitments are not widely shared by 
other students one is disproportionately disadvantaged [the challenge of cognitive dissonance]. 
I maintain that both the ideal of the detached school as well as the pedagogical strategy 
of imaginative engagement, are likely to create a disproportionate disadvantage for those 
students whose foundational beliefs or conceptions of the good are not part of the mainstream 
or depart from the shared public values of a plurally diverse polity. Moreover, the cultivation 
and the exercise of the capacity for critical reflection can result in the weakening of the 
bonding ties of individuals with their communities while not necessarily leading to the bridging 
capital of engaging with others. Neither the capacity for critical reflection nor the capacity for 
imaginative engagement are sufficiently sensitive to the issue of distance identified previously. 
The cultivation and exercise of the capacity for reflective distance can result in a detachment 
from one's constitutive commitments and allegiances and therefore jeopardise both the 
maintenance of cultural coherence and personal integrity. The model of the detached school, I 
maintain, disproportionately disadvantages those students whose foundational beliefs depart 
from the shared public values or prevailing norms of a society. At the same time, as Joseph Raz 
emphasises forcefully, 
[a] policy which forcibly detaches children from the culture of their parents not only 
undermines the stability of society by undermining people's ability to sustain long-term 
intimate relations, it also threatens one of the deepest desires of most parents, the desire to 
understand their children, share their world, and remain close to them. (Raz, 1994: 178) 
In the case of exposure of diversity, students coming from an ethical environment or an 
ethnocultural group that is not part of the mainstream are disproportionately disadvantaged 
compared to those that are part of the mainstream. Those children representing the majority 
will be in a privileged position compared to those who come from a minority position since the 
first position is the 'normal' one. For example, if I present myself in front of a group of 
students who find my own experience — for whatever reason — unfamiliar, I suffer an integrity-
based asymmetry. As proponents of the critical multiculturalist view emphasise (e.g. Parekh, 
2000), regime-level principles and institutional structures of a liberal and democratic polity 
unfairly exclude minority groups and religious associations from its basic institutional 
framework. The vulnerability of students who are not part of the mainstream is therefore 
disproportionately more burdensome compared to students who are part of the mainstream. In 
other words, this argument has led to insensitivity to the other part of engagement with 
diversity, leading to an asymmetry between those exposing themselves and those who benefit 
from this exposure. 
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V.3 	 Epistemic shortcomings 
There are three epistemic shortcomings that can arise with both exposure to diversity and with 
exposure of diversity, i.e. [i] stereotyping; [ii] reductionism; and [iii] rejection of diversity. Let 
me examine each in turn. The shortcoming of stereotyping can occur where a particular trait of 
character or characteristics of diversity becomes generalised. For example, if students from a 
distinctive cultural background present some aspect of their ethical environment or a particular 
practice that is part of their culture in the classroom, they might present a stereotyped version 
of their culture due to [i] children's limited knowledge about their culture [the limited 
knowledge shortcoming] and [ii] due to their lack of knowledge about the internal diversity 
within their culture [the partiality shortcoming]. As related to both [i] and [ii] explicated 
above, this partial treatment of a cultural practice or religious belief runs the risk of both 
neglecting and distorting the cultural and moral distinctiveness of a particular religious belief 
or cultural practice. Next, reductionism arises where those who are exposed to diversity receive 
a false impression that one view of a particular culture is all there is to this particular culture. 
This shortcoming makes the error of reducing the internal heterogeneity and pluralism of a 
particular culture and reducing it to one dimension only. Finally, rejection concerns the 
rejection of the viability of a particular culture after it is presented. Instead of appreciating a 
particular culture, the acquaintance with it creates the rejection of it. In this sense, the 
presentation of a culture might strengthen the prejudices that the majority and other students 
hold of a particular culture or some of its practices. If teachers do not have at least a minimum 
degree of knowledge about and familiarity with a particular culture, presentation of these 
`simplified' narratives might objectify and thus create a false description or interpretation of a 
particular culture. 
At the same time, the problem of imaginative engagement fails to take seriously the 
epistemic asymmetry between belief and imagination. While imaginative engagement with 
others' beliefs, values and cultural practices can and does enlarge one's ability and 
competence, it fails seriously to see these beliefs as binding and limiting to conscience. While 
one can acquaint oneself with a particular belief or point of view, the holder of this belief is in 
another position due to the internal relationship with the truth of his own belief whereas 
someone who imaginatively entertains the other's perspective as one among other possibilities 
sees it as a possible choice among others [the non-equivalence objection]. What is open to 
objection in this capacity for engagement with diversity, is that imaginative engagement as a 
strategy can fail to see the difference between belief and imagination in shaping an individual's 
choices, beliefs and decisions. Expressions of belief, I maintain, have a different interpersonal 
function from expressions of imagination. In the first case, we act out of a particular belief 
whereas in the other case, the example we imaginatively entered presents another possible 
option to us that is not binding on us. 
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If we assess the arguments for engagement with diversity advanced by the autonomy-
based conception of citizenship education, the toleration-based conception of citizenship 
education and multicultural education, we can clearly see that each of these positions fail to take 
into consideration the two foundational positions of the pluralism of diversity as well as the 
non-ideal circumstances of any educational environment. In particular, the arguments advanced 
by existing accounts of citizenship education are hampered by their reductionist understanding 
of the project of educating students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity including their insensitivity to the educational significance of engagement 
with diversity. Let me briefly recapitulate the major shortcomings of these approaches. 
First, the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education fails to treat with equal 
civic respect the normative significance of individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances 
and therefore threatens to reduce the overall diversity in a society (M. Levinson, 1999b). 
Moreover, its development of the primacy of autonomy is likely to create the 'spillover effect' 
of common principles and shared public values into other social spheres (Tomasi, 2001). In 
contrast, the toleration-based conception of citizenship education makes a twofold failure. On 
the one hand, by promoting the maximisation of diversity it fails to take seriously the unity it 
takes to sustain a plurally diverse polity. On the other hand, by almost indiscriminately 
promoting diversity it undermines the exercise of the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of 
the most at-risk individuals within non-dominant minority groups, i.e. the creation of the 
`reverse spillover effect'. Multiculturalist education suffers from two of the paradoxes 
associated with a multicultural understanding of civic equality identified in section IV.2 and 
IV.3 of Chapter 1, i.e. the paradox of multicultural vulnerability and the paradox of 
multicultural diversity. 
Each of the three existing approaches is faced with a problem of its own that makes their 
conception of engagement with diversity problematic at both the theoretical and the practical 
level. Three approach-specific problems can be identified here, i.e. [i] the threshold problem 
[what counts as a legitimate form of diversity]; [ii] the indexing problem [who is disadvantaged 
and in what respect]; and [iii] the balancing problem [between various possible forms of 
distribution of engagement with diversity]. The threshold problem associated with the 
autonomy-based conception of citizenship education faces problems with those forms of 
diversity that are inconsistent with common principles and shared public values. In contrast, 
the main problem of the toleration-based conception of citizenship education is to identify those 
groups and individuals that are in one respect or another disadvantaged. Finally, multicultural 
education is faced with the problem of how to calibrate the balance between the commitment to 
civic equality and the commitment to equal civic respect for diversity. 
This ambivalence towards the educational significance of engagement with diversity 
and the project of education for diversity by existing conceptions of citizenship education 
requires an alternative approach that would adequately address the fair terms of engagement 
with diversity and thus be consistent with the project of educating citizens so as to recognise 
and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
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VI. 
	 Conclusion 
The arguments for engagement with diversity as one of the basic aims of educating citizens so 
as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity have been used to 
advance the educational ideal of making classrooms and other educational settings more 
diverse in terms of religious, ethnic, racial, cultural and socio-economic status and therefore 
enabling students to learn from one another about their different beliefs, customs, languages, 
traditions and practices, rather than having classrooms composed of students from a similar or 
monocultural background. On this view, engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and 
heterogeneous seems to be trapped between two competing aims advanced by existing 
conceptions of citizenship education, each claiming primacy compared to other civic purposes 
of public education. On the one hand, the autonomy-based account of citizenship education 
promotes engagement with diversity primarily for the development of the capacities and 
dispositions associated with autonomy, based either on the maximisation of choice view or the 
evaluative significance view. On the other hand, the toleration-based account of citizenship 
education defends students' exposure to diversity primarily for the inculcation of the virtue of 
toleration and mutual respect. 
Yet, the insensitivity of the two accounts of citizenship education to the normative 
significance of diversity on the one hand, and a reductionist understanding of the non-ideal 
circumstances of any educational environment on the other, raise a number of challenges over 
the consistency of these accounts of citizenship education with the project of educating 
students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. It is 
precisely due to the inadequacy of existing accounts of citizenship education and the different 
conceptions of engagement with diversity in addressing the non-ideal circumstances of any 
educational environment that there is a need for an alternative educational agenda of 
citizenship. The fundamental challenge any account of citizenship education in a plurally 
diverse polity is faced with, then, is to articulate a conception of engagement with diversity that 
would adequately address both the distributive and the agent-relative specification of 
engagement with diversity so as to be consistent with the fair terms of engagement with 
diversity. 
This task requires us to outline the main features of the fair terms of engagement with 
diversity, to articulate its principled basis and to set out the basic capacities and virtues that 
would educate students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members 
of a polity. It is the task of the next part of the thesis [including Chapter 5 and Chapter 6] to 
articulate an alternative educational agenda of citizenship and its conception of the fair terms of 
engagement with diversity based on the educational ideal of openness to diversity that would 
be of the greatest benefit to those students that are the least advantaged. 
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Notes 
I borrow the terms richness, evenness and distance together with their basic interpretive framework 
from discussions on diversity (Weitzman, 1992), biodiversity preservation (Metric & Weitzman, 
1995) and linguistic diversity (Van Parijs, 2008). 
Whether ethnocultural affiliation is ascriptive or conscience-based is a much disputed issue. 
Nevertheless, the nature of cultural membership remains a crucial distinction between advocates of 
egalitarian liberalism and multiculturalism (see, Mendus, 2002). 
3 	 In his seminal article 'Multiculturalism and Mélange', Jeremy Waldron (1996) identified two 
models of the relation between culture and identity in the context of ethnic plurality, i.e. [i] the 
`One Person: One Culture' model [the One Culture model]; and [ii] the 'One Person: Many 
Fragments' model [the Many Fragments Model]. The One Culture model, writes Waldron, 
assumes 'that each individual constructs her identity within the framework of one culture, the 
culture of the particular group or community to which she belongs' (1996: 91). In contrast, the 
Many Fragments model assumes that identity construction under the circumstances of 
multiculturalism will normally comprise 'a multiplicity of cultural fragments, bits and pieces of 
various cultures from here and there' (ibid.: 91). 
4 	 Citizens are reasonable, writes Rawls, 'when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of 
social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of 
cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception of political justice; 
and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular 
situations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms' (Rawls, 1999: 578). 
5 	 In his book Rethinking Multiculturalism, Bhikhu Parekh advances a set of separate arguments in 
support of cultural diversity (2000 [ch. 5]) . He distinguishes between a liberal support to cultural 
diversity (e.g. by Mill, Humbold and Herder and recent restatements by Berlin, Raz and Kymlicka) 
and an alternative multicultural one that takes cultural diversity beyond its instrumental value alone. 
6 	 The liberal educational ideal of the 'detached school' advanced by Meira Levinson (1999b) 
implies considerable state intervention in the educational ethos of schools. Similarly, the idea of a 
`discontinuous ethos' advanced by Harry Brighouse fails to take into consideration the potential 
shortcomings to students from a disadvantaged background who might be negatively affected by 
this distributive specification of engagement with diversity. As William Galston rightly emphasises, 
the state should not 'prescribe curricula and pedagogical practices that require or strongly invite 
students to become sceptical or critical of their own ways of life' (Galston, 1995: 529). 
7 	 For an exposition of the contact hypothesis, see Putnam (2007) and Allport (1954). The contact 
hypothesis suggests that inclusion of diversity erodes the distinction between groups and at the 
same time enhances the solidarity between groups. In contrast, the 'conflict hypothesis' argues that 
the increase of diversity within a society creates distrust between groups and in-group solidarity. 
Social conservatives and civic republicans as well as political parties that pride themselves on 
being nationalistic and/or patriotic usually rest on arguments who use the 'conflict hypothesis' 
about engagement with diversity. 
A more inclusive type of citizenship, as explicated by Martha C. Nussbaum in her book Not for 
Profit should include 'critical thought, daring imagination, emphatic understanding of human 
experiences of many different kinds' (Nussbaum, 2010: 7). 
The literature on exposure to diversity is large and spans accross different disciplines including 
jurisprudence, political philosophy, philosophy of education, feminism etc. For pro and contra 
arguments on the Wisconsin v. Yoder case, see, Callan (1997); Macedo (2000); Nussbaum, 1999; 
Shapiro and Arneson (1996); Reich (2002). 
10 For a discussion on the Mozert v. Hawking case, see Callan (1997); Coleman (1998); Galston 
(2002, 2005); Macedo (1995a, 2000); Stolzenberg, 1993; Reich (2002); Tomasi (2001). 
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CHAPTER 5 
AN EGALITARIAN PLURALIST ACCOUNT OF 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 
As I have argued in the previous two chapters of the thesis, existing accounts of citizenship 
education rely on a number of implausible assumptions related to the status, scope and 
justification of a citizenship education that would be consistent with the aim of educating 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity, 
incorporate a reductionist understanding of the non-ideal circumstances of any educational 
environment, and ignore a range of separate considerations about the educational significance 
of engagement with diversity. It is this manyfold failure of existing accounts of citizenship 
education that introduces the need for an alternative educational agenda of citizenship that is 
sensitive to both the institutional and the individual dimensions in educating citizens so as to 
recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
The setup of the alternative educational agenda of citizenship and its conception of the 
fair terms of engagement with diversity that I aim to articulate in this part of the thesis needs to 
address two separate issues. On the one hand, it needs to identify the civic priorities and the 
individual interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. On the other 
hand, it needs to specify how a conception of the civic purposes of public education that claims 
to be consistent with the two principled commitments associated with the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship is to be squared with the fair terms of engagement with 
diversity. A defensible educational agenda of citizenship and its conception of the fair terms of 
engagement with diversity, I maintain, needs to articulate both the motivational foundations as 
well as the distributive conditions in educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity. In this sense, any consideration of an 
educational agenda of citizenship and its conception of the fair terms of engagement with 
diversity must be seen not as an issue concerning the relative efficiency of different types of 
engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous, but primarily as an issue 
of how best to square the balance between the civic priorities and the individual interests in 
educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. 
The basic challenge that lies ahead, then, is how to define and connect the distribution-
sensitive nature of engagement with diversity with the pluralist understanding of the civic 
priorities and the individual interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a 
polity. While the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I outline and defend here is not 
alone in claiming that the education of students so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity is among the most important aims of citizenship education, 
the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education I advocate here is the only one 
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claiming that this aim is the single most important aim of citizenship education in a plurally 
diverse polity. Moreover, this account of citizenship education, I argue, is the only one that 
takes fully into consideration what is necessary if this aim is to be realised in a non-ideal 
educational environment as it rests on a distinctive use of the difference principle articulated by 
Rawls in his theory of justice as fairness. 
This chapter of the thesis is composed of six sections. I set out in section I the 
motivational foundations and the rationale of this alternative account of citizenship education. 
Furthermore, I consider how engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and 
heterogeneous is to be squared with the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. Section II outlines the egalitarian 
and the pluralist character of the educational agenda of citizenship I defend here. I then outline 
in section III the core conceptual framework of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship 
education including the two foundational principles that are associated with the alternative 
educational agenda of citizenship I advance, i.e. [i] the principle of symmetrical treatment; and 
[ii] the principle of epistemic equivalence. Next, I explain in Section IV how the idea of the 
fair terms of engagement with diversity is to be understood, what are the basic goals it aims to 
achieve and what are the limits it should respect. In order to take into consideration both the 
complex nature of engagement with diversity as well as the different issues that arise in the 
non-ideal circumstances of any educational environment I make a distinction between the 
distributive specification and the agent-relative specification of engagement with diversity. In 
fact, this is a crucial distinction that distinguishes the the egalitarian pluralist account of 
citizenship education from existing accounts of citizenship education. I then elaborate the 
prioritarian character of the fair terms of engagement with diversity and the role the difference 
principle plays in the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I defend in this thesis. In the 
final section of this chapter [section VI] I advance the educational ideal of openness to 
diversity as a regulative principle that specifies how the fair terms of engagement with 
diversity are to be squared with the civic, moral and the epistemic interests of citizens as fully 
cooperating members of a polity. 
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I. 	 Egalitarian pluralism: some preliminary considerations 
As has been emphasised in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the public interest in educating citizens as 
fully cooperating members of a polity is a sine qua non of any political community and its 
basic institutional framework. The stability of a polity and the maintenance of its basic 
institutional framework are facilitated in an important respect by the exercise of civic virtues of 
its members. Yet, the traditional problems confronting the civic purposes of public education in 
a plurally diverse polity have been largely confined to the justification of a simplified version 
of the civic priorities and the individual interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity. The public commitment to the education of citizens was first and 
foremost oriented towards the inculcation of virtues, capacities and dispositions that would 
support common principles and shared public values of a plurally diverse polity without taking 
into account the differing circumstances members of a polity find themselves into. However, 
one potential aim of citizenship education that claims to be consistent with the two principled 
commitments associated with a liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship has 
been basically overlooked. The two accounts of citizenship education analysed in Part II of the 
thesis are inadequate, I maintain, because they do not recognise that the treatment of citizens as 
free and equal requires a certain kind of attention to the interests of the worst off. Hence, while 
the autonomy-based and toleration-based accounts may claim to wish to educate citizens so as 
to recognise and respect each other as free and equal, they do not offer any specification on 
how this is to be done in the non-ideal circumstances of everyday pedagogical practice. This 
aim, I maintain, is a crucial component of any educational agenda of citizenship that claims to 
educate citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. The nature of our concern in 
educating citizens, writes Rawls in Political Liberalism, is how citizens 'are to think of 
themselves and of one another in their political and social relationships as specified by the 
basic structure' (Rawls, 1993: 300). As he emphasises in Justice as Fairness, 
[i]f citizens of a well-ordered society are to recognise one another as free and equal, basic 
institutions must educate them to this conception of themselves, as well as publicly exhibit and 
encourage this ideal of political justice. (Rawls, 2001: 56) 
A specification of the status, scope and justification of an educational agenda of citizenship 
that educates students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of 
a polity needs to separate two distinct dimensions of citizenship as a political conception of the 
person, i.e. [1] the equality dimension; and [ii] the freedom dimension. Let me explicate each of 
the two dimensions below. 
The basis of equality of citizens as free and equal members of a polity is founded on two 
foundational capacities of citizens [those engaged in social cooperation] as free and equal 
persons, i.e. the capacity for a sense of justicel ; and the capacity for a conception of the good. 
`Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating members 
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of society', Rawls emphasises in Political Liberalism, 'makes persons equal' (Rawls, 1993: 19). 
Citizens are free, writes Rawls in three distinct respects. First, citizens are free, writes 
Rawls, 'in that they conceive of themselves and of one another as having the moral power to 
have a conception of the good' (ibid.: 30). At the same time, the conception of citizenship as a 
political conception of the person is premised on the assumption that there is no prerequisite 
whatsoever on gender, class, religious affiliation or socio-economic status for holding the 
status of citizenship. As has been emphasised in section II of Chapter 1 in this thesis, the 
expansion of status associated with the rights-based conception of citizenship has eliminated 
the discrimination between those who are free [and equal] and those who were not in a 
particular historical moment, e.g. members of non-dominant minority groups, religious or 
ethnocultural minorities, women etc. On this interpretation, citizens are regarded as free and 
equal persons 'in virtue of their possessing to the requisite degree the two powers of moral 
personality, namely the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the 
good' (ibid.: 34). Next, citizens have both political and non-political aims and commitments 
they must 'adjust and reconcile', i.e. they regard themselves 'as self-authenticating sources of 
valid claims' (ibid.: 31-32). In the end, the third respect in which citizens are viewed as free, 
writes Rawls, is 'that they are viewed as capable of taking responsibility for their ends and this 
affects how their various claims are assessed' (ibid.: 33). 
An educational agenda of citizenship that aims to educate citizens `[...] to a conception 
of themselves as free and equal' (Rawls, 2001: 57) as well as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity needs to develop an institutional framework 
where students will have the opportunity to recognise their fellow citizens, as Thomas Scanlon 
emphasised, 'as just as entitled as we are to contribute to the definition of our society' 
(Scanlon, 2003: 193). At the same time, the articulation of an agenda of educating citizens so 
as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity, then, requires a 
specific ethical environment guided by a set of normative principles that will guarantee that 
each citizen is recognised and respected as a free and equal member of a polity. I turn now to 
the delineation of the basic elements of the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I aim 
to defend in this part of the thesis and then move to the articulation of this intricate relationship 
any educational agenda of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity needs to specify. 
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11. 	 Egalitarian pluralism: an outline 
The status, scope and justification of an account of citizenship education and its conception of 
engagement with diversity that claims to be both egalitarian and pluralist at the same time faces 
two distinct difficulties. At the theoretical level, the calibration of the balance between civic 
equality and equal civic respect for diversity depends how we define and connect the two 
commitments associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship 
education. At the practical level, there is the question concerning which way of engaging with 
diversity is the most appropriate for educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity in the institutional arrangement and curriculum 
design of public schools and what capacities are defining the alternative account of citizenship 
education defended here. 
A conception of citizenship education that claims to be both egalitarian3 and pluralist at 
the same time is based on a twofold commitment, i.e. [i] the role the basic institutional 
framework of a plurally diverse polity should play in the promotion of civic equality and the 
elimination or compensation of the disadvantages and inequalities that affect the vertical and 
the horizontal dimension of citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity; and [ii] a 
pluralist understanding of the idea of citizenship as a political conception of the person 
including a pluralist understanding of being a fully cooperating member of a polity. This 
alternative account of citizenship education I advance here combines two basic liberal ideals: a 
difference-sensitive conception of civic equality and a pluralist understanding of cultural, 
social and political life including the associative sphere of civil society. I outline both 
commitments below. 
11.1 	 A difference-sensitive conception of civic equality 
The conception of egalitarian pluralism I defend here is egalitarian in two distinct respects. 
First, the commitment to civic equality requires that members of a political community are 
entitled to an equal share of basic rights and fundamental freedoms [the requirement of equal 
entitlement]. Members of a plurally diverse polity, as emphasised in section II of Chapter 1, 
share with other fellow co-citizens a common status, have an equal amount of entitlements 
[basic rights and fundamental freedoms] and are expected to exercise their duties and 
responsibilities according to the same principles, norms and other obligations. The equal 
entitlements associated with the status of citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity 
provide each and every member of a polity with the conditions necessary to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. On this interpretation, the 
conception of civic equality functions not only as a distributive ideal [the vertical dimension] 
but as an ideal of social and political relations among citizens as free and equal members of a 
polity [the horizontal dimension] where citizens are symmetrically situated against each other. 
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In fact, 'the reasonable conditions of symmetry', writes Rawls (1993: 104), are the defining 
elements that characterise the relationship between the parties [citizens' representatives] in the 
original position, the device of representation outlined by Rawls in A Theory of Justice.4 The 
egalitarian pluralist position specifies both the vertical and the horizontal dimension that 
characterise the difference-sensitive nature of the commitment to civic equality associated with 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. On this view, the equal basic 
rights and liberties secure the fundamental interests of citizens as free and equal members of a 
polity and enable them to pursue a wide range of different conceptions of the good. 
At the same time, the conception of egalitarian pluralism entails also a normative 
commitment to equal civic respect for diversity, i.e. the respect for different conceptions of the 
good that citizens as free and equal members of a polity might hold and arise out of their 
exercise of the basic rights and fundamental freedoms associated with citizenship as free and 
equal membership in a polity. A part of this commitment is the acknowledgement of individuals' 
different conceptions of the good including values, ideals and other doctrinal beliefs. The fact 
of reasonable pluralism, writes Rawls, refers to the circumstances 'that reflect the fact that in a 
modern democratic society citizens affirm different, and indeed incommensurable and 
irreconcilable, though reasonable, comprehensive doctrines in the light of which they 
understand their conceptions of the good' (Rawls, 2001: 84). In fact, writes Rawls, the 
coexistence of 'the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the 
meaning, value and purpose of human life [...] affirmed by the citizens of democratic 
societies', is 'a permanent feature of the public culture of modern democracies' (Rawls, 1999: 
424-425). The commitment of equal civic respect for diversity presupposes that all citizens 
within a particular political community regardless of their ascriptive or conscience-based 
characteristics, e.g. race, class, sex, language, religion or any other differentiating characteristic 
be treated as equals [the requirement of equal consideration]. The recognition of the equal 
moral significance of individuals' diverse commitments gives each and every member of a 
polity an equal entitlement to conduct one's life according to one's preferences and convictions. 
In this sense, an educational agenda of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity requires not only 
an equal distribution of the entitlements, duties and obligations of shared membership in a 
plurally diverse polity but a balance of equal civic respect for diversity with the fair terms of 
cooperation among citizens. 
11.2 	 Civic pluralism 
The acknowledgement and the recognition of pluralism, i.e. the existence of diverse, 
heterogeneous and incommensurable conceptions of the good as a foundational element of the 
alternative account of citizenship education I advance in this thesis is primarily viewed as the 
counterweight to the twofold egalitarian impulse of the difference-sensitive conception of civic 
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equality identified in the previous section of this chapter. Two distinct levels of civic pluralism 
need to be identified here, i.e. [i] institutional level; and [ii] individual level. 
11.2.1 Institutional level 
As advocates of the toleration-based account of citizenship education have been arguing, a 
plurally diverse polity does not consist exclusively of institutions, groups or associations that 
are either liberal, democratic or both. In fact, the recognition of the different social spheres 
whose internal arrangements might be incompatible or in tension with society's broader social 
arrangements is among the most important issues characterising a plurally diverse polity. 
However, they can nevertheless and with qualifications perform a number of important social 
functions besides the basic one, for example bringing together people with similar conceptions 
of the good. It is the task of public education, I maintain, to raise the awareness and to develop 
students' sensitivity towards those cases where there is a prima facie need to intervene or 
outrightly reject a particular practice or institutional arrangement due to its inconsistency with 
common principles and shared public values of a plurally diverse polity. In fact, writes William 
Galston, 
public institutions must be cautious and restrained in their dealings with voluntary associations, 
and there is no presumption that a state may intervene in such associations just because they 
conduct their internal affairs in ways that diverge from general public principles. (Galston, 
2002a: 9) 
For example: any major contemporary religion, e.g. Christianity, Judaism or Islam [and any of 
their denominations such as Protestantism] is neither fully liberal nor democratic or both. 
Women, for example, cannot be priests in the ordinancy of the Catholic church. However, 
religion does play an important part in individuals' lives and frequently performs a broader 
social function as well, e.g. care for the disabled, charity causes, running of schools, etc. This 
conception of civic pluralism argues for a reciprocally supportive and mutually reinforcing 
relationship between the public and the private sphere instead of a one-way link between the 
two spheres based on the assumption of the compensation of one sphere over the other due to 
an acknowledged limitation either of the civic or the private sphere. 
11.2.2 Individual level 
At the individual level, civic pluralism recognises that the exercise of the basic rights members 
of a polity are entitled to can lead to a wide variety of values, practices and conceptions of the 
good. In this sense, civic pluralism advances an ideal of citizenship as fully cooperating 
membership of a polity that is characterized by a variety of possible ways of being a good 
citizen. For example, one can exercise toleration and respect for other members of a polity but 
lack the adequate motivation to actively participate in either in the associational network of 
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civil society or in the political process, e.g. voting in elections. One's exercise of his 
associative liberty in the direction of not taking an active role does not preclude him from 
exercising a tolerant attitude towards those fellow members of a polity whose actions, practices 
or conceptions of the good are both plural and heterogeneous. In contrast to a reductionist 
interpretation of the distinction between minimal and maximal conceptions of citizenship 
education advanced by T.H. McLaughlin (1992), civic pluralism recognises a variety of ways 
of exercising one's rights as well as of being a fully cooperating member of a polity without 
necessarily characterizing members of a political community according to the exercise of 
entitlements associated with their status of citizenship as a political conception of the person. 
I maintain that the delineation of civic pluralism as specified above recognises the 
contribution of different social spheres to the development of the virtues, capacities and other 
dispositions necessary for the exercise of the basic rights associated with citizenship as free 
and equal membership in a polity. However, the crucial difference between the egalitarian 
pluralist account of citizenship education and the two predominant conceptions of citizenship 
education examined in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis is that the egalitarian pluralist 
position does not aim to neutralise diversity or prioritise the cultivation and the exercise of the 
capacities for autonomy as is the case with the autonomy-based conception of citizenship 
education. At the same time, it also does not aim to maximise the accommodation and 
recognition of diversity as in the case of the toleration-based conception of citizenship 
education. I argue that the difference between the autonomy-based conception of citizenship 
education and the toleration-based conception of citizenship education is misleadingly posed as 
a choice between the development of two competing capacities that are associated with 
engagement with diversity as one of the basic aims of their educational agenda of citizenship. 
On this understanding, the dilemma between the two conceptions of citizenship education is 
`either autonomy or toleration' or 'either civic equality or cultural coherence'. Both dilemmas 
are formulated as an either-or issue therefore leaving little space for any calibration of the 
balance between the development of these two capacities that would be sensitive to the fair 
terms of engagement with diversity. The two dilemmas present the tension between civic 
equality and equal civic respect for diversity as a zero-sum choice which gets rid of the other 
element in the dilemma altogether. 
In contrast, the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I defend in this thesis 
acknowledge a pluralist understanding of being a good citizen as a fully cooperating member 
of a polity and a difference-sensitive understanding of civic equality. The egalitarian pluralist 
account of citizenship education comprises two complementing principles that would enable 
the fair terms of engagement with diversity in the institutional arrangements, curriculum design 
and pedagogical strategies of public education. I turn now to the principled basis of the 
egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education that aims to articulate an alternative 
account of the civic purposes of public education in a plurally diverse polity, i.e. the education 
of citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
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III. 	 The principled basis of egalitarian pluralism 
As has been emphasised in the previous section of this chapter, an egalitarian pluralist account 
of citizenship education is characterized by a difference-sensitive conception of civic equality 
and the recognition of civic pluralism at both the institutional and the individual level. The 
principled basis of the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I defend here has its 
origins in a specific understanding of civic priorities and individual interests in educating 
citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. In this sense, the commitment in educating 
students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity needs 
to specify how engagement with diversity is to be situated and carried out in the institutional 
design and curriculum provision under non-ideal circumstances. The alternative account of 
citizenship education I defend here is characterized by two regulative principles that specify the 
distributive character of the fair terms of engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and 
heterogeneous, i.e. [i] the principle of symmetrical treatment; and [ii] the principle of epistemic 
equivalence. 
III.1 The principle of symmetrical treatment 
The principle of symmetrical treatment stands in contrast to the insensitivity of the autonomy-
based conception of citizenship education to individuals' commitments and the insensitivity to 
the circumstances of citizenship that might lead to the unequal exercise of the basic entitlements 
associated with the rights-based conception of citizenship. Alternatively, the egalitarian pluralist 
account of citizenship education and its fair terms of engagement with diversity gives citizens 
with diverse values, beliefs and conceptions of the good an equal protection of their basic 
interest in being recognised and respected as free and equal members of a polity. 
This particular principle of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education is 
sensitive both to the cultural coherence of individuals' basic commitments as well as the 
exercise of their basic rights that would lead to different conceptions of the good. In other 
words, the principle of symmetrical treatment takes into account the interests of both those that 
are exposed to diversity and those that expose themselves. In particular, this principle aims to 
overcome the moral asymmetry between those that are exposed to diversity compared to those 
that are exposing themselves under non-ideal circumstances. 
Consider the case of students with special educational needs, students coming from a 
minority ethnocultural background or students whose conceptions of the good or practices 
might be incompatible or in tension with society's broader social arrangements. In order for 
them to enjoy the benefits we normally avail ourselves of, they need an additional set of 
entitlements in order for them to function as equal members of a polity. In this sense, the 
principle of symmetrical treatment takes into consideration both the vertical dimension that 
designates a relationship between the individual and the state as well as the horizontal position 
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between members of a polity. It is therefore necessary to articulate how to square the principle 
of symmetrical treatment with difference-sensitivity as the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship is difference-blind. The liberal egalitarian argument for the 'uniform 
treatment approach' advanced by Brian Barry in Culture and Equality argues that a commitment 
to civic equality can only be achieved within a difference-blind normative framework. In 
contrast, an egalitarian pluralist position that claims to be consistent with the commitment to a 
difference-sensitive conception of civic equality would not rule out accommodation of diversity 
or compensation for those inequalities that are the result of bad brute luck. It would provide 
either exemptions or additional rights that would ensure that members of a polity remain in a 
relationship of equidistance. In this sense, the distribution-sensitive nature of the principle of 
symmetrical treatment takes into consideration both the pluralism of diversity and the non-
ideal circumstances any educational environment is faced with. The ideal of a detached school 
or a discontinuous ethos would be applicable only in the case in which all students were 
symmetrically situated in a particular educational environment or situation. In contrast to the 
`uniform treatment approach' and the two conceptions of citizenship defended by both the 
moderate and the critical multiculturalist view, the principle of symmetrical treatment is both 
context-sensitive and difference-sensitive. 
1112 The principle of epistemic equivalence 
Given the inadequate specification of existing accounts of citizenship education over the 
normative significance of individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances, the second 
principle associated with the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education holds that 
individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances are to be treated with epistemic equivalence. 
The principle of epistemic equivalence rejects the hierarchical nature of different beliefs that 
are part of the traditional model of the toleration-based approach to diversity. The inadequacy 
of the status-based justification of civic equality identified in Section III of Chapter 1 opens the 
opportunity to articulate a conception of citizenship as fully cooperating membership of a 
polity that would be coextensive with a pluralist understanding of the exercise of basic rights 
associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. 
In contrast to a liberal perfectionist conception of the value of particular cultures, beliefs 
or ways of life, the principle of epistemic equivalence does not presuppose that conceptions of 
the good or practices that might be incompatible or in tension with society's broader social 
arrangements are 'inferior to [...] the dominant liberal culture' (Raz, 1986: 423-424). Their 
inappropriateness is to be conceptualised as inadequate and not as inferior since treating the 
status of a particular practice or value that might be incompatible or in tension with society's 
broader social arrangements as inferior, I maintain, is inconsistent with the normative 
commitment to equal civic respect of diversity. Despite the fact that we find a particular 
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practice or value either wrong or false, the principle of epistemic equivalence would rule out —
in principle — their inadequacy as inferiority. 
The two regulative principles identified above specify in detail how engagement with 
diversity should be carried out in the non-ideal circumstances of everyday pedagogical practice. 
In other words, the advantage of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education over 
competing conceptions of citizenship education consists in the detachment of engagement with 
diversity in the classroom or other educational settings from claims that are exclusively 
individual. In particular, its distributive-sensitive nature is particularly oriented to the fair terms 
of engagement of diversity that would be of the greatest benefit to those students that are the 
least advantaged in a wide variety of educational environments characterized by differing 
degrees of richness, evenness and distance. I turn now to the specification of the two 
dimensions of the fair terms of engagement with diversity as the foundational commitment 
associated with the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity. More specifically, I explicate how the principle of 
symmetrical treatment and the principle of epistemic equivalence are to be incorporated into 
the distributive specification and the agent-relative specification of engagement with diversity. 
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IV. 	 The fair terms of engagement with diversity 
Given the disparate problems arising out of the various shortcomings linked to engagement 
with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous — identified in Section V of Chapter 4 
— there is a need for a conception of engagement with diversity that would take into 
consideration the different issues that arise in the non-ideal circumstances of any educational 
environment as well as the different functions associated with engagement with diversity as 
part of an educational agenda of citizenship. Two basic questions arise here: [i] how should the 
fair treatment of engagement with diversity be arranged in order to be of the greatest benefit to 
those students that are the least advantaged? [ii] How can we identify the least advantaged 
students in a non-ideal educational environment? 
In order to answer these questions in an adequate way, the fair terms of engagement 
with diversity need to be separated in two distinct elements, i.e. [i] the distributive specification 
of engagement with diversity; and [ii] the agent-relative specification of engagement with 
diversity. I elaborate below the two elements that constitute the basic framework associated 
with the fair terms of engagement with diversity that makes an integral part of the egalitarian 
pluralist account of citizenship education. 
IV.1 The distributive specification of engagement with diversity 
The first element associated with the fair terms of engagement with diversity refers to the 
distribution of entitlements and obligations that stem from the project of educating citizens so 
as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. Three possible 
scenarios that can guide us in the distributive specification of the fair terms of engagement with 
diversity can be identified here, i.e. [i] the equality scenario; [ii] the sufficiency scenario; and 
[iii] the priority scenario.5 
The first distributive scenario [the equality scenario] would use engagement with forms 
of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous so as to increase the improvement of all students 
in one of the basic functions engagement with diversity performs [as identified and elaborated 
in section III of Chapter 4]. In this case, engagement with diversity would indiscriminately 
expose students to different values, practices and beliefs irrespective of students' 
differentiating characteristics or the two dimensions of distance as identified in section II of 
Chapter 4]. Here, students would experience the possibility to reflect on and critically engage 
with forms of diversity they are not familiar with. Under these circumstances, there is no 
distributive specification that would differentiate between the two dimensions of engagement 
with diversity, i.e. exposure to diversity and exposure of diversity. I think the ideal of the 
detached school and an educational environment that would be characterised by a 
discontinuous ethos advocated by proponents of autonomy-based accounts of citizenship 
education could make some students worse off. Those students that come from, let's say, a 
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mainstream cultural background would have no difficulty in imaginatively detaching 
themselves from their basic commitments and conceptions of the good or attending a school 
whose ethical environment would differ from their normal family environment. In contrast, 
those students whose beliefs, values or conceptions of the good might be incompatible or in 
tension with society's broader social arrangements are not in the same position as these 
students. In this respect, the first possible scenario of engagement with diversity unfairly 
disadvantages students that are — in one way or another — not part of the mainstream. 
The second distributive scenario [the sufficiency scenario] would use engagement with 
diversity so as to advance the improvement of some students in one of the basic functions of 
engagement with diversity without making anyone else worse off. This possible pattern of 
engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous takes into consideration 
the possible asymmetry between different students and aims towards their reduction or 
elimination. Programs of multicultural education can primarily be identified as an example of 
this distributive specification. In this particular case, inclusion of and engagement with 
diversity makes the distinction between exposure to diversity and exposure of diversity but 
fails to take into consideration the pluralism of diversity under consideration as well as the 
different functions engagement with diversity performs for different students.6 
The third distributive scenario associated with engagement with diversity [the priority 
scenario] does take as its basic aim the setting up of an educational environment that would 
improve the conditions of the worst off students. In this case, the distributive specifications of 
engagement with diversity in the institutional arrangement and curriculum design would pay 
particular attention to those cases where engagement with diversity would improve the 
circumstances of those students that are identified as the worst off in a particular non-ideal 
educational environment or under specific circumstances. In this respect, the fair terms of 
engagement with diversity seek to prioritise the engagement with diversity of the worst off 
rather than to equalise students' prospects in a particular function associated with engagement 
with diversity. A prioritarian justification of engagement with diversity would arrange the 
institutional arrangement and curriculum design so as to increase the overall well-being of the 
least advantaged students. This means that educational resources would be distributed so as to 
improve the overall status of those students that would qualify as being the least well off in a 
particular case. This distance-reducing distributive specification of engagement with forms of 
diversity that are plural and heterogeneous, I maintain, is the only one that can claim to be 
consistent with the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity. 
Three different strategies associated with the distributive specification of engagement 
with diversity that arise out of these scenarios can be envisaged here. If we strive for the first 
distributive specification of engagement with diversity, we would go for a minimax strategy. 
Here, the overall aim of engagement with diversity would be to maximise the positive overall 
benefit of students while at the same time consciously striving for minimizing the possible 
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negative side effects that might be linked to engagement with diversity in the non-ideal 
circumstances of any educational environment and its institutional arrangement and curriculum 
design. 
In the second case, the strategy of calibration improves the conditions of a specific 
target group of students while at the same time aiming at not reducing the well-being of all 
others. The efficiency of this strategy would primarily aim to ameliorate the circumstances of 
those groups or individuals that make either claims for accommodation associated with their 
integration in society or one of its institutions. 
The third possible scenario identified above uses the maximin strategy which states that 
engagement with diversity should be organised in a way to make the worst off students benefit 
the most. On this view, any unequal distribution of the gains linked to engagement with 
diversity is just when it maximizes primarily the overall benefit of those who are worst off. 
While this strategy resembles Rawls's difference principle, there is a distinctive additional 
requirement that needs to be emphasized. Here I want to advance the strategy of optimisation 
that calibrates the balance between the different interests those that are the least advantaged 
might have. These modifications, I maintain, help us to reconcile our intuitions about the 
education of citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity with intuitions about the fair 
terms of engagement with diversity. I elaborate further the justification of this strategy that is 
associated with the fair terms of engagement with diversity in the next section of this chapter 
[Section V]. I turn now to the agent-relative specification of engagement with diversity. 
IV.2 The agent-relative specification of engagement with diversity 
The agent-relative specification of the fair terms of engagement with diversity associated with 
the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education needs to identify those students that 
are — in the non-ideal circumstances of any educational environment — identified as the least 
well off. In other words, the institutional arrangement and curriculum design that are part of the 
project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity requires that the fair terms of engagement with diversity take into 
consideration first the interests of those students that are the least advantaged. 
The question that arises here is which students can be identified as the least advantaged 
in the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity and what would be 
the justificatory ground for this rationale. As has been specified in Section V of Chapter 4, the 
circumstances of engagement with diversity give us two distinct groups of agents present in the 
non-ideal circumstances of any educational environment, i.e. [i] those exposed to values, 
beliefs or conceptions of the good [exposure to diversity]; and [ii] those exposing themselves in 
a specific situation [exposure of diversity]. In both cases those students that come from an 
environment that is different from the prevailing cultural, socio-economic, ethnic, racial 
background or whose values, beliefs or conceptions of the good might be incompatible or in 
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tension with society's broader social arrangements would have different interests from other 
students in the process of engagement with diversity. I therefore identify as the worse off 
students those that could potentially be disadvantaged both under the circumstances of exposure 
to diversity as well as exposure of diversity. A student should be identified as worse off, then, 
only under the circumstances of intersectionality of disadvantages stemming from exposure to 
diversity and exposure of diversity [the intersectionality of disadvantages condition]. This 
condition gives us an identifiable target group in terms of how the fair terms of engagement 
with diversity should be carried out in a variety of non-ideal circumstances of everyday 
pedagogical practice.' 
IV.3 Engagement with diversity and the priority to the least advantaged 
As has been emphasised in section IV.1 and IV.2 of this chapter, the fair terms of engagement 
with diversity including the distributive-specification and the agent-relative specification of 
engagement with diversity give priority to those students that are the least advantaged. A 
prioritarian conception of civic equality articulated in Section III of this chapter advances the 
assertion that the interests of the worst off should be given priority in cases where exposure of 
or exposure to diversity would be either disproportionate or could negatively affect their status 
of free and equal members of a polity. At the same time, the threefold characterisation of 
students' different interests at stake in engagement with diversity, i.e. the [i] civic; [ii] moral; 
and [iii] the epistemic interests [for explanation of these terms, see section V.2 of this chapter] 
makes clear that neither the 'maximisation of choice' nor the 'maximisation of accommodation' 
would promote students' interests both fairly and efficiently. 
This move away from the strategy of maximisation both the autonomy-based and the 
toleration-based account of citizenship education share in common relies on the application of 
the difference principle, one of the most important elements of Rawls's theory of justice as 
fairness. Giving priority to the least advantaged students in a variety of non-ideal 
circumstances of everyday pedagogical practice has become one of the basic claims associated 
with a broadly egalitarian outlook. For example, as Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift 
emphasise in their discussion on educational equality, to give priority to the benefit of the 
worst off should be 'the most urgent consideration of justice' (Brighouse & Swift, 2008: 451). 
Similary, as Debra Satz emphasises, 
Care must be taken to ensure that those with fewer opportunities are not at such a relative 
disadvantage as to offend their dignity or self-respect, relegate them to second-class citizenship, 
cut them off from any realistic prospect of upward social mobility, or deprive them of the 
ability to form social relationships with others on a footing of equality. (Satz, 2007: 637-638) 
The fair terms of engagement with diversity that give priority to the worst off in the process of 
engagement with diversity are therefore likely to reduce the unfair circumstances of distance and 
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exclusion that might jeopardise students' basic civic interest in being recognised and respected 
as free and equal members of a polity. I turn now to another basic element of the egalitarian 
pluralist account of citizenship education, i.e. the educational ideal of openness to diversity. 
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V. 	 The educational ideal of openness to diversity 
As has been emphasised in Section III of Chapter 4, the educational significance of engagement 
with diversity in the non-ideal circumstances of any educational environment can be 
distinguished along a number of different functions. In fact, the promotion of a specific 
function associated with a particular form of diversity depends not only on the specific form of 
diversity under examination but primarily on the circumstances associated either with students' 
exposure to diversity or with students' exposure of diversity. Given the fact of extensive human 
diversity as well as the non-ideal circumstances of any educational environment, the 
distributive specification of the fair terms of engagement with diversity should take into 
consideration the different interests of students present in a particular case. The specification of 
the fair terms of diversity introduced in the previous section of this chapter needs to be 
supplemented with a particular educational ideal that would specify the priority or urgency of 
students' different interests in a given educational scenario. Two different ways of determining 
the priority of a particular interest can be identified here, i.e. [i] the simple view; and [ii] the 
complex view. Let me consider each of the two ways below. 
V.1 	 The simple view 
In the case of engagement with diversity specified above, the interaction between students can 
be structured according to students' different interests. On the simple view, we calibrate the 
balance between the interests of those students that are exposed to diversity with the interests 
of students exposing themselves. In any case, the distributive specification of engagement with 
diversity needs to be consistent with the educational agenda of educating citizens so as to 
recognise and respect each other as free and equal members of a polity. In that respect, we 
would calibrate the balance between the different interests of students linked to engagement 
with diversity. On the simple view, we would need to calibrate the balance between the interest 
of students who would be exposed to diversity and the interests of the student whose values 
depart to some extent from the shared values of his educational and socio-cultural 
environment. On this view, we would take the interest of the worse off student as a matter of 
urgency and organise the institutional arrangement and curriculum design of a particular 
educational environment according to this distributive specification. Yet as I argue, the 
distributive specification of engagement with diversity associated with the simple view is 
basically incomplete as it fails to take into consideration the different interests a particular 
student might have. 
Despite the egalitarian inclination of taking into consideration both interests on equal 
terms, an important element is left out. A regulative principle that would structure the terms of 
engagement with diversity according to the most important interest of a particular student 
identified as worse off would need to take into consideration another dimension that would 
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calibrate the balance between different interests of those students that are identified as the 
worst off. 
V.2 	 The complex view 
The fair terms of engagement with diversity, I maintain, need to take into consideration a 
distinction between different individual interests of students in general and the worse off 
students in particular. Either in the situation of exposure to diversity or in the situation of 
exposure of diversity, we can identify three separate individual interests all students as free and 
equal members of a polity have, i.e. [i] the civic interest; [ii] the moral interest; and [iii] the 
epistemic interest. In the first case [the civic interest], a student that is worse off would have an 
interest in being treated with equal dignity. In the second case [the moral interest], the worse 
off student would have the interest in developing self-respect. In the third case [the epistemic 
interest], the worse off student does have an interest in being aware of other 'alternative' ways 
of life and of having these options available to him despite the fact that his conception of the 
good might be incompatible or in tension with society's broader social arrangements. 
Moreover, the civic, moral and the epistemic interests of students are not necessarily 
complementary but might result to be in tension with one another. Students whose conceptions 
of the good are not incompatible with shared public values might not face such a tension. In 
contrast, students whose conceptions of the good depart — in one way or another — from 
society's broader social arrangements might turn out to be disproportionately disadvantaged. In 
this sense, the educational ideal of openness to diversity as a regulative principle that would 
structure the fair terms of engagement with diversity according to the most important interest 
of a particular student identified as the worst off needs to calibrate the balance between the 
civic, the moral and the epistemic interest of the worst off students. Despite the fact that the 
moral interest of retaining his self-respect would normally qualify as a short-term priority of 
the worst off students, the long-term epistemic interest in having an open future should guide 
the distributive specification of engagement with diversity in that particular case. 
To summarise: the educational ideal of openness to diversity specifies how and under 
what conditions engagement with diversity should be made part of the project of educating 
citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. On this interpretation, the educational ideal 
of openness to diversity has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it needs to calibrate between the 
interests of different students that are part of an educational environment. At the same time, 
and more importantly, the educational ideal of openness to diversity needs to take into account 
the different interests individuals have in the case of engagement with diversity in a particular 
educational scenario. A defensible conception of the fair terms of engagement with diversity 
therefore needs to square the balance between the civic, moral and the epistemic interests of a 
student so as to be consistent with the basic civic aim of educating citizens so as to recognise 
and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
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In that respect, the educational ideal of openness to diversity associated with the 
egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education departs to a significant extent from the 
prevailing models of engagement with diversity associated with existing accounts of citizenship 
education in two important respects. First, engagement with forms of diversity that are plural 
and heterogeneous should be of the greatest benefit to the interests of those students that are 
the least advantaged. Second, it should take into consideration the different interests of these 
students. In order to exemplify the advantages of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship 
education and its fair terms of engagement with diversity compared to existing accounts of 
citizenship education let's consider an example. 
Imagine that we have in a classroom a student whose parents are members of a religious 
group that does not celebrate birthdays. The non-celebration of birthdays is a constitutive 
element of their religious observance. To be a good member of this religious group, then, 
implies that one does not celebrate one's birthday, nor does one celebrate birthdays of others. 
In line with their religious observance, the upbringing of children would imply that children do 
not celebrate their own or others' birthdays nor attend birthday parties or other festivities 
associated with birthday celebrations. Any trade-off associated with the celebration of 
birthdays would therefore be out of question. If we compare those students that do celebrate 
birthdays with students who do not, we see that they are asymmetrically situated in the case of 
engagement with diversity. In particular, engagement with diversity is likely to perform a 
different function [as set out in Section III of Chapter 4] depending on the basic position one is 
situated in, i.e. exposure to diversity compared to exposure of diversity. 
As in other cases examined previously, existing accounts of citizenship education would 
take a diametrically opposed position also in this particular case. On the one hand, the 
autonomy-based account of citizenship education would advocate students' exposure to a 
particular form of diversity they might be unfamiliar with. At the same time, a student who 
might be different would need to either be exposed to or to expose himself in a particular 
educational environment. While other students would definitely benefit out of the encounter 
with a custom, practice, values or beliefs they might be unfamiliar with, the student who is 
different himself might face a conflict with one's immediate ethical environment that might 
undermine his equal dignity or reduce his self-respect etc. On the other hand, the toleration-
based account of citizenship education would advocate — if specific conditions are met — non-
interference with student's beliefs and would therefore result in a student's abstention from a 
class or situation where a birthday would be celebrated. In this case, the other students would 
not familiarise themselves with this particular form of diversity which might result in a genuine 
case of enrichment for students. Each of the two options, I maintain, leaves us with a situation 
where there might arise the risk either that a student from a non-mainstream background would 
be — in one way or another — disproportionately disadvantaged compared to other students or 
that other students would not be exposed to the diversity in their educational environment. 
150 
Here as elsewhere, I maintain, existing accounts of citizenship education fail to 
recognise the two-way process of engagement with diversity. Given the fact that engagement 
with diversity considers the interests of those situated differentially in a non-ideal educational 
environment differently, a one-size-fits-all approach to engagement with diversity faces the 
risk of being either discriminatory or reductionist at best. The fair terms of engagement with 
diversity articulated by the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I advance here aims 
primarily at the best possible outcome for the least advantaged students. In the particular case 
under examination, it aims at the reduction of their overexposure to situations where they might 
be asymmetrically situated in comparison with other students. 
Engagement with diversity should therefore be structured as a two-way educational 
process that should take into account two separate issues. On the one hand, it should take into 
account equally the interests of different students in respect of their specific position. On the 
other hand, it should take into account the civic, moral and the epistemic interests of students. 
In this particular case, the educational significance of engagement with diversity for a student 
who comes from a non-celebratory background would be primarily that of developing his equal 
dignity and self-respect. At the same time, exposure to a non-celebratory experience for those 
students who do celebrate their birthdays would primarily perform the epistemic function. 
What needs to be acknowledged, then, is that engagement with diversity should enable the 
development and cultivation of knowledge, cognitive skills and dispositions that facilitate the 
options students might have available and enables them to access those opportunities they find 
consistent with their ethical environment. 
Given the complexity of real life examples, any clearcut proposal in a particular case is 
likely to result in a reductionist understanding of the problem at hand or an discriminatory 
solution to the different problems outlined. The egalitarian pluralist account therefore does not 
allow us in practice to simply derive the answer for a particular case from either the 
maximization of choice or the maximization of accommodation view. Practical judgement, 
involving an attempt to balance different considerations is therefore a sine qua non in any real 
life educational experience. In each particular case a judgement has to be made by taking into 
account both the interests of different students and the different interests of each student. Not 
to recognise this is to commit the fallacy of equal interest, i.e. the presumption that all students 
in a classroom share the same priority between different interests they might have in the case 
of engagement with diversity. In this sense, I maintain, the egalitarian pluralist account of 
citizenship education and its conception of the fair terms of engagement with diversity is most 
consistent with the aim of educating students so as to recognise and respect one another as free 
and equal members of a polity. 
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VI. 	 Conclusion 
The egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education and its educational ideal of openness 
to diversity I have outlined and defended in this chapter of the thesis attempt to combine two 
basic commitments: [i] the education of students so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity; and [ii] a commitment to the fair terms of engagement with 
diversity that would be of the greatest benefit to those students that are the least advantaged. 
This alternative account of citizenship education departs from the dominant conceptions of 
citizenship education including the two traditional interpretations of engagement with forms of 
diversity that are plural and heterogeneous where engagement with diversity is primarily 
conducive either to the cultivation and the exercise of the capacity for autonomy [the 
maximisation of choice model] or to the cultivation and the exercise of the capacity for 
toleration [the maximum accommodation model]. In contrast, the alternative educational agenda 
of citizenship I advance here puts the fair terms of engagement with diversity at the centre 
stage of the project of educating students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and 
equal members of a polity. While the alternative educational agenda of citizenship outlined and 
defended here is not alone in claiming that the education of students so as to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity is among the most important aims of 
citizenship education, the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education I advocate here 
is the only one claiming that this aim is the single most important aim of citizenship education 
in a plurally diverse polity. 
Moreover, the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education and its conception 
of the fair terms of engagement with diversity does not claim to be more ethically inclusive 
compared to existing accounts of citizenship education and their conceptions of engagement 
with diversity. The overall efficacy of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education 
and its educational ideal of openness to diversity consists in the assertion that educating 
citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity requires that any distribution of engagement 
with diversity should be of the greatest benefit to those students that are the least advantaged. 
In fact, any approach to citizenship education that does not situate the claims of the worst off 
as central in the process of engagement with diversity, I argue, is actually failing to educate 
citizens so as to recognise and respect each other as free and equal citizens, even if it pays lip-
service to this educational aim. Whereas the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education 
strives for containment of diversity, the toleration-based conception of citizenship education 
for protection of diversity and the multiculturalist model for maximum possible accommodation 
of diversity, the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education defends the strategy of 
optimisation as the best possible approximation of the fair terms of engagement with diversity 
that pays particular attention to the calibration of the balance between the civic priorities and the 
individual interests in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. 
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At the institutional level, the alternative account of citizenship education explicated 
above is characterized by two distinctive features. The first is how citizens as free and equal 
members of a polity view themselves and other members of their political community. The 
second is the idea of how citizenship as a political conception of the person should be 
understood in a polity that is plural in its cultures, values and traditions. On the one hand, 
citizens view themselves as free and equal members of a polity, i.e. as being treated and 
treating other members of a polity as civic equals. On the other hand, they would need to see 
themselves according to the ideal of civic pluralism, i.e. as exercising entitlements associated 
with membership in a polity in a way that is consistent both with the common principles and 
shared public values of a plurally diverse polity and their conceptions of the good. In this 
sense, I maintain, the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education divides the duties, 
obligations and the benefits of cooperation between citizens as fully cooperating members of a 
polity by taking into consideration both individual and civic-related interests. Moreover, the 
two distinctive elements of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education, i.e. [i] the 
distributive specification of engagement with diversity; and [ii] the agent-relative specification 
of engagement with diversity specify why and under what circumstances engagement with 
diversity should be carried out in the non-ideal circumstances of everyday pedagogical practice. 
Given the examination of the prevailing conceptions of citizenship education examined 
in Part II of the thesis and the presentation of the alternative account of citizenship education I 
have advanced in this chapter, the foundational problem associated with engagement with 
diversity as the basic aim of the alternative educational agenda of citizenship outlined and 
defended here ceases to revolve around the latitude of accommodation of diversity. Rather, the 
basic question is therefore how to articulate the fair terms of engagement with diversity in 
order to fulfil the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity. The final chapter of this thesis [Chapter 6] identifies the 
basic civic virtues, capacities and dispositions that the fair terms of engagement with diversity 
require and advances a number of possible areas of application of the alternative conception of 
citizenship education outlined in this chapter. 
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Notes 
The sense of justice (as a form of moral sensibility), writes Rawls, 'is the capacity to understand, to 
apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social 
cooperation. Given the nature of the political conception as specifying a public basis of 
justification, a sense of justice also expresses a willingness, if not the desire, to act in relation to 
others on terms that they also can publicly endorse' (Rawls, 1993: 19). 
The capacity for a conception of the good, writes Rawls 'is the capacity to form, to revise and 
rationally to pursue a conception of one's rational advantage or good' (Rawls, 1993: 19). 
3 	
'Any normative theory of social and political arrangements that have withstood the test of time', 
writes Amartya Sen, 'seems to demand equality of something — something that is regarded as 
particularly important in that theory' (Sen, 1992: 12). 
4 The original position developed by John Rawls in Theory of Justice and related works [e.g. Justice 
as Fairness: A Restatement] is a clear example of a hypothetical situation where each party is 
symmetrically situated against each other. 'The situation', writes Rawls, 'is symmetrical and one 
choice is arbitrary as the other' (Rawls, 1999: 260). 
5 For a detailed presentation of various distributive specifications, see Mason (2006). 
6 	 For an elaborated analysis of the concepts, practices and goals of multicultural education from a 
perspective of philosophy of education, see M. Levinson (2009). 
At the same time, this specification offers us a way to evaluate the various examples used in the 
literature on citizenship education that were identified in the previous chapters of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN NON-IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
In the preceding chapter of the thesis I outlined and defended the egalitarian pluralist account 
of citizenship education and its commitment to the fair terms of engagement with diversity. I 
set out the principled basis of this alternative educational agenda of citizenship and advanced 
its basic civic aim, i.e. the education of citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity. In this chapter I extend the presentation of the alternative 
educational agenda of citizenship to discuss the implications of the egalitarian pluralist account 
of citizenship education for educational practice. In particular, I aim to specify how we are 
supposed to educate citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity in a non-ideal educational environment. As it turns out, this task is more 
complex as well as more problematic than envisaged by existing accounts of citizenship 
education. 
This chapter of the thesis has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it aims to identify the 
main implications of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education for the the non-
ideal circumstances of pedagogical practice characterized by a diverse range of richness, 
evenness and distance. In this respect, it aims to examine which pedagogical strategies are the 
most appropriate to fulfil the aim of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity. On the other hand, it advances an alternative 
account of what should be the primary object of the fair terms of engagement with diversity 
together with the related civic virtues and capacities that should be cultivated in students. The 
argument of this chapter proceeds as follows. 
Section I examines the contextual factors associated with the capacities, virtues and 
pedagogical strategies that are part of the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity. In order to advance an alternative set of capacities that are part of the 
project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity together with a specific civic virtue associated with the egalitarian 
pluralist account of citizenship education I separate three distinct elements that are part of our 
intuitive understanding of diversity, i.e. [i] the pre-institutional dimension; [ii] the institutional 
dimension; and [iii] the individual dimension. This threefold characterisation offers a clearer 
insight into the problems, challenges and difficulties associated with the project of educating 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity as 
both the cultivation and the exercise of basic civic virtues and capacities, I maintain, depend on 
how students view themselves and other members of a polity. Section II advances the notion of 
civic integrity as an alternative understanding of citizenship as a political conception of the 
person and the way in which the civic priorities and the individual interests in educating 
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citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity are to be justified. I then proceed in Section 
III with the elaboration of the two capacities that should be developed in students, i.e. the 
capacity for difference-sensitivity and the capacity for distance-sensitivity. Section IV outlines 
an integrity-respecting conception of toleration that should be developed in students as part of 
the project of educating students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity. The cultivation of an integrity-respecting conception of toleration aims to 
avoid the imposition of disproportionate costs on those individuals and social groups whose 
ethical environment might be incompatible or in tension with society's broader social 
arrangements, e.g. religious groups and other communities of conscience. In particular, it aims 
to avoid the unintended negative impact on the civic integrity of citizens including the reduction 
of privacy and self-respect since an extension of common principles and shared public values 
into other social spheres might at the same time involve an unjust imposition of civic 
obligations on those members of our political community whose values, beliefs and 
conceptions of the good depart from the common principles and shared public values of a 
plurally diverse polity. I then evaluate in section V the strategy of avoidance and the strategy of 
engagement as two of the classical strategies adopted by contemporary conceptions of 
citizenship education — including the autonomy-based and the toleration-based conception of 
citizenship education — against the strategy of equidistance I think is most consistent with the 
fair terms of engagement with diversity. I conclude this chapter with an exposition of the 
different possibilities the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education might perform in 
the education of citizens as fully cooperating members of a plurally diverse polity. 
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	1. 	 Difference-sensitivity: contextual factors 
The education of citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity in a non-ideal educational 
environment needs to promote a set of distinct capacities and virtues that would enable citizens 
to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. The articulation of 
the capacities and virtues that should be inculcated in students in order to realise this 
educational aim brings us back full circle to the original problem articulated at the outset of the 
thesis, i.e. the understanding of diversity itself. The relationship between these two problems is 
of crucial importance for any project of educating citizens as the very understanding of the 
nature of a particular form of diversity determines to a significant extent both the institutional 
and the individual dimension of engagement with diversity itself as well as the exercise of civic 
virtues and capacities that are part of the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity. In order to address adequately the educational significance of engagement 
with diversity for the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity, three separate dimensions associated with diversity need to 
be identified here, i.e. [i] the pre-institutional dimension; [ii] the institutional dimension; and 
[iii] the individual dimension. Let me examine each of them in turn. 
	
1.1 	 The pre-institutional dimension 
The pre-institutional dimension is concerned with the question of how a particular form of 
diversity is to be characterized, i.e. either [i] as a matter of chance; or [ii] as a matter of choice. 
Natural and social factors, e.g. race or sex would be identified as something that is part of one's 
circumstances whereas doctrinal diversity would be identified as being something that pertains 
to the area of choice. Yet, when we move to the direction of cultural or religious diversity 
things become more controversial. It is the difference over the nature of cultural diversity that 
is the most disputed one. On the one hand, advocates of liberal egalitarianism, e.g. Brian Barry 
maintain that cultural diversity isn't a matter of one's circumstance but is basically a matter of 
choice. On the other hand, advocates of the two multiculturalist views identified in Chapter 1 
emphasise that one's cultural membership is a matter of chance and can present itself as a 
justice-based claim for accommodation. In fact, cultural membership, as Will Kymlicka 
famously argues, provides the 'context of choice' (Kymlicka, 1995). 
At this level, the crucial distinction is over what can be identified as out of the 
volitional power of the individual and what counts as choice-based diversity. Scholars with 
different theoretical perspectives or otherwise diverse political orientations often disagree with 
one another about which parts of an individual's identity are to be designated to pertain to 
choice-based diversity, i.e. are basically freely chosen and which are to be designated as part of 
individuals' circumstances. For example, if we maintain that homosexuality is a form of 
diversity that is ascriptive, i.e. out of the volitional power of an individual, this would imply a 
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different attitude towards it compared to a stance that understands homosexuality as a choice-
based form of diversity. In each of these two cases, the other two dimensions develop a distinct 
institutional framework and attitudes towards it that determine the inclusion of and engagement 
with this particular form of diversity. However, things start to get even more complex when we 
turn to the institutional level addressing the distinction between the different origins of 
diversity. 
1.2 	 The institutional dimension 
At this level, the foundational question is how should the basic institutional framework of a 
plurally diverse polity including public education, deal with a particular form of diversity as it 
may be accompanied by different forms of inequality. The contrasting answers advanced by 
liberal egalitarian scholars, liberal pluralist scholars and multiculturalists make clear that this is 
among the most contested and controversial areas addressing public policy including the civic 
purposes of public education. Let me examine the three perspectives in order to identify the 
main sources of tension between them. 
The liberal egalitarian position stands firmly on its commitment to compensating 
individuals for any inequality that arises out of natural or social factors. On this view, 
compensating individuals for the brute luck that is out of their volitional power should be a 
matter of justice. For example, being born with a handicap should be compensated as far as 
possible at the institutional level. On the other hand, liberal egalitarian scholars leave any 
inequality that originates from one's choices to the individual or a group. On this view, there is 
no right-claim upon which individuals could advance claims based on justice. To illustrate: by 
joining an association which promotes a particular set of values or doctrinal beliefs we are free 
both to enter and to exit this association. 
Advocates of a liberal pluralist perspective take a somewhat different view of the divide 
between inequalities arising out of one's circumstances and out of one's choice. They maintain 
that as long as the basic institutional mechanisms advanced by liberalism, e.g. freedom of 
association and freedom of expression are in place, they provide a sufficient institutional 
mechanism to protect individuals against the majority. At the same time, they argue that the 
basic institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity has no obligation towards the 
accommodation of minority groups or the associative networks of the civil society. 
The multiculturalist perspective is characterized by claims for accommodation of those 
minority groups who turn out to be disadvantaged largely because of their circumstantial 
diversity. Nevertheless, a liberal multiculturalist perspective (Kymlicka, 1995; Raz, 1994) 
claims that there is no unconditional compensation in the form of minority rights or exemptions 
that would be granted without qualifications. As Will Kymlicka argues, minority rights should 
be granted to those ethnocultural minorities that do not restrict the rights of their members and 
can serve as external protection against the majority. On the other hand, there should be no 
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minority rights for those groups that limit the rights of their members [internal restrictions]. On 
this view, multiculturalists argue, the basic institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity 
should meet the claims for accommodation that are based on the cultural membership of 
ethnocultural minorities as these are part of an individual's or group's chance. 
At the institutional level, the three perspectives presented above are very different from 
one another in terms of what form of diversity or inequality counts as eligible for 
accommodation. Each of them claims some form of egalitarianism as the basis of its institutional 
arrangement. The liberal egalitarian perspective is clear in its commitment to civic equality and 
its difference-sensitive character. It is inequalities that stem from one's circumstances that are 
to be compensated for. In contrast, the liberal pluralist perspective makes freedom of 
association and freedom of expression the central building blocks to protect individuals against 
the majority. The basic institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity, including public 
education, has to balance between the compensation for unchosen diversity that is a matter of 
one's circumstance and the toleration of diversity that is a matter of choice. As William 
Galston emphasises, 'liberalism is about the protection of diversity, not the valorization of 
choice' (Galston, 1995a: 523). Alternatively, the multiculturalist perspective argues that 
cultural membership is part of one's choice and because of its importance as the 'context of 
choice' any inequality stemming from this source should be compensated for. So, what are the 
implications of the institutional level for the individual dimension associated with difference-
sensitivity? I examine a concrete specification of the basic capacities required of citizens as 
free and equal members of a polity in the next section below. 
1.3 	 The individual dimension 
The basic question arising at this level concerns what virtues, capacities and dispositions should 
be developed in students given the vast range of diversity and inequalities that exist in our 
societies. We can begin to address this issue by emphasising two very different approaches to 
this question. Each offers the framework to articulate the virtues and dispositions we should 
develop in students as well as to address the more detailed and controversial questions over the 
civic purposes of public education in a plurally diverse polity. The first approach offers what I 
shall call a simple view that is primarily concerned with the stability of a polity and the 
maintenance of its basic institutional framework. Both the functionalist approach and the 
compensatory perspective on citizenship education identified in Section I.1. and 1.2 of Chapter 
3 are part of this interpretation of the civic purposes of public education. They are primarily 
concerned with the stability of a polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional 
framework. On this view, the main features of citizenship education in public education are 
justified because a polity that is stable can respect the two basic commitments associated with 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. Whatever controversy arises, 
the commitment to civic equality and its protection of equal basic rights need to take 
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precedence. However, this particular way of justifying citizenship education opens the problem 
of priority.' This is the foundational problem both at the normative and the practical level for 
any conception of citizenship education that claims to be consistent with the liberal version of 
the rights-based conception of citizenship. Both the liberal egalitarian approach and the liberal 
pluralist approach on the one hand as well as the moderate and the critical multiculturalist view 
give priority to basic rights and fundamental freedoms. It is the tension between different 
rights, their implementation [depending on the sphere where they should be applied, e.g. just 
the civic and the public sphere or also in the family and the associative network of civil 
society] and the interpretation of their effect that make the problem of priority the fundamental 
theoretical, normative and practical problem of balancing the commitment to civic equality 
with the equal civic respect for diversity. However, the simple view is unidimensional as it 
aims primarily to address the civic dimension, i.e. whatever results from the view of the polity. 
Moreover, under the simple view, the inclusion of and engagement with diversity is supposedly 
strengthened and enhanced with the development of civic virtues and capacities. 
The second approach presents a somewhat different perspective. I shall call this 
approach to citizenship education the complex view of the civic purposes of public education. 
In contrast to the simple view, the complex view is concerned with both the civic dimension 
and with the individual dimension. The latter dimension needs to be distinguished along two 
separate elements, i.e. [i] the distributive view; and [ii] the perspectival view. The distributive 
view is concerned with the distribution of the duties and obligations of shared membership 
between citizens in a plurally diverse polity. On the other hand, the perspectival view is 
concerned with how citizens view each other as members of a polity. 
Given the fact that choice has such an important function in the constitution of one's 
commitments, the capacities and dispositions that enable choice need to be cultivated in 
students. While the capacities for critical reflection, reflective distance and imaginative 
engagement contribute to a significant extent in making choices meaningful, each of them has 
its own shortcoming associated with the fair terms of engagement with diversity and could turn 
out to be inconsistent with the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity. So, a conception of citizenship education needs 
to be difference-sensitive as well as to express a specific model of toleration for those forms of 
diversity that are a matter of choice, i.e. endorsed freely. But, crucially, there is a need to 
articulate a particular element of citizenship as a political conception of the person that is 
closely associated with choice-based forms of diversity. At the same time, there is a need to 
develop an adequate answer to the question about the capacities and virtues that should be 
developed in citizens as free and equal members of a polity. In order to identify the capacities 
and the virtues associated with the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I defend here 
and that are to be examined in Section III and Section IV of this chapter, I turn now to the 
articulation of civic integrity as a specific element of citizenship as a political conception of the 
person and turn then to the capacities and virtues associated with it. 
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II. 	 Civic integrity 
Alongside citizenship, responsibility, virtue and community, the concept of integrity is part of 
the conceptual toolbox that traditionally has not been associated with liberalism. Nevertheless, 
over the last two decades, scholars with a broadly liberal outlook have advanced arguments 
that virtue (Galston, 1991; Macedo, 1990), community (Kymlicka, 1989) and responsibility 
(Dworkin, 1986; Scheffler, 2005) need to be incorporated into the liberal version of the rights-
based conception of citizenship. Here I argue that integrity needs to be part of the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship as some scholars broadly identified as 
liberals have already emphasised (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Mendus, 2009; Philp, 1999, 
2007; Scheffler, 2003 [1982]). All citizens, writes Stuart White, 'have basic integrity interests 
[...] and the common institutions that govern their life together in a fundamental way must 
respect these interests and protect individual citizens against their violation' (White, 2003: 32). 
An understanding of the relationship between integrity and citizenship in modern democratic 
states, Mark Philp emphasises, 'requires a clearer sense both of the demands of citizenship and 
of the contexts in which those demands become salient for individuals' (Philp, 1999: 21). A 
conception of integrity that should be part of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship 
education is to be labelled as civic integrity. 
II. 1 	 Key features of civic integrity 
Integrity needs to be differentiated along two separate dimensions, i.e. [i] the completeness 
dimension; and [ii] the equilibrium dimension. The completeness dimension presents civic 
integrity as a willingness to stand by one's most fundamental moral commitments, i.e. as a 
consistency of character. As Bernard Williams aptly emphasises, 'one who displays integrity 
acts from those dispositions and motives which are most deeply his, and has the virtues that 
enable him to do that' (Williams, 1981: 49). In this sense, integrity is a capacity to act 
according to one's fundamental commitments in the face of other competing, values, beliefs and 
conceptions of the good. On this interpretation, a life of integrity, writes Eamonn Callan, 'must 
exhibit some inner consistency or unity' (Callan, 1997: 64). On this interpretation, someone 
who performs an act that would qualify as positive but acts out of fear or for opportunistic 
reasons is not acting with civic integrity. For example, if one donates money to a charity 
exclusively as means to raise his or her public profile or if one defends a particular cause, e.g. 
equal rights for same-sex couples for selfish reasons, he or she is not acting with civic 
integrity. Moreover, as Mark Philp rightly points out 'the consistency of the agent's 
commitments and conduct' (Philp, 1999: 22) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an 
act to qualify as an act carried out with integrity. Furthermore, neither can an act qualify as an 
act of integrity 'by her conformity with the formal requirements of her roles' (ibid.: 23). To act 
with integrity concerns choices which are influenced by an individual's values, beliefs or ends. 
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At the same time, the equilibrium dimension presents integrity as a capacity to perform an 
action according to the competing demands associated with a particular social role or a set of 
roles one is associated with. On this interpretation, acting with integrity requires a reflective 
process by weighing up different principled commitments someone takes as one's own. 
Yet, I maintain, the two dimensions identified above are not sufficient for a conception 
of civic integrity that would be consistent with the project of educating citizens so as to 
recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. Civic integrity needs 
to take into consideration another crucial aspect of fair cooperation between members of a 
polity. To act with civic integrity and to respect the civic integrity of other members of one's 
political community presupposes, I maintain, that one acts in accordance with the respect and 
recognition of one another as free and equal members of a polity. Its central objective is to 
square individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances with the recognition of one another as 
free and equal members of a polity. This distinctive interpretation of integrity that I label civic 
integrity should be a crucial aspect in any project of educating citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity that is consistent with the two normative commitments associated with the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. 
11.2. 	 The conditions for civic integrity 
The justification of civic integrity needs to comply with two basic requirements that should 
guide its implementation at the level of everyday pedagogical practice. The two requirements 
primarily offer a normative framework that can be used to evaulate education policy and 
pedagogical practice in non-ideal circumstances to fulfil the aim of educating citizens so as to 
recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. The justification of 
the two capacities that form an integral part of the virtue of civic integrity within the principled 
basis of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education identified in Section III of 
Chapter 5 has to take into account two basic requirements that should guide their 
implementation at the practical level, i.e. [i] the requirement of balance; and [ii] the requirement 
of coherence. Let me clarify the two requirements below. 
11.2.1 The requirement of balance 
Under the circumstances of diversity, the requirement of balance envisages that different 
interpretations of a particular controversy not only assess various cases arising out of a conflict 
or disagreement differently, but largely on the basis of what kind of conflict is actually being 
addressed. For example, in the controversies over the wearing of the hijab in schools or the 
more recent 'cartoon controversy' over the publication of drawings of the Prophet Mohammad 
in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten various possible justifications and different 
interpretations can be identified. In the case of wearing of the hijab various claims have been 
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raised by both advocates of its permission in the public sphere as well as the critics of its place 
in the public sphere. On a conception of the fair terms of engagement with diversity that claims 
to be consistent with the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity, the publication of these cartoons wouldn't be 
banned but the different implications of its publication would need to be considered. Under 
non-ideal circumstances as delineated in section II of Chapter 4, the requirement of balance 
demands that those students that are — in one way or another — not part of the mainstream 
should not be disproportionately exposed themselves in comparison to all other groups and 
individuals present in a particular educational environment. In this respect, the requirement of 
balance is horizontal. 
11.2.2 The requirement of coherence 
Since it is logically possible to maximise the separate function associated with the educational 
significance of engagement with diversity in more than one dimension, there is a need for an 
understanding of the multiple aims and objectives that might be associated with the cultivation 
of civic integrity. Creating an educational environment where engagement with diversity is to 
realise the basic aim of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity, i.e. to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity takes more than acceptance of the 
maximisation of choice as the educational objective associated with engagement with diversity. 
The requirement of coherence primarily requires that the capacities and dispositions associated 
with the egalitarian pluralist approach are to be exercised in the direction of reducing the 
potential asymmetry between students' ethical background culture and the common principles 
and shared public values. The requirement of coherence, in contrast to the horizontal 
dimension of the requirement of balance, is vertical. In this sense, as an ideal, the cultivation of 
civic integrity requires — to paraphrase T.M. Scanlon — that we see other members of our polity 
as being as much entitled as we are to define the outlook of our polity. 
What capacities and dispositions, then, should be imparted in students so as to recognise 
and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity and yet not give up outrightly 
their diverse commitments, allegiances and conceptions of the good? Moreover, what virtues, 
capacities and dispositions should be part of civic integrity? These are the questions I address in 
the next two sections of this chapter. 
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III. 	 The capacities of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education 
The commitment of a plurally diverse polity to both civic equality and equal civic respect for 
diversity raises a number of difficulties in articulating a coherent account of educating citizens 
as fully cooperating members of a polity. As has been argued throughout the thesis, the two 
dominant conceptions of citizenship education, i.e. the autonomy-based conception of 
citizenship education and the toleration-based conception of citizenship education either fail to 
treat with equal civic respect the normative significance of individuals' diverse commitments 
and allegiances or misrepresent our commitment to civic equality. In this sense, both conceptions 
of citizenship education, I maintain, fail to educate citizens so as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity. This failure opens two separate challenges for 
any conception of citizenship education that claims to be consistent with the two normative 
commitments associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. 
On the one hand, how should citizens as free and equal justify to other members of a polity 
their basic commitments that stem from the exercise of their basic rights but turn out to be in 
contrast with common principles and shared public values [the challenge of civic integrity] ?3  
On the other hand, how should members of a polity view themselves as free and equal 
members of a polity [the challenge of civic equidistance]? 
The egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education and its capacity for civic 
integrity aims to inculcate in students two basic capacities that supplement the capacities and 
the contextual elements associated with the autonomy-based conception of citizenship 
education and the toleration-based conception of citizenship education, i.e. choice, reflexivity 
and imagination. The two capacities are [i] the capacity for difference-sensitivity; and [ii] the 
capacity for distance-sensitivity. Two characteristics are associated with these two capacities, 
one of application and other of implementation. First, these two capacities are non-
discriminatory, i.e. their exercise does not jeopardise either one's civic equality or an 
individual's cultural coherence. Second, the two capacities can be applied at various levels, so 
any version of the rights-based conception of citizenship would benefit from the development 
of these two capacities. I maintain that these two capacities are therefore most consistent with 
the commitment to the education of citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free 
and equal members of a polity. 
III. I The capacity for difference-sensitivity 
The capacity for difference-sensitivity stands in stark contrast to the engagement with diversity 
approach. In contrast to the capacities for critical reflection, reflective distance and imaginative 
engagement advocated by the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education, the 
cultivation and the exercise of the capacity for difference-sensitivity pays attention to 
individuals' commitments as well as taking into account the non-equivalence between those that 
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are exposed to diversity and those that expose themselves. In particular, the cultivation and the 
exercise of the capacity for difference-sensitivity pays attention both to the experience of 
exposing students to different values, beliefs and conceptions of the good as well as the 
experience where one exposes oneself to others. 
At one level, students should be encouraged to view diversity as stemming from two 
distinct sources, i.e. ascriptive and conscience-based. Two separate virtues should be cultivated. 
On the one hand, there is civic respect, i.e. respect that is based on Darwall's notion of 
`recognition respect'. On the other hand, the virtue that needs to be developed in students is 
toleration of both forms of diversity. Here there is toleration of the object of toleration and the 
respect of the right to exercise the capacity to form and revise one's conception of the good. 
Both elements are to be developed further in the next section of this chapter. At the same time, 
the mutual consistency of 'shaping diversity for civic purposes' (Macedo, 2000: 157) as a 
legitimate requirement of stability and civic unity and the accommodation of diversity should 
have a twofold aim. First, it should aim to introduce students to the diversity in their own 
society and educational environment with the benefits of critical engagement and 
understanding of other cultures and conceptions of the good. At the same time, it should aim at 
the preservation of their civic integrity together with the conditions necessary for their exercise 
of freedom of conscience. This capacity for difference-sensitivity should therefore enable the 
provision of an educational environment that encourages the cultivation of basic civic virtues as 
well as advocates the discouragement of activities, practices or values that fail to support 
common principles and shared public values of a plurally diverse polity or are in tension with 
society's broader social arrangements. The capacity for difference-sensitivity therefore opens a 
range of possibilities that are not taken into account either by the strategy of the autonomy-
based account of citizenship education which consists in the maximisation of choice or the 
strategy of the toleration-based account of citizenship education which consists in the overall 
maximisation of diversity. Its primary aim is to guarantee equal civic respect for diversity 
without jeopardizing the civic unity and the virtues associated with citizenship as free and 
equal membership in a polity. 
111.2 The capacity for distance-sensitivity 
The second capacity associated with the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education is 
that of distance-sensitivity. In contrast to the capacity for difference-sensitivity, the capacity 
for distance-sensitivity should help students grasp the two dimensions of distance among 
different conceptions of the good and other forms of doctrinal beliefs identified in section 
11.1.3 of Chapter 4, i.e. [i] divergence [vertical level]; and [ii] dissimilarity [horizontal level]. 
The main difficulty associated with the cultivation and the exercise of this capacity is primarily 
how to square the allegiance to common principles and shared public values with the different 
commitments and allegiances individuals as members of a polity endorse. As we can intuitively 
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imagine, various conceptions of the good are not symmetrically distributed in comparison with 
common principles and shared public values. The traditional model of the toleration-based 
approach to diversity is insensitive to the issue of distance of particular conceptions of the good 
as its conception of what is tolerable is based on a threshold of what is or what is not to be 
tolerated. In this respect, whatever falls outside of the tolerable does not qualify as eligible for 
either toleration or accommodation. In contrast, it is the task of the capacity for distance-
sensitivity to develop the sensitivity for both elements of distance, i.e. divergence [vertical 
level); and dissimilarity [horizontal level] beyond the traditional model of the toleration-based 
approach to diversity. Its justificatory foundation lies in the principle of non-interference that is 
based on a principled restraint towards diversity. So, the capacity for distance-sensitivity shares 
with the toleration-based approach to diversity the principled basis of restraint while departing 
significantly from it at two different levels. Both non-interference and the restraint that forms 
the principled basis of the capacity for distance-sensitivity are based on moral as well as 
epistemic grounds. At the moral level, the capacity for distance-sensitivity avoids the possible 
`shameful revelation' of one's diversity even if exposure of diversity is based on fairness. As 
Jonathan Wolff argues, insisting on fairness might undermine individuals' self respect and the 
respect other members of a polity grant to them (Wolff, 1998: 97-98). At the epistemic level, 
the capacity for distance-sensitivity offers both the one who exposes himself as well as those 
who are exposed to diversity an equal chance of engagement with diversity. The cultivation 
and the exercise of the capacity for distance-sensitivity therefore departs from the classical 
toleration-based approach to diversity both at the level of implementation and at the level of 
pedagogical practice. 
Moreover, the implementation of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship 
education depends on a number of different factors. At the normative and the conceptual level, 
the overall coherence of the alternative account of citizenship education requires that we do not 
undermine the balance between civic equality and equal civic respect for diversity. Neither the 
capacity for difference-sensitivity nor the capacity for distance-sensitivity we are to cultivate in 
students assume the maximisation of the accommodation of diversity on the one hand or giving 
outright priority to civic equality over other competing commitments on the other. To do 
otherwise, I maintain, would be either to undermine civic pluralism or to jeopardise the civic 
integrity of citizens as free and equal members of a polity. At the practical level, the capacity 
for difference-sensitivity and the capacity for distance-sensitivity contribute significantly to 
how citizens view themselves and other citizens as free and equal members of a political 
community. The implementation of the capacity for difference-sensitivity and the capacity for 
distance-sensitivity would potentially change how diversity is to be included in pedagogical 
practice in a number of respects. 
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111.3 The cultivation of the capacity for difference-sensitivity 
The considerations examined so far confirm that advancing civic integrity in students should be 
developed for both civic and individual interests. As a condition of civic equality, civic 
integrity and the related commitment to civic equality are best respected by the cultivation of 
the capacity for difference-sensitivity. Three distinct arguments arise here. 
First, students would learn to understand that the reasonable differences between them 
stem from two distinct sources. On the one hand, there are differences in one's circumstances 
that we cannot regulate or have any volitional power over. On the other hand, there are 
differences arising out of the choices we make or the values we hold. In this case, we can 
reasonably expect that any aspect of one's identity that is conscience-based could — in principle 
— be changed. 
Next, it is precisely because of diversity that may stem from ascriptive sources or 
choice-based commitments that there are different ways of accommodating diversity. This 
distributive specification has been overlooked by both the autonomy-based and the toleration-
based conceptions of citizenship education. It is therefore necessary that the alternative account 
of citizenship education I defend pays attention also to the distributive issues within a political 
community. So, the dilemma between redistribution and recognition is a false one as it leads to 
a reductionist understanding of one's identity and its educational significance. Making students 
more difference-sensitive means paying attention to this dimension as well. 
Ultimately, the inequalities that stem from individuals' circumstances can potentially 
undermine the civic equality element of the rights-based conception of citizenship. Either 
integrative or compensatory mechanisms granted to reduce the differences in people's unequal 
circumstances that might affect the exercise of their basic entitlements should be evaluated 
both from the civic interests and the individual interests point of view. It is therefore necessary 
for students to understand the principles and the institutional mechanisms that might exist, e.g. 
affirmative action, language rights as well as the justificatory foundations for the additional 
entitlements some groups or individuals might be entitled to. 
111.4 The cultivation of the capacity for distance-sensitivity 
As a description of the pluralism and diversity present in a plurally diverse polity, civic 
equality and the related commitment to equal civic respect for diversity would be best achieved 
by the cultivation of the capacity for distance-sensitivity. Two distinct arguments arise here. 
First, the implementation of the capacity for distance-sensitivity associated with the 
egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education is to make clear that there are different 
ways of exercising one's basic entitlements as well as different ways of being a 'good' citizen, 
i.e. a fully cooperating member of a polity. Indiscriminate promotion and development of 
certain virtues on the one hand, e.g. participation and a principled rejection of values and 
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beliefs that might be in tension with common principles and shared public values would lead to 
unnecessary tensions and possible conflicts in a plurally diverse polity. While the principles 
associated with civic equality do impose limits and constraints on social arrangements within a 
plurally diverse polity, to impose the principles of justice in the private sphere and in the 
sphere of the associative network of civil society, I maintain, is to misunderstand the aims and 
purposes of associative and expressive liberty as well as their very nature. One way of 
understanding civic pluralism, as the advocates of toleration-based liberalism argue, is that the 
basic principles and shared public values of the basic institutional framework of a plurally 
diverse polity should not be used as an overall metric by which to evaluate other social spheres. 
Second, more than just enabling students to be exposed to the diverse ways of being a 
`good' citizen or the diversity of the possible ways of exercising one's basic rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education enables 
students to have an insight into the different choices individuals may have available or the 
different circumstances they might experience. In this sense, the promise of the egalitarian 
pluralist account of citizenship education is twofold. On the one hand, it supports exposure of 
diversity without the risk of 'shameful revelation', i.e. the exposure of diversity under 
conditions that are not difference-sensitive and therefore it does not create the risk of 
jeopardizing civic integrity. On the other hand, it recognises the different ways of exercising 
one's basic rights that would be consistent with the project of educating citizens so as to 
recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
The two capacities advanced here need to be contrasted with the three basic capacities 
for engagement with diversity examined in section V of Chapter 4 in two important respects. 
First, the prevalent goal of critical reflection, reflective distance and imaginative engagement is 
to evaluate the content of a particular set of actions, practices and conceptions of the good that 
are plural and heterogeneous. In contrast, the capacities associated with the alternative 
educational agenda of citizenship require that we see each and every member of a polity as 
equally entitled to both civic equality and equal civic respect of diversity. In this sense, the 
capacity for difference-sensitivity and the capacity for distance-sensitivity associated with the 
egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education I defend here open the way for the 
cultivation of a specific virtue that would enable students to recognise and respect one another 
as free and equal members of a polity. I turn now to the elaboration of an alternative 
conception of toleration that should be up to this task. 
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IV. 	 The integrity-respecting conception of toleration 
As has been emphasised in section IV of Chapter 2, neither the traditional toleration-based 
approach to diversity nor mutual respect and recognition offer a sufficiently elaborated 
approach that could address adequately the pluralism of diversity present in our societies. In 
fact, each of these approaches to diversity suffers from a range of normative problems and 
practical difficulties that seriously hamper the project of educating citizens so as to recognise 
and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity in a number of separate respects. 
This leads towards their inconsistency with the two principled commitments associated with 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. At the same time, they are 
likely to end up with outcomes that will either conflict with justice-based claims over the 
education of students that are the least advantaged or contribute to the maintenance of 
inequality in those groups and communities that are — in one way or another — not part of the 
mainstream. What civic virtue should we therefore cultivate in students so as to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity? 
Given the two capacities identified in the previous section of this chapter [the capacity 
of difference-sensitivity and the capacity for distance-sensitivity] I argue that the most adequate 
civic virtue for educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity is an alternative 
conception of toleration , i.e. the integrity-respecting conception of toleration. In contrast to the 
existing approaches to diversity, the integrity-respecting conception of toleration imposes a 
requirement to recognise and respect the exercise of those actions, practices and conceptions of 
the good that qualify as legitimate objects of engagement with diversity. 
In contrast to the traditional toleration-based approach to diversity together with the 
conception of mutual respect advanced by the advocates of autonomy-based liberalism and the 
conception of recognition defended by multiculturalist scholars, the integrity-respecting 
conception of toleration is characterized by two separate requirements that none of the three 
approaches identified earlier share in one place. It, first, recognises the reciprocal nature of 
toleration for the two agents of toleration. In this sense, the integrity-respecting conception of 
toleration recognises and respects the very exercise of the capacity for civic integrity and is 
binding both for the tolerating agent as well as for the tolerated agent. In fact, as Samuel 
Scheffler interestingly points out, 
[...] if, as I have been arguing, the injuries inflicted by intolerance on its victims are closely 
related to the temptations of intolerance for its perpetrators, then it seems to follow that, just as 
intolerance threatens the integrity of its victims, so too the perpetrators of intolerance may 
perceive a willingness to tolerate others as a threat to their own integrity. In other words, the 
threat that intolerance poses to the integrity of its victims may be mirrored by the threat that 
tolerance poses to the integrity of the perpetrators. (Scheffler, 2010: 327-328) 
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At the same time, the integrity-respecting conception of toleration shares with the toleration-
based approach to diversity the normative dependency on the nature of the tolerated object 
(Forst, 2007). Tolerating violence or being intolerant of cultural diversity are clear examples of 
the dependency of a toleration-based approach to diversity on a more fundamental requirement. 
On this interpretation, the integrity-respecting conception of toleration is a priori neither 
positive nor negative. The exercise of an integrity-respecting conception of toleration would 
therefore require of students first to be sensitive to the different forms of diversity as well as 
their possible distance or dissimilarity from common principles and shared public values of a 
plurally diverse polity. The alternative conception of toleration I advance here would qualify as 
a virtue only by being consistent with these two separate requirements. As a virtue that should 
be developed in students, the integrity-respecting conception of toleration therefore contributes 
to the recognition and respect of each and every citizen as a free and equal member of a polity. 
In this sense, it is egalitarian by recognising the equal civic respect of individuals' diverse 
commitments and allegiances providing they qualify as being consistent with the principle of 
non-interference. At the same time, its sensibility towards the distributive specifications of the 
fair terms of engagement with diversity together with the difficulties of educating citizens so as 
to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity in non-ideal 
circumstances confirm its compatibility with a pluralist understanding of the education of 
citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. 
After discussing the normative nature of the alternative conception of toleration I 
advance and defend here, there is a practical pedagogical question that needs to be answered as 
well. As Stephen Macedo firmly points out, 'how can tolerance be taught without exposing 
children to diversity and asking them to forbear from asserting the truth of their own particular 
convictions [...]' (Macedo, 1995b: 471). I turn to these difficulties in the next — and final —
section of this chapter. 
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V. 	 Avoidance, engagement and equidistance 
As has been emphasised in section I and section II of Chapter 4, engagement with diversity can 
take place at different levels, through different contexts (classroom, textbooks), via different 
strategies and different educational policies. At the practical level, accounts of liberal 
citizenship education include two different strategies, i.e. [i] the strategy of avoidance [liberal 
silence]; and 
	 the strategy of engagement [critical imaginative engagement with diverse 
values, beliefs or conceptions of the good in a given cultural and social framework]. Despite 
the fact that their implementation originates in the area of the teaching of controversial issues 
(e.g. Hand, 2007, 2008), they have become two of the most commonly used pedagogical 
strategies to deal with issues that are part of the citizenship education discussion. 
We can proceed now with an evaluation of the strategy of avoidance and the strategy of 
engagement as two classic strategies adopted by liberal conceptions of citizenship education —
including the autonomy-based and the toleration-based conception of citizenship education —
against the strategy of equidistance that I claim is the centrepiece of the pedagogical 
implications of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education defended in this thesis. 
A clear example of political liberalism's strategy of avoidance is 'liberal silence', i.e. 
the avoidance of any explicit or open examination of a burdensome moral issue. Arguments for 
advocating this strategy are based either on neutralist or minimalist grounds. The first view 
claims that schools should be neutral among conceptions of the good life in order to respect the 
capacity of students for engagement with diversity [identified in section IV of Chapter 4]. In 
contrast, advocates of the minimalist view maintain that an open examination of controversial 
issues should be minimised. On this view, the main outcome of this strategy is the avoidance of 
any explicit or open examination of a burdensome and controversial issue, e.g. homosexuality, 
same-sex marriage, euthanasia etc. As some critics have argued, 'liberal silence' cannot have 
neutral effects as it is likely to disfavour non-dominant minority groups, whose perspectives, 
beliefs or values may have contributed to the understanding of a particular moral issue. 
On the other hand, the advocates of the strategy of engagement argue that introducing 
citizens to the diversity in their own society and the critical imaginative engagement with 
diverse values, beliefs or conceptions of the good in a given cultural and social framework is 
important in the development of childrens' moral competence since it challenges their set of 
values and has an important interaction effect that contributes significantly to respect those 
members of their political community who can differ from them in matters of ethnicity, race, 
religion, etc. This approach was examined in detail in Section IV.3 of Chapter 4. On this 
interpretation, the strategy of engagement's basic aim is the avoidance of stereotyping as well 
as the possible development of prejudice against those students that are not — in one way or 
another — part of the mainstream. Yet, this anti-discriminatory and emancipatory purpose has 
proven to be inadequate as it may turn out to be both inegalitarian and failing to treat with 
equal respect those conceptions of the good that might be incompatible or in tension with 
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society's broader social arrangements. The requirement that some issues and controversies 
should not be included or discussed on equal terms applies only to those values, practices or 
conceptions of the good that are in tension or otherwise incompatible with common principles 
and shared public values of a plurally diverse polity. 
The strategy of engagement consists in the 'imaginative engagement' approach. I 
maintain that imaginative engagement with others' ethical background culture might turn out to 
be unfairly coercive on citizens who hold views or beliefs that depart from common principles 
and shared public values that are consistent with both civic equality and equal civic respect for 
diversity. The involvement with issues and controversies that are largely part of the private life 
or life within the associative network of civil society is primarily aimed at the cultivation of 
engagement with views one might disagree with or find wrong. I maintain that this progressive 
move towards a more egalitarian society might have an unintended negative impact on its 
citizens, as for example the reduction of self-respect and of personal integrity, since an 
extension of shared public values into the private sphere and the associational network of the 
sphere of civil society could at the same time involve an unjust imposition of civic duties, 
obligations and responsibilities of citizenship in all social spheres of a plurally diverse polity. 
In contrast to the two strategies I advance the strategy of equidistance. 
These two strategies deal only with 'how' to engage with a particular disputed issue 
without examining the different contextual elements as well as the issues associated with 
privacy and personal integrity. It is at this stage that the strategy of equidistance needs to be 
considered as a serious contender to the two existing approaches traditionally associated with 
existing conceptions of citizenship education. 
The strategy of equidistance is primarily concerned with the cultivation of the integrity-
respecting conception of toleration. Its integrity respecting commitment makes it more widely 
acceptable as the two predominant pedagogical strategies advocated by existing conceptions of 
citizenship education lead to a range of counterintuitive results. While there may not be 
significantly different outcomes between the strategy of equidistance and the approaches 
advocated by existing conceptions of citizenship education, its difference and distance-
sensitivity is more consistent with the aim of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect 
one another as free and equal members of a polity. Nevertheless, the strategy of equidistance is 
neither uncontroversial, more inclusive nor equally accommodating of all actions, practices and 
conceptions of the good. 
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VI. 	 Conclusion 
As has been emphasised in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of the thesis, the egalitarian pluralist 
account of citizenship education and its project of educating citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity is characterized by two interrelated features, i.e. [i] the education of 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity; and 
[ii] the fair terms of engagement with diversity. The alternative account of citizenship 
education explicated above aims at a distinctive educational agenda of citizenship that is 
characterized by two separate aims. First is how citizens as free and equal members of a polity 
view one another. On the one hand, they view one another according to the ideal of civic 
integrity. On the other hand, they view themselves according to the ideal of civic pluralism, i.e. 
of exercising their basic rights and fundamental freedoms in a variety of different ways. 
Second is the development of the capacities associated with the liberal version of the rights-
based conception of citizenship since inclusion of and engagement with diversity are not 
coextensive with recognition and respect of one another as free and equal members of a polity. 
In this sense, I maintain, the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education gives citizens 
with diverse reasonable conceptions of the good an equal protection of their basic civic interest 
in being recognised and respected as free and equal members of a polity. There are two related 
justifications for the alternative educational agenda of citizenship and its fair terms of 
engagement with diversity I develop here, i.e. [i] the justification on the basis of civic interests; 
and [ii] the justification on the basis of individual interests. The first form of justification is 
rooted in the civic interests of the political community, the other rooted in the civic, moral and 
epistemic interests of its members. I turn now to the elaboration of the final justification of the 
egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education. 
The public interest in educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity is a 
sine qua non of any political community and its basic institutional framework. The stability of 
a polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework are facilitated in an important 
respect by the exercise of civic virtues and other capacities of its members. In this sense, the 
development of the capacity for difference-sensitivity and the capacity for distance-sensitivity 
that are part of an alternative educational agenda of citizenship developed above and the 
exercise of the basic civic virtues in students should have an effect of educating citizens as 
fully cooperating members of a polity. In this sense, having a polity of citizens that exercise the 
basic civic virtues together with other capacities and dispositions associated with their status of 
free and equal members of a polity contributes decisively to the stability of a plurally diverse 
polity and the maintenance of its basic institutional framework. 
The cultivation and the exercise of the capacities and dispositions associated with the 
egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education should, in principle, be in the interest of 
every citizen as a fully cooperating member of a plurally diverse polity. Two closely related 
arguments can be identified here, i.e. [i] the moral argument; and [ii] the epistemic argument. 
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At the moral level, each of the two capacities enables citizens to see themselves and others as 
free and equal members of a polity. In this sense, both the capacity for difference-sensitivity 
and the capacity for distance-sensitivity enable individuals to face the diversity of their 
political community and to develop a reflective and respectful relationship with other members 
of a polity. At the epistemic level, being sensitive to the pluralism of diversity enables one to 
have a more complex understanding of different social factors associated with a particular form 
of diversity as well as the choices and options available in a particular non-ideal educational 
environment. The exercise of the two capacities advanced by the egalitarian pluralist account 
of citizenship education, then, consists to a large degree in the ability to evaluate one's 
commitments against common principles and shared public values of a plurally diverse polity 
as well as not to jeopardise the civic integrity of other members of a polity. I maintain that the 
cultivation and exercise of the capacity for difference-sensitivity and the capacity for distance-
sensitivity is a necessary element of any conception of citizenship that claims to be consistent 
with the aim of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal 
members of a polity. These two capacities should not replace the basic capacities associated 
with engagement with diversity that have been examined in Section V of Chapter 4. Instead, 
they should be viewed as a supplementary set of capacities that would enable students both to 
experience diversity in all its complexity as well as to enable those students that expose 
themselves to avoid any possible violation of their civic integrity. 
In this respect, I maintain, the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education and 
its conception of the fair terms of engagement with diversity gives citizens with diverse values, 
beliefs and conceptions of the good an equal protection of their basic interest in being 
recognised and respected as free and equal members of a polity. 
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Notes 
Similarly, Ian MacMullen argues in his book Faith in Schools (2007) that the 'principle of political 
primacy' is among the basic problems any liberal conception of citizenship education needs to 
tackle [Chapter 2]. 
In their book Democracy and Disagreement (1996) Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 
associate the demonstration and exercise of civic integrity from citizens and officials with three 
separate elements, i.e. [i] consistency with speech; [ii] consistency between speech and action; and 
[iii] integrity of principle (pp. 81-82). 
For a futher refinement of the Rawlsian conception of reasonableness of a particular form of 
diversity, see Kelly & McPherson, 2001; Quong, 2004. 
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CONCLUSION 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND THE LIMITS 
OF IDEAL THEORY 
This thesis defends a particular conception of citizenship education that puts engagement with 
diversity at the centre stage of the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of 
a polity. It offers a distinctive response to the problems, challenges and difficulties linked to 
the justification of the centrality of educating students so as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity. In particular, it argues that the question over the 
latitude of accommodation of diversity that divides the autonomy-based and the toleration-
based accounts of citizenship education was a wrongly posed question as it fails to identify the 
theoretical problems and practical difficulties associated with the education of students as fully 
cooperating members of a polity. As I argued at the outset of the thesis, the difficulty in 
reconciling our commitment to civic equality with the demands for toleration, respect and 
recognition of diversity do not stem primarily from the calibration of the balance between civic 
equality and equal civic respect for diversity but largely spring from our understanding of 
diversity itself. As has been emphasised throughout the thesis, the insensitivity of existing 
accounts of citizenship education to the distributive specification and the agent-relative 
specification of engagement with diversity has resulted in a reductionist understanding of the 
educational significance of engagement with diversity and an inadequate justification of the 
status, scope and justification of citizenship education in a plurally diverse polity. 
The lack of adequate answers to these challenges opened the way for an alternative 
account of citizenship education. The egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education I 
articulated advances a conception of the fair terms of engagement with diversity based on the 
educational ideal of openness to diversity that would be of the greatest benefit to those students 
that are the least advantaged. In fact, any approach to citizenship education that does not situate 
the claims of the worst off as central, I maintain, is actually failing to educate citizens so as to 
recognise and respect each other as free and equal citizens, even if it pays lip-service to this 
aim. Questions about the educational significance of engagement with diversity, I argue, have a 
broader impact than the one on pedagogical practice alone due to the centrality of engagement 
with diversity in the project of educating students so as to recognise and respect one another as 
free and equal members of a polity. In this way, engagement with forms of diversity that are 
plural and heterogeneous has implications not only for the institutional arrangement and 
curriculum design of public education but plays a central role in the understanding of the 
relationship between the two principled commitments associated with the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship. In what follows, I first recapitulate the main points 
made in the preceding chapters of the thesis and then advance some possible objections against 
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the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I outline and defend in this thesis. 
The difficulty in conceptualizing citizenship as a political conception of the person, as I 
emphasised in Chapter 1, originates from its complexity and controversiality as any of its 
existing conceptions entail several distinct and interrelated meanings. While both the expansion 
of membership and the expansion of entitlement associated with the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship have resulted in a more just and inclusive polity and in 
an egalitarian status of civic equality, its critics forcefully argue that this conception of 
citizenship is either too permissive and inefficient on the one hand or too divisive, unfairly 
discriminatory and oppressive on the other. While both of these criticisms and the related 
objections against the integrative and the redistributive character of our commitment to civic 
equality rightly diagnose the foundational tension any conception of citizenship as free and 
equal membership in a polity is faced with, both projects explicated above fail to grasp the 
complexity of the problem at hand. Neither the traditional nor the contemporary critics of the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship succeed in offering a conception of 
civic equality that would be consistent with the fair terms of engagement with diversity. The 
difference between various conceptions of citizenship, then, is not just a matter of the latitude 
and the distribution of entitlements associated with citizenship as a political conception of the 
person. Rather, the essential difference turns on the understanding of civic equality itself. 
Chapter 2 provided both a clarification and a defense of the foundations, nature and the 
value of a toleration-based approach to diversity since there is hardly any concept in 
contemporary political thought that is more complex and controversial than that of toleration. 
The persistence of the moral and conceptual objections to toleration confirms that toleration 
remains an elusive virtue, an ambiguous principle and a contested concept. Despite the fact that 
the traditional conception of toleration might not be the best option available it is — other things 
being equal — the one with the least negative consequences compared to other approaches to 
diversity advocated by the critics of the toleration-based approach to diversity, e.g. mutual 
respect and recognition. In order to advance an alternative conception of toleration, I first 
outlined the circumstances and the possibility conditions of toleration and then examined in 
detail the moral and the conceptual objections to toleration. 
As I argued at length in Chapter 3 of the thesis, existing conceptions of citizenship 
education ignore a number of important considerations about the civic purposes of public 
education in a plurally diverse polity. In particular, they rely on implausible assumptions about 
engagement with diversity, incorporate a simplistic view of its educational significance and fail 
to consider the centrality of the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one 
another as free and equal members of a polity. On the one hand, the requirement of maximal 
congruence advanced by the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education fails to treat 
with equal civic respect individuals' diverse commitments, values, beliefs and allegiances. In 
this sense, the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education might advance 
requirements and constraints on the exercise of basic rights and fundamental liberties that 
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could impose unfair burdens and obligations on those students who are — in one way or another 
— not part of the mainstream. Among other problems, the failure of the autonomy-based 
conception of citizenship education to pay equal civic respect to these students raises the 
challenge of their possible alienation and sense of disempowerment. On the other hand, the 
requirement of minimal congruence advanced by the toleration-based conception of citizenship 
education misrepresents our commitment to common principles and shared public values since a 
maximally expansive policy of accommodating diversity defended by its advocates turns out to 
be problematic for a range of separate issues associated with the exercise of civic equality. In 
this respect, each of the two prevailing conceptions of citizenship education that have been 
examined, I maintain, fail to address adequately the various problems, challenges and tensions 
any educational agenda of citizenship in a plurally diverse polity is faced with. 
Although there are many features that distinguish autonomy-based and toleration-based 
accounts of citizenship education, their agreement on engagement with diversity as a central 
feature of citizenship education is in itself interesting, given the centrality of justification of 
educating students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a 
polity in the project of the education of citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. The 
arguments for engagement with diversity have been used by both liberal and multiculturalist 
scholars to advance the idea of making classrooms and other educational settings more diverse 
in terms of ethnic, cultural, religious and socio-economic background and therefore enabling 
students to learn from one another about their different beliefs, values, languages and 
traditions. In contrast to our intuitive understanding of the educational significance of 
engagement with forms of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous, the cultivation and the 
exercise of the capacities for engagement with diversity that should be a constitutive part of 
any educational agenda of citizenship can have a number of potential shortcomings and is 
likely to face a number of difficulties in a non-ideal educational environment. In particular, the 
failure of existing conceptions of citizenship education to differentiate between exposure to 
diversity and exposure of diversity, to identify the basic functions of engagement with diversity 
as well as to examine the basic features of the non-ideal circumstances of any educational 
environment in terms of richness, evenness and distance has resulted in a reductionist 
understanding of the civic priorities and individual interests in educating citizens as fully 
cooperating members of a polity. 
For these and other reasons specified in Part II of the thesis these two dominating 
contemporary accounts of citizenship education fail in important respects to deliver a viable 
model of engagement with diversity that would be consistent with the overall aim of educating 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. In 
particular, choice, reflection and imagination as the three basic capacities for engagement with 
diversity associated with existing conceptions of citizenship education [elaborated in Section 
IV of Chapter 4] fail to articulate an educational agenda of citizenship that would educate 
citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity. More 
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specifically, I conclude that existing accounts of citizenship education are either inadequate or 
incomplete. For that purpose I articulated and defended in Part III of the thesis [including 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6] an alternative educational agenda of citizenship. 
A basic question, then, follows: how should we educate citizens as fully cooperating 
members of a polity given the shortcomings of existing accounts of citizenship education? I 
began Chapter 5 with a defense of an egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education that 
is based on a twofold interconnected commitment, i.e. [i] to educate citizens so as to recognise 
and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity; and [ii] to articulate the fair 
terms of engagement with diversity. This alternative educational agenda of citizenship attempts 
to connect two basic liberal ideals: a difference-sensitive commitment to civic equality and a 
pluralist understanding of cultural, social and political life including the associative sphere of 
civil society. Instead of an 'either-or' dilemma between civic equality and equal civic respect 
for diversity, the egalitarian pluralist conception of citizenship education advances a difference-
sensitive conception of civic equality that I label 'civic integrity'. I argue that this alternative 
account of citizenship education is theoretically viable and practically desirable. Nevertheless, 
defending the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education poses a twofold challenge 
ahead of us. On the one hand, to answer advocates of the autonomy-based conception of 
citizenship education that equal civic respect for diversity would not undermine civic equality. 
On the other hand, one should answer advocates of the toleration-based conception of 
citizenship education that civic equality does not downplay the commitment to equal civic 
respect for diversity. The egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education articulates the 
principled basis of the fair terms of engagement with diversity at the institutional level and the 
basic capacities together with the virtue of an integrity-respecting conception of toleration 
associated with the education of citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and 
equal members of a polity at the individual level. 
The egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education and its conception of the fair 
terms of engagement with diversity I articulated in this thesis are characterised by a set of 
distinctive features, i.e. [i] context-sensitivity characterising the non-ideal circumstances of any 
educational environment in terms of richness, evenness and distance; [ii] the pluralism of 
diversity that distinguishes between exposure to diversity and exposure of diversity; [iii] civic 
pluralism that accepts different possible ways of being a fully cooperating member of a polity; 
[iv] the various functions of engagement with diversity; [v] the distributive specifications of 
engagement with diversity; and [vi] the agent-relative specification of engagement with 
diversity. At the same time, the educational ideal of openness to diversity that is closely related 
to the civic, moral and the epistemic interests of students bears the mark that the alternative 
educational agenda of citizenship advanced in this thesis departs to a significant extent from 
existing accounts of citizenship education in putting engagement with diversity at the centre 
stage of its agenda. In particular, the justification of its basic educational aim, i.e. the education 
of citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a polity 
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builds on some basic fundamental ideas any conception of citizenship needs to pay particular 
attention to. In this respect, the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education and its 
conception of the fair terms of engagement with diversity offers a distinctive interpretation of 
the two normative commitments associated with the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship. 
Nevertheless, the alternative conception of citizenship education I have advanced in this 
thesis would certainly not be accepted as uncontroversial. Given the fact that the project of 
educating citizens so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a 
polity remains open to a range of possible interpretations, the educational agenda of citizenship 
outlined and defended in this thesis is bound to face several challenges. I assume that the 
objections to the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education can take as their target 
various elements of this alternative educational agenda of citizenship education and its 
commitment to the fair terms of engagement with diversity. In particular, both the advocates of 
toleration-based citizenship education and — perhaps even more forcefully — the advocates of 
the autonomy-based accounts of citizenship education [both primary targets of this thesis] 
might raise a number of objections against the status, scope and justification of this alternative 
conception of citizenship education. I envisage below some of the possible objections. 
The basic objection raised by some critics might be directed at the interpretation of the 
two competing educational agendas of citizenship I examine in this thesis, i.e. the autonomy-
based and the toleration-based accounts of citizenship education. In particular, the representation 
of the autonomy-based account of citizenship education as being too demanding on diversity 
could be interpreted as unfair given the fact that its various proponents do in fact recognise 
engagement with diversity as an important element of citizenship education. The depiction of 
the autonomy-based account of citizenship education advanced in this thesis is done exclusively 
to contrast the existing accounts of citizenship education and to emphasise the potential 
unexpected outcomes their implementation might have in the non-ideal educational environment 
characterised by differing degrees of richness, evenness and distance. In order to bring out the 
contrast between the different accounts of citizenship education, I have often referred to a 
certain 'ideal type' of an autonomy-based account of citizenship education. Where I have made 
such an approach sound as if it taking rather a heavy interventionist line this is to show what is 
possible within the autonomy-based approach, so as to bring out the different problems with it. 
I am therefore not denying that some theorists of an autonomy-based approach would be more 
moderate in their commitments. 
Moreover — and relatedly — some critics could argue that the interpretation of liberalism 
advanced in this thesis is likely to be reductionist. Given the fact that there are a number of 
possible positions within liberalism itself, only those authors or positions have been considered 
which help to clearly demarcate a specific problem, tension or challenge that a given principled 
commitment associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship is 
faced with. For this reason, for example, Brian Barry has been cited several times in Chapter 1 
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and elsewhere. This obviously does not imply that his own position is to be identified as most 
representative of liberalism. The use of his own position on a variety of issues associated with 
civic equality and the rights-based conception of citizenship in general is primarily intended to 
present in as clear a way as possible the basic problems different conceptions of civic equality 
have struggled with. The two objections examined so far are closely intertwined given the fact 
that contemporary conceptions of liberalism do in fact disagree over the different conceptions 
of its basic commitments and principles, i.e. civic equality and equal civic respect of diversity. 
Another objection could be oriented against the status of engagement with diversity in 
the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I defend in this thesis. Three closely related 
justifications defending the centrality of engagement with diversity can be advanced here, i.e. 
at the [i] theoretical level; [ii] policy level; and [iii] practical level. As has been emphasised 
throughout the thesis, diversity is at the very centre of classical as well as contemporary 
liberalism. In fact, both historically and conceptually, diversity has been the motivational 
impetus for policies, strategies and concepts that are identified as distinctively liberal, e.g. 
toleration. At the theoretical level, 'the fact of pluralism', as Rawls emphasises in Political 
Liberalism (1993), makes clear that diversity is in fact a central problem of liberalism and 
political philosophy in general. At the policy level, engagement with diversity has been 
identified recently as one of the basic aims of citizenship education (DfES, 2007) and other 
educational initiatives, e.g. OECD's project Educating Teachers for Diversity (presented in 
detail in OECD, 2010). In this respect, diversity is identified as a central issue associated with 
various challenges education is facing today. At the practical level, no educational environment 
is monocultural. Given the fact that any educational envirnonment is composed of students 
from a wide variety of backgrounds and conditions, issues related to diversity are likely to arise 
in a variety of separate cases. In this sense, the centrality engagement with diversity plays in 
the alternative educational agenda of citizenship education defended here does not presuppose 
that other aims of citizenship education would be supplanted or even suppressed. Quite the 
contrary, I maintain, should be the case: placing engagement with diversity at the centre stage 
of the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity is of crucial 
importance for other aims of citizenship education to function as a coherent project, e.g. 
maintaining and strengthening democratic institutions. 
The next objection is directed against the scope of the egalitarian pluralist account of 
citizenship education. The foundational question associated with this objection is primarily one 
of outright necessity: why does an alternative account of citizenship education need to be 
articulated? As I have argued throughout the thesis the two predominant conceptions of 
citizenship education misrepresent our commitment to civic equality on the one hand or fail to 
treat with equal civic respect individuals' diverse commitments and allegiances on the other. 
Their insensitivity to the pluralism of diversity and the complexity of engagement with forms 
of diversity that are plural and heterogeneous opened the possibility for an alternative account 
of citizenship education that would take into consideration both the distributive specification of 
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engagement with diversity as well as the agent-relative specification of engagement with 
diversity. Furthermore, a distinctive feature of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship 
education consists in the claim that engagement with diversity affects the interests of different 
students differently. A liberal educational agenda of citizenship education that claims to 
educate students so as to recognise and respect one another as free and equal members of a 
polity, I maintain, needs to take into account these two specifications in order to articulate the 
fair terms of engagement with diversity. This is a significant departure from existing educational 
agendas of citizenship. 
The fifth objection to the account of citizenship education I advance here is one of 
coherence. The critics of the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education could raise 
an objection as to why the egalitarian pluralist position is not either an exclusively egalitarian 
position that defends the strong role of government in pressing for the civic purposes of public 
education or exclusively pluralist, i.e. allowing and protecting diversity that is consistent with 
the exercise of basic rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens as free and equal members of 
a polity. The foundational question associated with this objection to the egalitarian pluralist 
account of citizenship education can be formulated as follows: how can this alternative position 
retain its basic commitment to a broadly egalitarian outlook and be consistent with the pluralist 
formula, i.e. of not interfering with individuals' exercise of expressive and associative liberty? 
The challenge, then, is to advance a theoretical account that is coherent. 
Against this coherence-related objection I advance a twofold response. On the one 
hand, existing conceptions of citizenship education are likely to end up either with a reduced 
amount of diversity in a polity, i.e. the autonomy-based conception of citizenship education, or 
with conflicting diversity, i.e. the toleration-based conception of citizenship education. Either 
of the two options could be acceptable with some reservations. In contrast, the egalitarian 
pluralist account of citizenship education I advance does emphasise that the civic integrity of 
all members of a polity counts equally. At the same time, civic pluralism should be equally 
important, as the diversity in the exercise of citizens' basic rights-based claims makes both the 
public sphere and its basic institutional framework and the associative network of civil society 
mutually supportive. In this sense, the egalitarian pluralist account would not be compromised 
either to the possible limitations of implementation that are associated with the autonomy-
based account of citizenship education, i.e. the spillover effect, or to the shortcomings that are 
associated with the toleration-based account of citizenship education, i.e. the reverse-spillover 
effect. By incorporating the Rawlsian difference principle in the distributive specification of 
engagement with diversity in the project of educating citizens as fully cooperating members of 
a polity along with a number of other characteristically liberal normative foundations, e.g. civic 
equality and toleration, the alternative educational agenda of citizenship I articulate in this 
thesis should be identified as a liberal conception of citizenship education along with existing 
accounts of citizenship education examined earlier. At the same time, the critical treatment of 
the autonomy-based and the toleration-based accounts of citizenship claims that existing 
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conceptions of citizenship education would need to be more sensitive to the various issues 
associated with engagement with diversity and its educational significance. 
A sixth possible objection that could be formulated is one of consistency. On this view, 
the egalitarian pluralist commitment to the development of the capacity for difference-sensitivity 
and the capacity for distance-sensitivity would not be consistent with the two normative 
commitments associated with the liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship. I 
claim that this objection is the weakest one as the two capacities advanced by the alternative 
educational agenda of citizenship I defend in this thesis are actually committed both to an equal 
distribution of the burdens and obligations of shared membership between members of a polity 
and to the equal civic respect for diversity. 
In the end, a civic republican objection against the alternative account of citizenship 
education I defend in this thesis could advance the claim that the focus on difference-
sensitivity cannot generate the civic unity and social cohesion necessary to maintain the basic 
institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity. In contrast, I argue, difference-sensitivity is 
not advanced as a principled defense of diversity in itself but primarily as to emphasise the 
variety of circumstances members of a polity encounter one another when sharing the ethical 
environment of a plurally diverse polity and its basic institutional framework. 
In this sense, I do not view the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education as 
the best possible solution to how to blend the egalitarian character associated citizenship as a 
political conception of the person with the pluralist nature of the public culture of a plurally 
diverse polity. Needless to say, the egalitarian pluralist account of citizenship education does 
not and cannot settle all the problems, challenges and tensions that are part of the project of 
educating citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity. My contention over its adequacy is 
modest and limited. I argue that the alternative account of citizenship education I advance in 
this thesis provides an adequately articulated conception of the fair terms of engagement with 
diversity. In that respect, I maintain, the project of educating citizens so as to recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal members of a polity provides a sufficiently elaborated 
basis for the education of citizens as fully cooperating members of a polity that is plural in its 
cultures, values and traditions. 
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